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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of financial restatements (FRs) on the likelihood of the top management team (TMT) dismissal. It investigates the effects of types of FRs [corrective note and reissuance of financial statement (RFS)], of FR severity and of FR related to international financial reporting standards (IFRSs) easy or difficult-to-estimate.

The authors hand-collect: data about 96 FRs from the Italian public oversight board documents; chief executive officer (CEO) name, chairman name, year of the financial statement under investigation, total assets and operating income, from their financial statement. The authors use multivariate regression to test the effects of FRs on the probability of TMT dismissal.

The authors find that the RFS leads to a higher likelihood of chairman dismissal. A greater magnitude of misrepresentation on income statements, and FRs, which decrease net income, increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal. Difficult-to-estimate IFRSs increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal.

FRs are significant determinants of the CEO/chairman dismissal. The authors show that FRs directly involving shareholders (RFS) have negative consequences on the chairman of the board of directors, while the CEO is more affected by FRs that involve technical factors (FR severity or financial statement associated with difficult-to-estimate IFRSs).

The purpose of this paper is to critically engage with societal origins of public (dis)trust and public credibility of nutrition science and offer suggestions for addressing its public dismissal.

This viewpoint presents a conceptual analysis of public dismissal of nutrition science, drawing together perspectives on the relationships between science and society from the history, sociology and philosophy of science.

The origin of trust amongst scientists relies is actively tied to their social and moral status and science as a cultural activity is inextricably linked to institutions of power. Accordingly, trust in science relies heavily on public perceptions of those institutions, the ways in which citizens feel represented by them, and to what extent citizens consider these institutions to be held accountable. Ignoring this origin leads to expectations of science and scientists they cannot live up to and inevitable disappointment in those holding such expectations.

Managing responsible expectations asks that we first dismiss dominant portrayals of science as pure, neutral, value-free and fuelled by curiosity. Second, we should pursue a reorganisation of science, favouring social inclusiveness over scientific exceptionalism.

Post-truth dynamics are a source of concern in the dissemination of nutrition science. Rather than dismissing it as a consequence of public ignorance, a comprehensive engagement with post-truth arguments allows a constructive repositioning of nutrition science organisation and communication. It asks that we design research programmes and studies differently, incorporate different voices. Above all else, it asks humility of researchers and tolerant approaches to other perspectives.

Entrepreneurs tend to be self-styled “idea” people. They often believe they have the next “Big Concept”‐one which could change the world, reaffirm their self-worth, and, of course, make them and their venture team a fortune. In contrast, as they build a company to implement their business dream, entrepreneurs also tend to eschew or trivialize administrative details. Why should they waste their creative juices on minutia? As a result of this insensitivity to detail, these captains of capitalism often trip in their entrepreneurial journey. For example, they might:

1. •

   Forget to remit payroll taxes on schedule.

2. •

   Fail to document the justification underpinning the dismissal of a key employee.

3. •

   Allow the company℉s liability insurance to lapse.

4. •

   Neglect to report sales usage tax.

5. •

   Verbally grant employee incentive stock options during an informal luncheon meeting, at a yet-to-be-determined exercise price and without the board of directors℉ approval.

Forget to remit payroll taxes on schedule.

Fail to document the justification underpinning the dismissal of a key employee.

Allow the company℉s liability insurance to lapse.

Neglect to report sales usage tax.

Verbally grant employee incentive stock options during an informal luncheon meeting, at a yet-to-be-determined exercise price and without the board of directors℉ approval.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of accountability in times of exception. The Italian government's account-giving practices are critically analysed with respect to the distinct modes in which duties of accountability are discharged for the exceptional measures taken during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak in early 2020.

This paper draws on an exploratory case study. The case analysis draws primarily on data obtained through publicly available documents and covers the period between January 1 and August 7, 2020.

The paper reveals that the Italian government employed various accountability styles (rebuttal, dismissal, reactive, proactive and coactive). Each style influenced both how the government justified its conduct and how it sought to form distinctive relationships with social actors.

The paper uses the notion of “styles of accountability” to empirically illustrate how an unprecedented public governance challenge can reveal broader accountability trends. The paper contributes to accountability research by elucidating how governments tackle ambiguity and uncertainty in their systems of public accountability in extraordinary times.

This paper aims to examine the effect of financial restatement on changing the auditor in the following years.

The study uses data of 105 companies (735 company-years) listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange collected during the period 2008-2014. Logistic regression is used to test the hypotheses.

The results of hypotheses present that restatement does not cause auditor changes and that as the severity of a restatement increases, the auditor change in the following year of restatement also does not increase. Restating companies having strong governance do not go for auditor changes as compared with other companies. In addition, in companies that are restating, non-big auditor changes are not more likely than a big auditor. Also, in companies restating simultaneous with a CEO turnover, there is no possibility of auditor change. Furthermore, multinomial logistic regression showed that the adjustments resulting from the correction of errors and changes in procedures and the amount of adjustments do not cause auditor change in the following year. So, the results have shown that the restatement is not an important factor in changing auditor the next year.

The current study analyses the impact of financial restatement on auditor changes in a deep manner in a developing country like Iran.