Search results

The purpose of this chapter is to advance existing literature on crisis management by critically analysing the impact of crisis on tourism performance within a developing world context, with a specific focus on South Africa as a case study area. Crime, xenophobic attacks and the Day Zero water crisis form the basis for discussion as significant crisis affecting the country's tourism industry.

Utilising qualitative content analysis as a methodological approach, the study analysis strategic policy documents, newspaper reports, press conferences, and campaigns to discover policies, strategies and plans that have been applied to alleviate the impacts of catastrophic events on tourism performance.

The interpretation of literature reveals that factors affecting the South Africa tourism industry stem from mainly human-caused disasters, this being crime and violence, and inadequate water management strategies.

Results discussed in this study were framed through a systemic review of existing literature To gain an in-depth understanding of crisis-related matters in the Global South, future research can apply empirical data-gathering procedures.

The study proposes that proactive crisis management planning and inclusion of non-tourism stakeholders in crisis management planning is essential to combat crisis' impact on tourism performance.

In the Global South, studies that interrogate the effects of crises on tourism performance generally focus on a single case of a disaster or crisis, therefore lacks a study that comprehensively discusses events that deter tourism performance. Thus, this study bridges the existing literature gap by focussing on South Africa as a case study area.

Using the case of the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, I argue that the catastrophe was less an example of a low probability-high catastrophe event than an instance of socially produced risks and insecurities associated with deepwater oil and gas production during the neoliberal period after 1980. The disaster exposes the deadly intersection of the aggressive enclosure of a new technologically risky resource frontier (the deepwater continental shelf) with what I call a frontier of neoliberalized risk, a lethal product of cut-throat corporate cost-cutting, the collapse of government oversight and regulatory authority and the deepening financialization and securitization of the oil market. These two local pockets of socially produced risk and wrecklessness have come to exceed the capabilities of what passes as risk management and energy security. In this sense, the Deepwater Horizon disaster was produced by a set of structural conditions, a sort of rogue capitalism, not unlike those which precipitated the financial meltdown of 2008. The forms of accumulation unleashed in the Gulf of Mexico over three decades rendered a high-risk enterprise yet more risky, all the while accumulating insecurities and radical uncertainties which made the likelihood of a Deepwater Horizon type disaster highly overdetermined.