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By the end of World War II, the world witnessed both military and peaceful uses of nuclear science. A number of countries and different sections of the international community strongly urged to avoid repetition of the devastation witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A world without nuclear weapons was a subject matter of not only pacifists but also of a large section of the world. The 2010 RevCon was held from 3 to 28 May 2010. The final document noted: ‘… the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon states of their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish, in accordance with the principle of irreversibility, the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty’. The 2010 RevCon also welcomed ‘the new proposals and initiatives from Governments and civil society related to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons’. Indeed, Obama, during his election campaign, spoke on the need for nuclear disarmament. So, should we conclude that global nuclear disarmament would materialize soon? What is the reality? If we take into account signals emitting from the postures and pronouncements of the nuclear weapons countries of the NPT and the influential section of the global civil society, we may find that global nuclear disarmament is somewhere between myth and super myth. A reality check would indicate that global nuclear disarmament would continue to elude us.

The study of arms control and disarmament is a subject of renewed interest in the United States. The attention of academicians, politicians, and average citizens, focused by a fear of nuclear holocaust, has turned to questions of how best to seek peace and safety in the nuclear age. Courses and programs devoted to arms control and disarmament and methods of achieving peaceful resolution of conflicts in today's world are offered at all educational levels, and the general public, aware of the necessity of being well‐informed on such an important topic, is looking for ways to obtain factual and reliable information to help sort out the conflicting claims of political spokespeople. Such material does exist and should be available to researchers, professors, students, and citizens, so that they can form opinions and attempt to influence policy on the basis of a sound understanding.

Is the nuclear sky falling? It appears so. With the quantitative and qualificative improvements in nuclear stockpile, a proliferation-pessimism finds expression in metaphors about nuclear dominoes, chains etc. With a number of threshold states, the catch-phrase is ‘credible deterrence’. However, much of the zero-sum cold war thinking on strategic defence has now become anachronistic. A phased adaptive approach, leading to universal disarmament is necessary, especially in India’s strategic interest. A nuclear weapon-free world could ensure a safer regional security environment for India. It’s all the more imperative in view of China’s interest to emerge as the strategic leader in Asia, even well beyond Asia.

New START initiatives are positive developments in this regard. However, it is necessary to bring into this fold other nuclear powers. (China has rejected the US and Russian levels of nuclear ‘transparency’ as part of its defence calculus; it has already crossed the multiple warhead Rubicon. It may also install a National Missile Defence System by 2020.)

Though a Nuclear Weapon-Free World (NWFW) cannot emerge instantaneously, an NWFW can evolve, if the following measures are evolved:

• (i)

  Change the mind-set devaluing nuclear weapons by strategically displacing ‘disbelief’ with ‘faith’ in the efficacy of nuclear abolition.

• (ii)

  Change the perception of  the utility and prestige associated with nuclear weapons.

• (iii)

  Redraft nuclear doctrines to restrict their role and break the ‘feed-back paradigm of the need for nuclear deterrence’.

• (iv)

  Take measures to build confidence in multilateral initiation on NWFW.

• (v)

  Ensure universal acceptance of ‘no first use’ (NFU) through a legally binding, universally accepted agreement.

• (vi)

  Have agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

• (vii)

  Devise agreements for controlling the continuous qualitative upgradation.

• (viii)

  Establishment of a Safeguard Regime with thorough organizational and institutional mechanism.

• (ix)

  Use advanced surveillance and monitoring technology to ensure compliance.

• (x)

  Implement effective enforcement strategy to penalize delinquent.

Change the mind-set devaluing nuclear weapons by strategically displacing ‘disbelief’ with ‘faith’ in the efficacy of nuclear abolition.

Change the perception of  the utility and prestige associated with nuclear weapons.

Redraft nuclear doctrines to restrict their role and break the ‘feed-back paradigm of the need for nuclear deterrence’.

Take measures to build confidence in multilateral initiation on NWFW.

Ensure universal acceptance of ‘no first use’ (NFU) through a legally binding, universally accepted agreement.

Have agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Devise agreements for controlling the continuous qualitative upgradation.

Establishment of a Safeguard Regime with thorough organizational and institutional mechanism.

Use advanced surveillance and monitoring technology to ensure compliance.

Implement effective enforcement strategy to penalize delinquent.

It is in India’s interest to pursue universal disarmament with universal focus on economic and social cohesion for war prevention as the key to long-term security.

As the first Asian country to build a nuclear reactor, and as one among the handful of countries with full nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, India should strive to bring about universal disarmament of nuclear weapons so that world can meet spiralling demand for power through nuclear reactors, which pose no threat to the world peace.

Nuclear proliferation has become a global phenomenon since 1945. A debate has emerged about whether the nuclear nonproliferation regime is sufficient to contain nuclear proliferation. Nuclear proliferation regime has confronted new challenges in recent times. Developments stemming from the demise of the former USSR have raised few serious problems: a previously acknowledged nuclear weapon state had been subjected to political disintegration. This was a period of nuclear transformation which required long-term cooperation between Russia and the United States. This period of transition was facilitated by the foresight of policymakers from both sides of the former cold war divide and by the frameworks of arms control and disarmament agreements then in place. Ensuring nuclear stability during this period was possible because of agreements like the NPT and START.

However, the other side of the story is that in January 2000, the Russian Government released its new nuclear policy in a document entitled: “Concept of National Security” which was ratified by Presidential decree on April 21, 2000. The document was updated version of policy statements made in 1993 and 1997, and indicated a heightened sense of conflict with NATO and the United States on nuclear issues, and an increased reliance on nuclear weapons. Russia rejected to adhere to the “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons policy.

Russia’s nuclear policy under Putin entered a period of new realism. Russia was presented as an alternative pole to the West which gave way to new arms race. Therefore the initiative toward nuclear disarmament would most likely be largely cosmetic in nature. This chapter attempts to present a theoretical framework on Russia’s nuclear disarmament policy since early 1990s.

The chapter presents an analysis of the decision-making process of leaders on issues of nuclear armament and nuclear disarmament, through four case studies. The first, pertaining armament, is South Africa, with a focus on Pieter Willem Botha, former prime minister and president of South Africa. The second deals with former Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi’s nuclear armament decision. The third case study investigates the decision of former president of South Africa, F. W. De Klerk, on nuclear disarmament. The fourth and final case study uncovers Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s nuclear disarmament decision.

Using the Applied Decision Analysis (ADA) method historical decisions have been analyzed in this chapter for the purpose of identifying each leader’s ‘decision code’. Specifically, were these decisions based on rational calculations or were they influenced more by cognitive decision processes?

By revealing a ‘decision code’ using a reverse engineering of the decision processes, I conclude that the three leaders placed high importance on security and geopolitics. By analyzing different dimensions and processes that impacted their decision processes, it is evident that while armament decision utilizes the poliheuristic decision rule, disarmament decisions abide by rational calculations.

The quest for national security through the expansion of military force has been a dominant feature of international relations for the past three decades. Since the Second World War this quest has given rise to an arms race which has seen the development, production and deployment of weapons of mass destruction in numbers great enough to threaten the termination of human society. It is thus only reasonable to try to understand the forces which have propelled this process forward and to ask whether the process has, in fact, resulted in the achievement of its alleged primary objective — the improvement, or at least the maintenance of the military security of the participants.

This chapter is in two parts. Part I is an analysis of the efforts made by India to promote Nuclear Disarmament. Part II discussse the recent global efforts towards Nuclear Disarmament and India’s evolving stand towards it along with a note on what could be done in coming years to make Nuclear Disarmament a reality.

Comprehensive nuclear disarmament which has been traditionally regarded as an idealistic and unachievable objective in the foreseeable future is now receiving greater attention from all quarters including major countries, statesmen and international NGOs. In fact, recent initiative for a nuclear-free world came from four well-known US political figures namely George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn and William Perry. Though the process towards nuclear disarmament seems long, arduous and extremely complicated, it is, no doubt, emerging as the primary mission of the international community. In today’s world many think that a nuclear weapon free world is achievable; an optimism, probably, generated by the end of Cold War politics. However, the objective of this chapter is not to map the contours of global nuclear disarmament but to limit to a discussion on European remedies, if any, for Russian nuclear disarmament.

The position of France – President Nicolas Sarkozy reiterated the French nuclear doctrine in a speech in Cherbourg. For the first time, a French president dealt at length with the problems of disarmament. He also clarified the French position: Paris has always been doubtful about the “Global Zero” level advocated by some other countries.

Under President Jacques Chirac another element was added: the force de frappe could be used against the leadership of states that use terrorism against France as well as those that envisage using weapons of mass destruction. In addition to the vital interests of the French nation, “the interests of nations allied to France” consacrated a first step toward a common European policy in nuclear matters.

From the beginning of the Fifth Republic (1958) till today, there has been a wide consensus on defense issues, particularly on the force de frappe. Even the Socialists under Mitterrand rallied to the necessity of a policy of deterrence; the Communists, though proponents of total nuclear disarmament, did not oppose it.

The position of European Union – However, the European Union has worked on strategy policies on subjects such as the Union action plan on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security; nuclear nonproliferation; European security strategy; etc.

The European Union consists of two nuclear states and 25 nonnuclear states. It makes it difficult to find a unified approach toward disarmament. Despite the Treaty of Lisbon and the creation of post of a high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, the European Union struggles to define a common foreign policy.