Search results

The purpose of this paper is to address the question of whether Malaysian public listed companies manage their earnings in response to changes in tax polices. The context of this study is the tax waiver year of 1999 which came about from the introduction of the Self Assessment System (SAS) by the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM) in the year 2000. If companies are to minimize tax liabilities, then the tax waiver year of 1999 may provide a substantial incentive for these companies to manage earnings in 1999.

The modified Jones Model (adjusted) is used to obtain the discretionary current accruals which represent earnings management. It is hypothesized that there is a significant positive discretionary current accrual (income increasing earnings management) in the tax waiver year of 1999.

The results indicate that that there is a negative relationship between earnings management and the effect of the tax waiver year of 1999. These results suggest that the magnitude of discretionary current accrual is not related to the tax waiver year in a way that is consistent with tax‐motivated income shifting behavior. Instead companies tend to manipulate earnings downwards during severe economic downturn. This is in line with Healy's bonus maximization hypothesis.

The test sample is limited to public listed companies only and some companies are excluded due to insufficient data. Therefore, the results cannot be a representation of Malaysian companies' practices.

The findings of this paper contribute to the sparse literature on tax‐induced earnings management practices in Malaysia. The findings could be of value to the IRBM in designing and improving on the plans for future tax‐based incentive schemes.

We examine whether discretionary accruals of firms obtaining substantial external financing can be explained by managerial manipulation or managerial overoptimism. Insider trading patterns and press releases around equity and debt financing suggest that managers are more optimistic about their firms around debt financing. Consistent with earlier studies, we find that discretionary current accruals peak when firms obtain equity financing. However, we also find that discretionary accruals peak when firms obtain debt financing. Moreover, discretionary accruals are higher for firms that rely on debt rather than on equity financing. The results are robust to controlling for firm characteristics, excluding small and distressed firms, and using alternative measures of discretionary accruals. These findings support the hypothesis that managerial overoptimism distorts financial statements of firms obtaining external financing.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether firms engage in earnings decreasing management before share repurchases to mislead investors or to smooth earnings and improve earnings informativeness.

The authors examine discretionary accruals and cash flows around open-market share repurchases. The primary discretionary accruals measure is industry- and performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals estimated from cash-flow data.

Results show that, firms experience temporary increases in operating cash flows and use negative discretionary accruals to smooth earnings before share repurchases. Firms with the highest pre-repurchase cash flows use the lowest pre-repurchase discretionary accruals. Moreover, pre-repurchase discretionary accruals reflect expectations about future operating cash flows. Firms with the strongest deterioration in operating cash flows after repurchases use the lowest pre-repurchase discretionary accruals. These findings suggest that repurchasing firms use earnings management to increase smoothness and predictability of reported earnings rather than to mislead investors.

This paper provides an alternative explanation to the finding of negative discretionary accruals before share repurchases. It adds to the literature on repurchases and earnings smoothing by showing that firms use earnings management around share repurchases to smooth earnings.

Firms are concerned about earnings per share (EPS) dilution after equity issues. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether firms manage upward their discretionary accruals around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) to mitigate the impact of dilution on reported earnings.

The authors employ adjusted discretionary accruals from cash flow statements, normalized by the average common equity, in the multivariate tests.

There is evidence that SEO‐year discretionary accruals are the highest when contemporaneous operating cash flows are the lowest. Moreover, managers react to temporary rather than permanent declines in operating performance. Firms with the highest SEO‐year discretionary accruals experience the strongest improvements in post‐SEO operating cash flows. In addition, investors are not misled by the SEO‐year earnings management. There is no relation between the SEO‐year discretionary accruals and post‐SEO stock performance. Overall, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms manage discretionary accruals around SEOs to mitigate the effect of temporary EPS dilution.

The paper's findings suggest that firms manage discretionary accruals during the SEO year to reduce the temporary negative impact of SEOs on operating performance measures, consistent with the EPS dilution hypothesis. Such earnings management makes earnings smoother and more predictable, improving earnings informativeness. The findings also suggest that misleading earnings management is not a common practice during the SEO year.

This paper adds to the literature questioning the evidence that managers frequently engage in misleading earnings management around corporate events. The authors provide an alternative explanation for earnings management around SEOs.

This paper aims to investigate the relation between corporate governance and earnings management around UK rights issues.

The paper examines the effect of board structure, ownership structure, adviser structure, and capital structure on discretionary current accruals – a proxy for earnings management – for a sample of size‐controlled rights issuers. Rights issues are chosen as a context in which firms have particular incentives to manage earnings.

The results suggest that firms with higher debt to equity ratios, with lower proportions of non‐executive directors, or with no large block owner, are more likely to use discretionary current accruals to manipulate earnings around rights issues.

Similar research can be conducted around other equity issuing methods such as open offers and around other major corporate events such as initial public offerings.

The paper's evidence contributes to an understanding of corporate governance and has practical implications for stakeholders. It suggests that investors can rely more on the financial disclosures of firms with lower debt to equity ratios, higher proportions of outside directors, and with a large blockholder. Regulators may propose that firms undertaking corporate events such as equity offerings should follow best corporate governance practices to enhance investor confidence.

This study is the first to investigate the corporate governance mechanisms in place to check opportunistic earnings management around specific corporate events for the UK market.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate, using data on US manufacturing firms, how and when corporate governance affects managers' decisions to use discretionary accruals and thereby artificially influence company financial reports.

Three‐stage least squares is employed to study the relationship between financial status, corporate governance and financial reporting discretion. The sample spans the years 2001‐2003 during a severe downturn in the US stock market. Financial status is measured with the Altman Z‐score.

A significant difference is found between firms not classified as healthy or failed (i.e. the mid‐range group) and the two extreme categories when examining governance quotient using a well‐known index. A positive relationship is found between discretionary accruals and the governance index. Strong governance appears to reduce the incidence of mid‐range firms engaging in accruals management. The least healthy and the most distressed companies have the weakest relationship with discretionary accruals. By contrast, mid‐range firms are more likely to resort to discretionary accruals.

Non‐executive members of boards of directors are warned to be particularly vigilant about discretionary accruals with firms transitioning between healthy and high‐failure risk.

The relationship between firms' financial health and discretionary accruals reveals an agency problem in credit markets with financially stressed firms. More attention is required on firms whose financial condition is uncertain. Also, it is documented that significant findings of importance to the earnings quality and corporate governance literature by documenting the role of corporate governance on discretionary accruals and financial status.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the contracting incentives (i.e. bonus plans, debt covenants, political costs hypotheses), and income smoothing can explain accounting choices in an emerging country, Egypt.

The paper uses the ordinary least square regression model to examine the relationship between earnings management and reporting objectives. A sample of 438 non-financial firms listed on the Egyptian Exchange over the period 2005-2007 is used.

The paper finds that the contracting objectives explain little of the variations in accounting choices (i.e. discretionary accruals) in the Egyptian context. However, the paper finds that mangers are likely to smooth the reported earnings by managing the accrual component in an attempt to reduce the fluctuation in reported earnings by increasing (decreasing) earnings when earnings are low (high) in attempt to reduce the variability of the reported earnings.

The empirical results rely on the ability of earnings management proxies to adequately capture earnings manipulation activities.

The findings of the study should be of substantial interest to regulators and policy makers. The results implicitly contribute to the ongoing argument in relation to the optimal flexibility permitted by standard setting and the argument that tightening the accounting standards and mandating International Financial Reporting Standards are likely to improve reporting quality and reduce opportunistic earnings management. The results reveal that many of the weaknesses related to corporate reporting in emerging countries may result from the inadequate enforcement of the law and the weak legal protection of minority shareholders. The results also highlight the crucial role of understanding the reporting incentives, which is mainly shaped by institutional and market forces and the legal environment, in explaining accounting choices.

Unlike previous studies that tested an individual objective, this study examines the trade-offs among various reporting objectives in an emerging economy.

The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of earnings management during initial public offerings on the listing day returns.

The study collected data for 511 Indian IPOs that came between April 2003 and March 2019 for calculating earnings management. On the basis of the Cross Sectional Modified Jones Model 1995, the paper presents three proxies of earnings management as discretionary accruals (DA), discretionary current accruals (DCA) and discretionary long-term accruals (DLA). The study further used correlation and multiple regression analysis to assess the impact of earnings management on listing day returns.

The findings show that earnings management and listing day returns vary through issue-year and industry-type. Apart from it, the study reveals a greater contribution of short-term accruals in earnings management on the basis of higher DCA values. It also discloses that the aggregate level of earnings management (DA) influences listing returns, whereas DCA and DLA separately have no impact on the listing day returns of the Indian IPOs.

The findings are useful to potential investors and analysts to observe, assess and understand the quality of financial reports that are based on fallacious disclosure of accounting figures. The study also reflects the efficacy of Indian regulatory norms for IPOs in constraining earnings management and underpricing, thus providing meaningful insight to the policy makers and the regulators.

This study is distinguished by its focus on determining the influence of earnings management on listing day returns in Indian IPOs by using three earnings management proxies.

This study aims to investigate the occurrence of pre-merger earnings management for a sample of 197 stock- and cash-financed UK acquirers between 1990 and 2009. It also examines the earnings management behaviour around the change in the Corporate Governance Code in 2003 based on the Higgs recommendations.

Mean and median accrual- and real-based manipulation are examined in the period before the announcement of a merger and acquisition. These are compared across stock and cash acquirers as well as before and after the implementation of the Higgs recommendations. Logistic regressions are also run to examine accrual- and real-based manipulation across stock and cash acquirers after controlling for variables that may affect the acquisition type.

The study found some evidence of upward pre-merger accrual-based earnings management by stock-financed acquirers, which is in line with the findings of Botsari and Meeks (2008). Furthermore, no significant changes were found in the post-Higgs period, which indicates that the recommendations put forth by Higgs may not have been successful in mitigating earnings management. The evidence also shows that cash bidders engage in pre-merger real earnings manipulation through lower discretionary expenses, possibly to enhance cash availability for the bid.

The findings in this study confirm earnings management exists around mergers and acquisitions and provide some evidence that the recommendations set out in the Higgs Report do not appear to have mitigated earnings management activities. This is of interest to regulators as well as investors and academicians.

This provides the first analysis in the UK examining the use of real-based earnings management activities by UK acquirers. It also extends prior research around corporate governance changes that occurred in the UK.

This study aims to examine whether US oil and gas companies engaged in earnings management during the 2011 Arab Spring, which resulted in significant increases in both crude oil and gasoline prices.

Following a similar research methodology from prior research, this study tests the existence of earnings management based on discretionary total accruals, current accruals and non-current accruals to determine whether both large petroleum refining firms and relatively small oil and gas-producing firms, jointly and separately, lowered reported earnings.

The results show that, overall, US oil and gas companies as a group engaged in income-decreasing earnings management during the Arab Spring. The results seem to support the political cost hypothesis. However, further analyses indicate that the results are driven by abnormal income-decreasing accruals of the relatively small oil and gas-producing firms, which are politically less sensitive.

The findings suggest that there may be other non-political cost incentives, such as income smoothing, for the relatively small oil and gas-producing firms managing earnings downward during periods of large oil price increases. However, the possibility for firms with reversals of income-increasing activity from other quarters is not ruled out.

This study not only is the first empirical study of earnings management by oil and gas companies during the Arab Spring, but also contributes to extant earnings management literature regarding political cost hypothesis, which still remains a major concern for US oil and gas companies.