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Transaction‐specific investments are often required in marketing channels in order to improve channel efficiency. However, such investments often increase the risk of opportunistic behaviors being sparked off. This paper aims to analyze the role of partners' investments in specific assets and the development of relational norms as safeguarding mechanisms against opportunism.

Three hypotheses are developed in line with transaction cost economics and relational exchange theories. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 479 manufacturer‐distributor relationships in the food sector in Spain.

The paper finds that partner‐specific investments and relational norms are effective mechanisms against opportunism. However their efficacy differs depending on which opportunism (supplier's or distributor's) is to be avoided.

The paper focuses on two mechanisms, yet there are other safeguards that firms can employ.

The partner's investments in specific assets are an effective safeguard for suppliers as well as for distributors. Companies should aim for balanced investment in this field, as it is the optimum way in which to avoid opportunistic behavior. Relational norms have shown to be effective only for distributors.

The study adopts a bilateral approach analyzing the effects of the governance mechanisms on both supplier and distributor opportunism. The paper provides new evidence on the role of the partner's specific investments as a safeguard against opportunism. They do not directly act against opportunism, but they act as variables that moderate the causal relationship between the specific investments of the firm and the partner's opportunism.

This study aims to examine how contractual mechanisms, trust and ethical levels impact opportunism in marketing channel relationships between manufacturers and distributors. Because the type of interactions, short-term or transaction-based vs long-term or relation-based, may also affect the level of opportunism, the study includes two scenarios to assess the impact of interaction type.

Survey data from 145 distributors were collected with 69 being transaction-based and 75 being relation-based interactions.

The sole use for transaction-based and relation-based interactions is not a significant deterrent for opportunistic behavior by a distributor. Ethical level is negatively related to opportunism in transaction-based interactions, perhaps because of calculative commitment. Trust positively moderates the relationship between contractual enforcement and opportunism in transaction-based interactions. Under relation-based interactions, the opposite occurs as trust reduces contractual enforcement efforts, and thus, opportunism is reduced as well. Ethical level negatively moderates the relationship between contractual enforcement and opportunism in transactional and relational based interactions.

Researchers have called for a more holistic approach to better understand phenomena. This study addressed that call by being the first to include contracts, trust, ethical level and opportunism within the context of the transaction and relation-based interactions between a manufacturer and a distributor. Contractual enforcement is not a significant deterrent of opportunism for transactional or relational interactions. Trust is negatively related to opportunism only in transaction-based interactions; perhaps, the threshold for acting opportunistically may be lower because of the short-term nature of the interaction. The ethical level is negatively related to opportunism in transaction and relational interactions.

Rather than focussing on dyadic distributor–supplier relationships, this study aims to examine whether the difference in transaction-specific investments (TSIs) between rival suppliers in a supplier–distributor–supplier triad influences whether distributors expropriate or maintain their supplier’s TSIs.

Drawing on triadic data from 276 questionnaires that address both the supplier–distributor relationship and the rival supplier–distributor relationship, a moderated regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses.

Five out of six hypotheses are supported by the empirical test. The results show that the supplier’s TSIs increase the distributor’s opportunistic behaviour and reduce cooperation when the distributor perceives that the supplier’s TSIs are lower than those of a rival supplier. In contrast, when the distributor perceives that the supplier’s TSIs are higher than those of a competitor, the supplier’s TSIs do not improve cooperation and can shift the link between the supplier’s TSIs and the distributor’s opportunism from being positive to negative.

The findings have implications for the top managers of supplier firms embedded in distribution networks. This study suggests that the competitor’s TSIs can be regarded as an indicator of the supplier’s relationship with the distributor. By keeping an eye on their competitors’ TSIs, the top managers of suppliers can predict the likelihood of distributors’ opportunistic and cooperative behaviour and make efforts to improve their position by adjusting their own firm’s TSIs. Furthermore, this information can help suppliers decide on their investment strategies and maintain stable and healthy relationships.

This study 1) examines the effect of TSIs using a triadic framework and triadic data and demonstrates that how a distributor responds to a supplier’s TSIs, with either opportunism or cooperation, depends on the relative level of those TSIs in focal and competitive relationships; and 2) reveals the expropriation effects and restraint effects of TSIs by drawing on prospect theory. This finding indicates the dynamics of TSIs in a triadic relationship.

In mature global business-to-business (B2B) product markets, management of external sales channels, governed by contractual relationships, is a key determinant of business performance. However, existing sales channel management literature lacks focus on contractual governance and reseller management success. The purpose of the study is to systematically review different governance theories in relation to sales channel management and to show which factors are the most influential in making or keeping external sales channels effective.

A case study on a large B2B information and communication technology (ICT) company is used to reflect on the way the different theoretical governance perspectives explain sales channel management success. Interviews and mini-questionnaires were used to collect data.

Expressions of interdependence and equality alongside persevered personal relationships are important in managing daily business activities and in avoiding bad will at the reseller’s grass-root level. Future-oriented planning, long-term-oriented support and jointly set incentive systems are important for reseller management. Degree of professional management sets resellers apart through shifts in power balance.

A multi-theory governance perspective offers a holistic view over reseller management and provides a comprehensive view over different sales channel management issues and their relative importance.

The findings highlight the importance of long-term orientation and cooperation in setting up a reseller management system to gain and nurture distributors’ trust and commitment towards the manufacturer.

The study is the first to comprehensively use governance perspective in studying reseller management.

Although supplier-initiated punishment is widely used to manage distributors’ opportunism, its spillover effect on unpunished distributors (i.e. observers) within the same distribution network remains under-researched. Specifically, this paper aims to investigate the curvilinear effect of punishment severity on an observer’s opportunism, and how such an effect is contingent on the observer’s network position.

This paper uses regression analysis with survey data gathered from 218 distributors in China’s automobile industry.

Punishment severity has an inverted U-shaped effect on the observers’ opportunism, and such effect is weakened by both the observers’ network centrality and their degree of dependence on the supplier.

The findings should encourage suppliers to focus more on the spillover effects of punishment on observers. To this end, the supplier must deliberately initiate the appropriate level of punishment severity against its distributors because an inappropriate level of punishment severity (e.g. too lenient) may unexpectedly raise the unpunished observers’ level of opportunism. Moreover, the supplier should be fully aware that observers’ specific network positions may produce varying spillover effects of the punishment.

This study enriches the literature on channel governance by revealing the curvilinear mechanism through which punishment severity influences observers’ opportunism. By applying social learning theory to channel punishment research, this study unveils both the inhibitive learning and the imitative learning forces inherent in a single punishment event, and it delineates their joint effect on an observer’s opportunism. In addition, this study outlines the observer’s vertical and horizontal relationships within the distribution network and explores their contingent roles in determining the spillover effects of punishment.

This study aims to examine the double-edged effects of guanxi on opportunism and the moderating effects of legal enforceability and partner asset specificity. It thus differs from the current literature, which primarily focuses on the benevolent effects of guanxi.

Based on matched data collected from 268 sales manager and salesperson dyads, this study tested hypotheses using hierarchical regressions.

The empirical test supports the conceptual model and demonstrates two findings. First, guanxi between boundary spanners follows an inverted U-shaped relationship with inter-firm opportunism. Second, both the benefits and drawbacks of guanxi are stronger under the condition of low legal enforceability and high partner asset specificity.

The study did not untangle guanxi into different dimensions and did not investigate how firms should make trade-offs between the benefits and drawbacks of guanxi. Therefore, future research could further explore this question by using a multidimensional approach.

The study alerts managers that guanxi is a double-edged sword, so they should complement it with formal control mechanisms, particularly when they are operating in legally inefficient regions or when their partner firm’s asset specificity is high.

The study offers a more balanced view of guanxi by showing both its positive and negative effects on opportunism. It also uncovers legal enforceability and partner asset specificity as two boundary conditions that influence the curvilinear effects of guanxi on opportunism.

The purpose of this study is to determine the dimensions of cultural differences, which are theoretically most relevant to contract functions in international marketing. Moreover, the contradiction between contract governance and opportunism is reconciled by exploring the boundary conditions of specific cultural differences.

The authors obtained 235 bilateral data provided by Chinese exporters and overseas distributors. The authors matched a secondary data set with the questionnaire data, which were analyzed by confirmatory factor analysis and a hierarchical moderation model.

The results demonstrate that while contract specificity is less successful in this area, contingency adaptability is useful in reducing opportunism. Moreover, as the national cultural differences regarding uncertainty avoidance, power distance or individualism-collectivism become more pronounced. One contractual dimension will be more effective at curbing opportunism, while the other will be less effective.

Despite sample limitations, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to theoretically identify the effect of cultural difference dimensions in contract governance, unlike past studies taking cultural differences as an aggregated variable. Furthermore, by exploring the boundary conditions of cultural differences, this paper effectively reconciles the conflicting findings on the relationship between contract governance and opportunism in various cultural context.

Exporters’ managers can design contingency adaptability to complement the limitations of contract specificity and consider cultural differences’ contingency effects.

First, the authors identify cultural differences dimensions related to contract governance, refining and emphasizing the research context. Second, comparing the efficacy of contract specificity and contingency adaptability in specific cultural context can show which contract is better at preventing opportunism.

This paper seeks to report the results of a study examining the effects of manufacturer-distributor relationships' governance structures (market governance, third-party enforcement of agreements and self-enforcing governance modes) on the distributor's willingness to collaborate with the manufacturer.

To test the hypotheses, survey data were gathered from 224 wholesalers from the food and beverage industry in Spain. Manufacturer-distributor collaboration refers to the possibility of sharing strategic information and encouraging creativity. Regression analyses illustrate the differences in the distributor's willingness to collaborate with the manufacturer under different governance scenarios.

The study illustrates that the greater the skill of the manufacturers and distributors in developing self-enforcing governance modes (e.g. bilateral formal safeguards and bilateral informal safeguards) that complement third-party enforcement of agreements (e.g. legal contracts), the greater the willingness of both to share strategic information and creativity will be. Furthermore, this investigation delineates the moderating effect of opportunism on the relationship between governance and the distributor's willingness to collaborate with the manufacturer. Finally, the results show that the distributor's willingness to share strategic information has an inverted-U relationship with creativity and innovation development in manufacturer-distributor relationships.

The study's findings allow firms to concentrate their efforts on the most relevant governance structures that minimize transaction costs and provide incentives to develop collaborative manufacturer-distributor relationships and create value for the customer.

The research acknowledges the multidimensional nature of collaboration and goes deeper into the need to share strategic information (external and internal strategic information) and the factors that compose the generation of creative ideas in the manufacturer-distributor relationship (knowledge-sharing routines, learning orientation, open-mindedness and management support). Additionally, although research on collaborative distribution channel practices has advanced over the past decades, the importance of governance structures to the development of collaborative practices has not been firmly established. The paper addresses this void in the literature by reporting the results of an empirical study examining manufacturer-distributor collaborations within the food and beverage industry in Spain.

Within the fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) supply chain, one of the problems facing the distribution channel strategy is the presence of the gray market. The article shows two novel antecedents of the participation of official distributors in this gray channel: Negative impact on distributor performance and the relationship with their supplier. Knowledge of this background helps to preserve the strategy outlined for the official distribution channel.

Data were collected from 172 Spanish wholesale distributors and analyzed using PLS-SEM.

The authors found that the damage through negative affectation in the official distributor's performance and the cooperation provided by the manufacturer, have different effects. While affectation is shown to be a powerful antecedent of participation in the gray market, the effect of perceived manufacturer cooperation does not show strong results.

In business practice, these findings lead the manufacturer to keep transactions carried out in the gray market at low levels and provide cooperation to official distributors to guarantee the official channel strategy aimed at efficiency in the distribution of branded goods.

The background of the gray market discussed in the study has not been previously analyzed in the literature. In this way, the authors contribute to the knowledge of such a common problem as the presence of the gray market in the segmentation of distribution channels of high-demand products.

Today, it is becoming increasingly important for manufacturers to develop cooperative relationships with distributors and obtain customized distribution services. Previous research has suggested that, with specified assets, manufacturers might “hold up” distributors and that such a relationship would not be sustainable. In contrast, the purpose of this paper is to develop a causal model to explain why and how manufacturers intend to extend cooperative relationships with distributors.

To propose a causal model, two approaches – relationship marketing and transaction cost analysis – are examined. To complement the defects of the two approaches, a repeated game theoretic approach was applied in the causal model. The proposed model is empirically tested with 144 strategic business units of manufacturers and the structural equation modelling. Also, a case from the US and Japanese automobile industries is proffered to discuss the validity of the model.

The results of the empirical analysis show that asset specificity by distributors increases manufacturers' long‐term orientation, which increases manufacturers' intention to extend the relationship. It was also found that the intention to extend the relationship is reduced by distributors' opportunism. These findings are supported by a case study of the automobile industry in the USA and Japan.

While most previous relationship marketing literature has focused on social psychological constructs, the present paper introduces the viewpoints of a game theoretic approach. The paper proposes a causal model regarding the relationship among asset specificity, opportunism, long‐term orientation and intention to extend the relationship, which successfully explains why manufacturers do not hold up distributors with their specified assets.