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The prime objective of this study is to investigate the moderating influence of executive and independent female directors on the relationship between remuneration packages (CEO and executive director) and socially responsible practices (marketplace, environment, community, workplace and money spent on CSR) of 483 Malaysian listed firms during 2006–2017.

The dynamic estimator, namely, system generalized method of moments (GMM) given by Blundell and Bond (1998) has been employed on the dataset to control dynamic endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity problems.

Findings indicate that there is a significant relationship between remuneration patterns of CEOs and executive directors and socially responsible activities. In the same way, executive board gender diversity significantly, whereas independent board gender diversity insignificantly moderates the remuneration and CSR nexus.

This study is particularly significant for regulatory bodies of Malaysia, e.g. Securities Commission Malaysia, Bursa Malaysia, policy makers, investors and managers. For academia, this study fetches support from agency theory, stakeholder theory and upper echelons theory and presents integrated theoretical approach to be considered for future research.

This paper is unique in providing empirical evidence on the moderating effect of both executive and independent women directors on the relationship between remuneration patterns of CEOs and executive directors and independent CSR activities for the first time. Moreover, this study has sourced several theoretical and practical implications. And, the study employs dynamic estimator for precise and concrete results.

This paper aims to examine the two different approaches adopted in the UK to regulate directors’ remuneration. The paper also aims to explore the two approaches to understand which one better regulates directors’ pay and why. It provides an account of the two approaches’ evolution, effectiveness and challenges towards the regulation of directors’ remuneration. The paper will also make some recommendations on both approaches and the way forward to better regulate directors’ remuneration.

The paper reviews various corporate governance codes, its recommendations on directors’ remuneration, its effectiveness and the challenges it face in regulating directors’ remuneration. The paper also reviews provisions of the Companies Act 2006 on directors’ remuneration, its effectiveness and challenges faced.

The paper finds that corporate governance adopts a better approach to regulating directors’ pay than the Companies Act 2006 because it targets the pay setting process. However, the existence of grey areas and lack of enforcement procedure poses a challenge on its effectiveness. The Companies Act 2006 is unable to regulate directors’ pay adequately because it adopts a corrective approach and it considers directors’ remuneration as a management responsibility.

The paper offers an up-to-date assessment of the two approaches to regulating directors’ pay in the UK. It highlights the challenges faced by both approaches and which approach could regulate directors pay better and its challenges. The paper further makes recommendations on how the regulation of directors’ remuneration can be effective in the UK.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of family directors and independent directors on executive remuneration of listed family firms in Malaysia, and their involvement in remuneration committee on executive remuneration.

Fixed effect estimation is employed to examine 1,395 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2014.

Family and independent directors do not have statistically significant influence on executive remuneration. Rather, family ownership exerts a significant positive influence on executive remuneration. This study also reveals that the interaction of family CEOs with the family directors on remuneration committee exerts a significant positive influence on executive remuneration.

The measurement of executive remuneration excludes the share options due to the non-disclosure of this information in the annual reports.

The findings would be useful to the policy-makers and regulators in appraising the governance measures of remuneration arrangement.

This study premises on the Type II agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Independent directors could not mitigate the Type II agency conflict via the governance of executive remuneration. They are not the effective governance mechanism that the minority shareholders can rely on. The additional analyses provide theoretical implication that the pervasive Type II agency conflict is ameliorated when the CEOs do not have family relationships with the controlling family shareholders.

The purpose of this study is to study the evolution of French corporate governance law in light of collibration approach and bring statistical evidence from French Companies Executive Compensation practices.

The study has used mixed methods. In the first part, the authors analyzed the French laws in the light of collibration. In the second part of the study, the authors used unbalanced panel data to test the hypotheses related to executive remuneration based on the theoretical underpinning of collibration. Data for 173 firms listed in the Euronext Paris Index is collected from the Bloomberg database. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) analysis is performed to investigate the impact of collibration on the governance disclosure of French-listed firms.

SUR results indicate that board size plays a significant role in the governance disclosure before collibration. However, the collibration model is found to be more effective in ensuring the desired level of governance disclosure. Under the collibration approach, executive remuneration, frequency of board meetings, executive directors in the compensation committee and independent directors play a significant role in governance disclosure. Board size, however, does not have a substantial impact on governance disclosure after the adoption of collibration mechanism.

Results provided by this study can allow regulators to improve corporate disclosure regime in France, which could play a vital role in safeguarding the interest of stakeholder.

The authors study the impact of collibration on the extent of governance disclosure in the context of France. Empirical evidence on the implication of collibration as governance mechanisms to enhance stakeholder confidence is rare and allows this study to make a unique contribution to the governance literature.

In the wake of certain corporate scandals, many stakeholders are questioning if current high levels of executive remuneration, world-wide, are in fact related to company performance. After the implementation of King III in 2010, there has been an expectation that governance has improved in South African companies. If so, empirical testing should find executive remuneration to be positively related to forms of performance that reflect an increase in company value, like Tobin's Q, or return on assets, rather than measures such as total revenue.

Agency theory predicts that if executive remuneration is not carefully designed to maximise the value of the company, executive directors will tend to maximise revenue instead. To test this prediction, hand-collected panel data from Johannesburg Stock Exchange company reports are linked to company performance data to test this prediction, across the years 2010–2017, post King III.

Results challenge certain important assumptions. Generalised method of moments tests find total revenue, rather than value added measures of performance such as Tobin's Q or return on assets, to predict executive director remuneration. This is notwithstanding the significance of Tobin's Q in testing based on ordinary least squares. Implications of these findings for the field are derived and discussed.

Unique findings suggest that complacency about the relationships between executive director compensation and company performance is unwarranted. In light of a decline in the country's international rankings on the quality of its corporate governance, a renewed focus on the effectiveness of human resource compensation strategy may be necessary in this context.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of company performance, governance structure and ownership structure in determining the managerial remuneration for 134 listed companies in India over the years 2003-2012.

Remuneration paid to the board of directors of companies is taken to represent the managerial remuneration. Exogeneity among the company performance measures is verified with the endogtest suggested in Baum et al. (2007). A fixed effects panel regression with clustered standard errors is employed after checking for the presence of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence in the data.

The study reveals that managerial remuneration increases as the accounting performance of companies improves, whereas the market performance of companies has no significant association with managerial remuneration. The study also shows that foreign institutional shareholding is significantly and positively related with managerial remuneration in India.

This study highlights the various factors which affect the determination of managerial remuneration in India. These findings can be used as inputs by regulatory authorities in framing and improving governance norms regarding managerial remuneration. This study also suggests that factors other than the number, the independence and objectivity of independent directors are more important in determining managerial remuneration.

The present study proposes more reliable results, obtained through a fixed effects panel regression model with clustered standard error estimates and also checks endogeneity of performance measures with the endogtest, which is the appropriate test to use for verifying endogeneity in panel data.

This paper aims to examine the Salomon principle of separate legal personality and its impact on the regulation of directors’ remuneration in the UK. The aim of the paper is to explore the Salomon principle to determine whether it serves as a driving factor for directors’ remuneration levels. The paper will also examine the restrictive approach of the courts to move away from the principle and their reluctance to get involved in directors’ remuneration issues of a company. The paper explains the Salomon principle, describes the nature of the problem on directors’ remuneration and provides an analysis on how the Salomon principle impacts on the directors’ remuneration.

The paper reviews case law, statutory provisions and academic opinions on the directors’ remuneration and the concept of separate legal entity. The paper critically reviews the impact of the concept of separate entity on directors’ remuneration.

The paper finds that the courts are reluctant to come away from the concept of separate legal personality as well as reluctant to get involved with directors’ remuneration. This reluctance of the court makes the concept of separate legal personality to act as one of the drivers of directors’ remuneration.

The paper offers a different explanation into why directors’ remuneration continuous to be an issue in the UK. It points out that the concept of separate legal personality is a potential driver of directors’ remuneration in the UK.

Companies around the globe increasingly receive immense shareholder scrutiny due to perceivably excessive executive director remuneration. The debate in South Africa intensifies due to severe pay inequality. The authors thus accounted for the perspectives of asset managers and listed financial services companies in South Africa pertaining to the impact of voting and engagement on director pay policies and practices.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with selected asset managers, chief executive officers, chief financial officers and remuneration committee members of listed financial services companies to gauge their views on the impact of shareholder activism endeavours on remuneration governance. The qualitative data was analysed by conducting thematic analysis.

Most of the asset managers and financial services representatives preferred proactive, private engagement on pay concerns, given the impact thereof on voting outcomes, and ultimately director remuneration practices and policies. Independent remuneration committees have a prominent role in facilitating engagements with investors to ensure fair remuneration.

The consequences should be clearer if organisations receive substantial votes against their pay policies and implementation reports. South African regulators can consider the “two-strikes” rule to ensure that action is taken in response to shareholder voting on director remuneration matters.

Representatives of asset managers and listed financial services investee companies offered valuable insights on remuneration governance deliberations in an emerging market. This in-depth analysis highlights the importance of proactive engagement to ensure that corporate leaders are paid fairly.