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This chapter examines corporate governance–related financial reporting issues in the context of globalization. Over the past few decades, the process of globalization has substantially altered the fields of corporate governance and accounting. More specifically, Anglo-American models of corporate governance and financial reporting have received increasing momentum in emerging economies, including China. However, a review of relevant studies suggests that there is limited research examining the implementation of Anglo-American concepts in various countries regardless of their growing acceptance. This monograph extends the existing literature by comprehensively investigating the adoption of internationally acceptable principles and standards in China, the largest transitional economy that has different institutional context from Anglo-American countries. In addition, the review has a number of implications for developing the theoretical framework, and determining the research methodology for the monograph.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent of directors breaching the reporting requirements of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and the Corporations Act in Australia. Further, it seeks to assess whether directors in Australia achieve abnormal returns from trades in their own companies.

Using an event study approach on an Australian sample, abnormal returns for a range of situations were estimated.

A total of 13 (seven) per cent of own‐company directors trades do not meet the ASX (Corporations Act) requirement of reporting within five (14) business days. Directors do achieve abnormal returns through trading in shares of their own companies. Ignoring transaction costs, outsiders can achieve abnormal returns by imitating directors' trades. Analysis of returns to directors after they trade but before they announce the trade to the market shows that directors are making small but statistically significant returns that are not available to the market. Analysis of returns to directors subsequent to the ASX reporting requirement up to the day the trade is reported shows that directors are making small but statistically significant returns that should be available to the market.

Future research should investigate the linkages between late reporting by directors and disadvantages to outside shareholders and the implementation of internal policies implemented to mitigate insider trading.

Market participants should remain vigilant regarding the potential for late/non‐reporting of directors' trades.

Uncovering breaches of reporting regulations are particularly important given that directors tend to purchase (sell) shares when the price is low (high), thereby achieving abnormal returns.

The literature has revealed auditors' going concern risk disclosures are examined in research as a homogenous risk class. This is despite the various going concern modifications auditors are entitled to give pertaining to this issue. A five‐level risk class is established in this paper derived from Australian Auditing Standard pronouncements to examine the appropriateness of auditors' going concern reporting relating specifically to the likelihood of firm failure.

Time is necessary to reveal the appropriateness of going concern reporting therefore a longitudinal research methodology was adopted. The research focuses on all Australian listed companies within the building industry in 1989 and follows all of the reporting of going concern by auditors and directors through until 2007. The building industry was selected because of its volatility, which increased the possibility of going concern reporting allowing a more in‐depth focus in the research. All auditors' going concern modifications were examined along with all indications of going concern problems identified by directors. To properly investigate the appropriateness of auditors' reporting, all sampled audit reports were examined using Altman's Z‐score model which were matched with a risk class model using the relevant requirements to report in order to determine the appropriateness of the auditors' and directors' opinions.

The level of under reporting of going concern risk by auditors (75 per cent) implies they are more affected by the agency relationship found in literature than directors who are found to have an incidence of underreporting of 57 per cent.

Literature classifies auditors along with directors as part of the agency problem. Altman's Z‐score bankruptcy prediction model is used because of its enduring nature, reliability and ability to be externally calculated to independently compare the going concern reporting performance of auditors and directors as part of the contribution to this research area.

The paper for the first time examines going concern reporting at a multi‐risk level rather than the binomial level used in research previously. The approach is developed in this paper using auditing pronouncements. These risk levels are linked with an independent measure being the Altman Z‐score to determine the appropriateness of auditors' and directors' reporting of going concern issues.

Highlights the role played by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Treadway Commission, and other professional organizations in furthering the establishment of audit committees in the USA. In the international arena, the UK Cadbury Committee, the Australian Borsch Committee, and the Canadian Macdonald Commission have influenced the widespread use of corporate audit committees in their respective countries. The guidelines on audit committees set by the IIA, AICPA, SEC, and the Treadway Commission have had a tremendous impact worldwide. Cultural differences may, however, limit the formation and effectiveness of audit committees globally even though auditing is a relatively homogeneous profession. The Institute of Internal Auditors, as an international professional association, may wish to consider the cultural dimensions of corporate governance in formulating professional internal auditing standards dealing with the structure and functions of audit committees internationally.

Accounting is a complex system, comprising numerous items and transactions that are interrelated in various ways. Management’s decisions are reflected in accounting information. The user of accounting information has a real need to comprehend such information in order to make informed decisions. The research reported in this article reveals that when the directors’ report fully complies with the letter and context of the Companies Act, it should be used as: a communication tool to enhance comprehensibility; as a mechanism to explain the economic reality of the company; and as a vehicle to reduce the gap between accounting information and the user. It should therefore be used as a knowledge‐creating statement, which the various stakeholders of the company can tap into.

This study aims to examine the extent to which UK directors failed to report their share trading in the timeframe required by extant regulations in the run‐up to the changes in insider trading law contained in the Financial Services and Markets Act.

The study investigates the extent of non‐compliance amongst the 7,461 trades reported to the London Stock Exchange by the directors of UK firms in the year 2000.

The results indicate that 1,055 (or 14 per cent) of directors' trades were reported late (or with the transaction date absent), with these being concentrated amongst “buy” transactions in both absolute and pro‐rata terms.

The evidence suggests that non‐compliance in the reporting of directors' transactions was common at the time when UK authorities chose to toughen the legal framework governing the conduct of trading based on private price‐sensitive information. Once sufficient time has elapsed, further studies should be able to provide evidence about the iterative impact of the new legal framework by comparing results with the findings of this study.

This is the first study to report a detailed examination of the extent of non‐compliance in the timing of directors' trades in their own equity.

Following the introduction of the revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in 2012 (MCCG 2012), this study aims to investigate the influence of corporate governance structure on the quality of sustainability reporting from the perspectives of agency theory and resource dependence theory.

Based on an analysis of 126 firms’ annual reports for the year ended 2010 and 2014, this study analyses sustainability reporting quality before the introduction of MCCG, 2012 (year ended 2010) and after (year ended 2014).

The findings of the study show that there was a significant increase in the quality of sustainability reporting from 2010 to 2014. Results from multiple regression analyses indicate that the number of sustainability-related training attended by the board of directors and the percentage of directors with sustainability-related experience have a significant impact on the quality of sustainability reporting.

Observations from the study provide useful insights into the importance of the appointment of directors with sustainability-related experience as part of the criteria for directors’ appointment. Moreover, the board of directors is encouraged to attend sustainability-related training to help firms improve sustainability practices and reporting.

The increase in the quality of sustainability reporting indicates that companies are committed in ensuring that environmental degradation is put at the minimum level if not eliminated. It appears that companies are embracing the concept of sustainability reporting, and hence, contributing to improving and enhancing social well-being.

This study contributes to the discussion of both internal mechanisms (board independence and board capital) and external mechanisms (compliance to the code on corporate governance) of corporate governance structure on the quality of sustainability reporting. The findings can be used to identify necessary mechanisms that should be enhanced to strengthen the practice of sustainability reporting.

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).

Performance measurements have become a prominent part of government steering of public agencies. At the same time, they are increasingly criticized for creating heavy administrative burdens. The purpose of this paper is to argue that consent on part of the heads of agencies is vital for making performance measurement an efficient tool for not only control but also organizational learning.

The paper reports a survey with a nearly total sample of Swedish Director Generals.

Findings suggest that Director Generals who feel that they are able to influence the goals and indicators of their agencies are significantly more willing to consent to the government’s reporting requirements.

The paper suggests that a more encompassing, interactive and participatory process might increase agency consent with reporting requirements.

The purpose of this study is to establish whether Irish listed firms comply with the substance of corporate governance guidance rather than the letter of the rule in the determination of director independence. The paper examines non-executive director independence from three perspectives: the first is from the viewpoint of the sample firms, the second from that given in corporate governance guidance when applied to the sample firms, and the third based on extensive financial statement analysis, prior research and prior literature. By exploring multiple perspectives of director independence, disparities in the interpretation of non-executive director independence can be identified.

Descriptive statistics and non-parametric statistical analysis are used to examine for differences between multiple perspectives of non-executive director independence.

The study identified significant disparities in the interpretation of independence by Irish listed firms. This may be explained by a misunderstanding of what director independence means, a deliberate choice to ignore pre-existing norms regarding NED independence or the desire to exceed such norms. The findings suggest Irish financial institutions exhibit higher levels of NED independence than the remaining sample firms explained in part by linkages with the institutions themselves. Findings suggest a lack of adequate oversight in the sample firms, which could ultimately lead to greater agency costs for shareholders.

Policymakers and other stakeholders valuing director independence may need to reassess guidelines for interpreting director independence and related reporting, policies regarding adherence to such guidelines and associated director training requirements.

This study is timely, topical and the first of its kind in relation to Irish listed firms and provides evidence into the lack of compliance within Irish listed companies with best practice guidance. The findings clearly identify a notable lack in a consistent means of interpretation in the sample firms as to what non-executive independence is and why it is an important part of good corporate governance. The paper provides a basis for future research. Such research may include studies of firm motivation in interpretation choice and comparative studies with other jurisdictions.