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This chapter examines the relationship between directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance and stock-price synchronicity by testing competing corporate governance-related monitoring and moral hazard-related agency conflict hypotheses. Testing a sample of stocks listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the Taipei Exchange for 2008–2020, the empirical results of this study indicate that D&O insurance in Taiwan is negatively correlated to stock-price synchronicity. This negative relation is robust to a battery of tests, including those of fixed-effects regression models, alternative sample periods, alternative synchronicity measures, and alternative insurance measures. Further evidence indicates that this negative relationship is more pronounced among firms with greater agency problems, especially during periods of high market uncertainty. Overall, these findings support the corporate governance-related monitoring hypothesis, which posits that firms with greater D&O insurance are likelier to be characterized by better governance structures and information transparency. Additionally, their stock prices are more likely to reflect firm-specific information in a timely and precise manner, and they are more likely to have lower synchronicity with the industry and market.

Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance hereafter) on corporate governance and firm performance, with a specific focus on investment efficiency.

Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from the period 2007 to 2020, this study uses Ordinary Least Squares regressions to investigate the research questions, as well as moderating and mediating effects. Additionally, alternative measures of investment efficiency are used, and the Heckman two-stage model and propensity score matching model are used to demonstrate the consistency of the findings and to mitigate the risk of endogeneity.

The findings of this study suggest that purchasing D&O insurance has a detrimental impact on corporate investment efficiency, particularly in the context of over-investment activities; robust internal governance mechanisms, exemplified by a higher shareholding ratio of the top shareholder and enhanced internal control quality, alleviate this negative effect; and financing constraints act as a mediating factor in the association between D&O insurance and investment efficiency.

Corporate investment efficiency is of significant importance for both national macroeconomic growth and micro-enterprise development. Notably, the prevalence of D&O insurance among Chinese firms is progressively increasing, thus exerting a growing influence. This study contributes to the existing literature on D&O insurance and corporate investment efficiency, providing valuable insights into the economic impact of D&O insurance on Chinese firms. The empirical evidence presented herein facilitates future reforms and adjustments.

This study aims to investigate whether firms purchase directors' and officers' liability (D&O) insurance when the country-level economic policy uncertainty (EPU) is high.

This study uses D&O insurance data from Chinese listed firms between 2003 and 2019 to conduct regression analyses to examine the association between D&O insurance and EPU.

The results show that government EPU, despite being an exogenous factor, increases the likelihood of firms' purchasing D&O insurance, and this effect is more pronounced when firms are exposed to great share price crash risk and high litigation risk, suggesting that firms intend to purchase D&O insurance possibly due to the accentuated stock price crash risk and litigation risk associated with EPU. In addition, the results indicate that the effect of EPU on the D&O insurance purchase decision is moderated by the provincial capital market development and internal control quality.

The study highlights the role of uncertain economic policies in shareholder approval of D&O insurance purchases.

The study enriches the literature on the determinants of D&O insurance purchases by documenting novel evidence that country-level EPU is a key institutional factor shaping firms' decisions to purchase D&O insurance.

In order to succeed in an action under the Equal Pay Act 1970, should the woman and the man be employed by the same employer on like work at the same time or would the woman still be covered by the Act if she were employed on like work in succession to the man? This is the question which had to be solved in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith. Unfortunately it was not. Their Lordships interpreted the relevant section in different ways and since Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome was also subject to different interpretations, the case has been referred to the European Court of Justice.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

Directors and officers are facing a continuing crisis in D&O liability insurance, and many may lack the coverage they thought they had to protect their personal assets. The factors threatening the availability of adequate D&O coverage are growing in number and severity. They include the soaring cost of settling class action suits; the increase in such suits; new trends in securities litigation that the industry is hesitating to address appropriately; the dilution of coverage because many D&O contracts are trying to do too much; and the uncertainty injected into the market by the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002. Because many insurers are ailing financially, some are trying to rescind policies just when a company and its directors and officers need the policy most. Also, in efforts to attract new business, some are offering superficially attractive contracts and allowing misperceptions of how the contracts actually work, leading to the possibility of deep disappointments for insureds.

This study empirically investigates the impact of directors' and officers' liability insurance on corporate environmental investment.

This paper takes A-share listed firms in the most polluting industries from 2013 to 2019 as the research sample. The authors perform multiple regression analysis to examine the research question, and other approaches such as PSM and Heckman two-stage model are applied to test the robustness of the main results.

The authors find that D&O insurance insured firms significantly decrease the level of corporate environmental investment. The results keep consistent after alleviating potential endogenous concerns. Further analysis shows that the negative association between D&O insurance and environmental investment is more pronounced in firms facing greater environmental pressure and stronger market supervision, and firms located in regions with a rich legal environment.

This research extends the literature on the antecedents of corporate environmental investment and the consequences of D&O insurance.

The study may deepen people's understanding of D&O insurance and inform them of its negative effects. This research sheds light on the potential factor resulting in a relatively low level of corporate environmental investment in China, which has an important policy implication for government to carry out some regulations to make a difference.

Against the backdrop that more importance has been attached to environmental protection globally, this paper is the first study to examine the impact of D&O insurance on corporate environmental investment in the context of the transitional and emerging market-China.

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relations between the directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance and digital transformation of Chinese-listed companies to provide insights into triggers of digital transformation from the perspective of D&Os' incentive plan.

Based on a panel dataset of 2,590 listed manufacturing companies in China from 2017 to 2020, and using a textual analysis of annual reports, this paper empirically examines the impact of D&O insurance on digital transformation. The authors investigate the mechanism through a mediating model and apply a series of robustness tests including firm fixed effect model, propensity score matching and changing key measures.

The research shows that the digital transformation has been negatively influenced by D&O insurance. The long coverage duration of D&O insurance significantly lowers the level of digital transformation. The moral hazard problem caused by D&O insurance has hampered digital transformation through reducing explorative innovation, while there has been no significant change in innovation quantity. Under the coverage of D&O insurance, firms with worse internal governance and state-owned firms are more reluctant to invest in risky transformation than their counterparts.

Based on a textual analysis of annual reports, this paper empirically tests the influential mechanism of D&O insurance coverage on digital transformation. The authors provide insights into non-tech triggers of digital transformation and uncover how incentive plans influences D&Os' behaviors. This paper provides a new angle to the debate on governance-strengthening and governance-weakening role of D&O insurance.