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It is generally accepted that irrespective of training, motivational programmes, and the development of positive work environments, not all personnel will perform at acceptable levels. In an effort to change behaviour, many organizations attempt to develop formal disciplinary procedures that include a number of possible disciplinary actions, with each disciplinary action identified as a reasonable response to defined levels of unsatisfactory performance. Unfortunately, few academic organizations have developed or implemented “appropriate‐response” disciplinary procedures or programmes. Without such reasoned disciplinary procedures, organizational responses to unacceptable performance may take on many of the characteristics of punishment rather than discipline. Explores the barriers to such disciplinary programmes in academic organizations.

This study seeks to explore the incidence and severity of inconsistency in the application of disciplinary measures between supervisors, given the same disciplinary incident. Consistency is an important aspect of procedural fairness in disciplinary action, but it has received little empirical attention.

Four employee discipline scenarios were assigned at random to 130 real‐life supervisor‐employee dyads, who role‐played the scenario.

There was little consistency between supervisors in their decisions regarding disciplinary measures. Overall, having an informal discussion with the employee was the most common response. Only when specific instructions to impose a verbal or written warning were provided did most supervisors move beyond an informal discussion. Even when clear instructions were given, a substantial minority applied a less severe disciplinary outcome.

Even in this role‐play situation, where “real life” variables such as union grievances that could lead to the dilution of disciplinary action were not present, supervisors were generally lenient regarding employee discipline.

The trade‐off between the objectives of consistency and consideration of individual circumstances presents a serious challenge to practising supervisors.

This is a rare empirical paper exploring the issue of consistency in employee discipline.

The purpose of this paper is to provide excerpts of selected Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Regulatory Notices and Disciplinary Actions issued from January to March 2009 and a sample of disciplinary actions during that period.

The paper provides excerpts from FINRA Regulatory 09‐12, Auction Rate Securities; 09‐13, Threshold for Single Arbitrator Cases; 09‐14, Trading Ahead of Customer Limit Orders; 09‐17, Investigations and Formal Disciplinary Actions.

The SEC has defined reporting requirements for settlements of customer disputes involving auction rate securities, raised the threshold for single arbitrator cases to $100,000, approved alternative means for calculating minimum price‐improvement obligations that firms must provide to trade ahead of customer limit orders, and provided guidance on its enforcement process to improve transparency into its regulatory framework.

These are direct excerpts designed to provide a useful digest for the reader and an indication of regulatory trends. The FINRA staff is aware of this summary but has neither reviewed nor edited it. For further detail as well as other useful information, the reader should visit www.finra.org

The London Metal Exchange is a recognised investment exchange under s. 36 Financial Services Act 1986 and is thus exempt from any need to secure authorisation under that Act. Schedule 4 of the Financial Services Act 1986 sets out the criteria which an investment exchange must meet and fulfil on a continuing basis in order to procure recognition from HM Treasury. Included in the Sch. 4 criteria are:

The purpose of this paper is to examine the operation of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland's (ICAI) complaint process from the complainant's perspective. The findings are interpreted drawing on key elements of Parker's private interest model of professional accounting ethics, particularly the private interest roles of professional authority and professional insulation.

The primary evidence used is drawn from numerous sources. These include: extensive “private” documentation comprising original correspondence between the complainant in the case examined (or his advisors) and various representatives of the ICAI spanning a five‐year period; detailed supporting documentation included with this correspondence; Independent Experts' Reports on the complaints submitted; and in‐depth interviews with the complainant prior to, during, and post the examination of the documentary evidence.

The paper reveals how high levels of professional authority and professional insulation worked in tandem to prevent complaints entering the complaint process and deny the complainant reasons for decisions taken. It demonstrates how a key structural barrier in the complaint process, the screening role of the professional accounting body's secretary, created a complainant impression of a process concerned primarily with protecting members' interests. Subsequent to complaint process changes, an erosion of professional insulation is unveiled. However, this proves fleeting and, in response to persistent complainant challenges to heightened demonstrations of professional authority, the degree of professional insulation intensifies further.

The paper focuses on a specific case where the complainant was dissatisfied with the ICAI's procedures. It reveals the extent to which complainants using professional body complaints procedures may, often by virtue of the structures in place, feel that profession protection motives are overriding purported concerns for society protection.

The paper extends and advances the literature examining professional accounting body disciplinary and complaint procedures. Prior research investigating the operation of these procedures has neglected to examine complaint processes in depth to inform their evaluations, particularly from the perspective of potential users of these processes.

Money laundering is established as a criminal offence and, to date, the prosecution of money laundering has been the responsibility of the Criminal Prosecution Service (CPS) and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO). However, the Financial Services and Markets Bill will provide the Financial Services Authority (FSA) with the power to bring a prosecution for offences under the Money Laundering Regulations. This may result in some confusion as to who should prosecute, particularly as it is established that all three bodies cannot prosecute the same crime since this would allow the defendant to claim double jeopardy. It should be noted that the FSA has stated that it will only prosecute for failing to maintain adequate controls against money laundering and that prosecutions for money laundering itself will be left to the criminal prosecution authorities. Despite this limitation there will still be an overlap between offences that the CPS, SFO and FSA may prosecute. The situation is further clouded, as the FSA will also be able to undertake a disciplinary action. A disciplinary action for money laundering has not been specifically mentioned in the Financial Services and Markets Bill. However, the FSA is most likely to introduce an and money‐laundering statement of principle, particularly as the reduction of financial crime is one of the objectives of the FSA. If a regulated person or institution is found to breach this, they will be subject to a penalty imposed under disciplinary proceedings. In addition, a blanket provision of ‘misconduct’ would also trigger the imposition of a penalty. Therefore, the possibility arises of a criminal prosecution by the FSA for failing to maintain adequate controls against money laundering, a prosecution by the CPS or SFO for money laundering itself and for failure to maintain adequate controls as well as an FSA disciplinary action.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the disciplinary measures that teachers apply to student participants in violent altercations and how protestations of self-defense and a violent record affect the measures taken.

Israeli teachers (326) were shown fictional vignettes that recounted violent conflicts between students and were asked whether and how they would punish them. The vignettes portrayed students in three roles: aggressor, confirmed self-defender, and unproven self-defender.

Confirmed self-defenders are much more leniently disciplined than unproven self-defenders and aggressors. Unproven self-defenders are disciplined almost as severely as aggressors. A violent record results in much more severe punishment of unproven self-defenders and aggressors but has only a slight upward effect on the disciplining of confirmed self-defenders.

The study reveals a difficulty in complying with a zero-tolerance approach to school violence because it collides with the right to self-defense. The intensity of discipline applied to self-defenders appears to depend on their ability to “dig up” witnesses to prove their case. Therefore, socially isolated self-defenders may be punished severely whereas social accepted ones would not.

The results may enhance the understanding of arbitrators’ decisions in conflicts that defy attempts to determine “who started it.” They break new ground by describing the disciplinary measures taken against different role-players in fracases and are immensely important for understanding peacemaking measures in school and the “real world.”

Provides a strategy for avoiding discrimination through education. Covers areas such as treating all fairly and equally, the hiring process, disciplinary action and training needs. Provides case law as examples. Covers particularly sexual and age discrimination. Suggests that training and awareness appear to be the key to compliance with national guidelines and highlights the need to document such work.

Quality assurance review programs are created to provide assurances to the public that all accountants maintain a high level of competence in public practice. However, not all countries require such programs. The purpose of this research is to compare and contrast quality assurance review programs in different parts of the world in order to identify similarities and differences in these programs. In addition, the paper attempts to explain why some countries adopt quality assurance programs while others do not have such programs.

A request for information and a survey were sent to the accounting regulatory bodies who are members of the International Federations of Accountants (IFAC). In total, 44 countries responded to the survey, of which 33 have formal quality assurance programs. The survey results were analyzed to identify similarities and differences in the design and implementation of such programs and to draw conclusions from this analysis.

Analyses of the questionnaires indicate that quality assurance review programs among countries share some common features, but vary significantly in many other areas. It was also found that countries with significant stock markets tend to require quality assurance programs of their accounting firms while countries of less significant stock markets tend not to require such programs.

The conclusions are based on the countries which responded to the survey. More countries did adopt quality assurance programs subsequent to the date of a survey in 2002.

Harmonizations of accounting and auditing standards have come a long way as a response to market globalization. Regulators, such as the IFAC, Securities and Exchange Commission and its counterparts, are demanding that such programs be implemented. This study provides a comprehensive evaluation of such programs in selected countries, and thus regulators may benefit from its findings.

The paper is the first of its type. The paper will help regulators and auditing firms to gain knowledge of the quality assurance programs of selected countries and establish policies in light of these results.

The chief reason for disciplinary action against blue collar workers is poor timekeeping, followed by unauthorised absence and poor work standards, says a report from the Institute of Personnel Management.