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In this paper we assess the management costs of delivering services under alternative institutional arrangements. We develop an analytic framework based on transaction cost and public sector network theories to identify management costs public managers face in delivering services directly and via contract. Results from a survey of refuse collection managers in Ohio indicate that direct service provision carries higher management costs, though when combined with vendors’ activities, contracting carries more monitoring costs. These results suggest two important contributions to knowledge and contract management practice. First, we develop an innovative approach to assessing management costs. Second, we use our framework to determine whether there are differences in management costs under alternative institutional arrangements that managers should take into account as they approach the “make or buy” decision.

Boards of directors are assumed to exercise three key accountability roles – control, monitoring and oversight roles. By researching one board type – investment fund boards – and the power relations around those boards, the purpose of this paper is to show that such boards are not capable of operating the three key roles assumed of them.

The authors conducted 25 in-depth interviews and a focus group session with investment fund directors applying a grounded theory methodology.

Because of their unique position of power, the authors find that fund promoter organisations (that establish and attract investors to the funds) exercise control and monitoring roles. As a result, contrary to prior assumptions, oversight is the primary role of investment fund boards, rather than the control role or monitoring role associated with corporate boards. The findings can be extended to other board-of-director contexts in which boards (e.g. subsidiary boards, boards of state-owned entities) have legal responsibility but limited power because of power exercised by other parties such as large shareholders.

Shareholders and regulators generally assume boards exercise control and monitoring roles. This can lead to an expectations gap on the part of shareholders and regulators who may not consider the practical realities in which boards operate. This expectations gap compromises the very objective of governance – investor protection.

Based on interviews with investment fund directors, the authors challenge the control-role theory of investment fund boards of directors. Building on our findings, and following subsequent conceptual engagement with the literature, the authors differentiate control, monitoring and oversight roles, terms which are often used interchangeably in prior research. The authors distinguish between the three terms on the basis of the level of influence implied by each.

A major theme in the literature on bank regulation is that greater reliance on market forces can mitigate the moral hazard problem inherent in government sponsored deposit insurance. Specific proposals to impose greater market discipline on banks include minimum requirements on (1) uninsured subordinated debt financing (either fixed-term or with option-type features), and (2) private coinsurance on deposits. Both proposals amount to delegating the responsibility for bank regulation to various private sector claimholders. The results suggest that such delegation (with or without claims that include option-type features) may be ineffective in lowering bank risk, at least within the present regulatory and institutional framework. Alternative mechanisms exist that can mitigate the moral hazard problem; however, it may be necessary for the regulator/deposit insurer to be an integral part of the solution.

Corrosion monitoring techniques fall broadly into two categories: those which provide simple numeric data for control purposes, and those which offer a spectrum of information for diagnostic purposes. Corrosion monitoring can be carried out directly at locations susceptible to corrosion, or indirectly under conditions simulating susceptible but inaccessible points. The interpretation of the data can reflect the purpose of monitoring at the particular location. A consistent form of presentation, and comparative tabulation including statistical analysis can greatly facilitate correlation and trend spotting. Broad spectrum techniques may give an early indication of new problems. An effective internal corrosion monitoring programme can make a major contribution towards the control of plant operating costs.

The purpose of this paper is to test the theory of optimal monitoring, which posits that more generous county homestead exemptions lower the incentive for residents to monitor school operations, thereby increasing inefficiency in service outcomes.

This research uses two-stage Simar and Wilson’s data envelopment analysis to assess county school districts’ efficiency in the state of Georgia for each year from 2007 to 2012.

Controlling for other factors known to be correlated with government efficiency, such as fiscal capacity and competition, this study finds evidence that higher property tax burdens resulting from lower county school district homestead exemptions, as a proxy of more intense citizens’ monitoring pressures, are associated with improved county school district performance efficiency. These results provide empirical support for the theory of optimal monitoring.

Increased government funding toward education is more likely to improve education outcomes if accompanied by efficiency control mechanisms. One such mechanism could be increased transparency of government operations and accountability of public officials.

This research uses a newer and more robust estimation of relative efficiency and analyzes a more common type of property tax exemption. This improves the internal validity and generalizability of the findings regarding the theory of optimal monitoring.

What are the performance implications of peer monitoring in a multiple-supplier context? Grounded in agency and social exchange theories, this study aims to examine how, when, and why peer monitoring works as a crucial control mechanism to reduce opportunism among suppliers.

A conceptual model and research hypotheses are tested using survey data from 246 respondents in 82 supplier groups.

Results suggest that peer monitoring is related positively to perceived deterrence (as mediator) and negatively to opportunism, whereas the mediated relationship is moderated negatively by generalized reciprocity and positively by balanced reciprocity and negative reciprocity.

This study introduces the application of peer monitoring into business-to-business research and shows how it reduces opportunism. Its findings have implications for manufacturers on how to use peer monitoring to control opportunism among multiple suppliers.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute significantly to the first wave of empirical investigations related to the impact of green supply chain management practices on environmental and organizational performance from a manufacturer's perspective within a supply chain context.

An environmental collaboration and monitoring performance model is theorized and assessed following a structural equation methodology. Data were collected from 159 manufacturing managers through an on‐line survey.

Environmental collaboration and monitoring practices among supply chain partners are found to lead to improved environmental performance and organizational performance.

As a first wave investigation of the impact of green supply chain management practices on performance, the study is somewhat exploratory.

Practitioners are provided with a framework for assessing the impact of environmental collaboration and monitoring practices among supply chain partners on environmental performance and organizational performance. The study provides evidence that green supply chain practices lead to improved environmental and organizational performance.

The results also have important societal implications. While green supply chain management practices enhance the economic sustainability of the firm, they also positively impact society through improvements to the overall environment.

The results of this investigation support the proposition that implementation of environmental collaboration and monitoring practices by supply chain partners are both environmentally necessary and good business. The paper provides manufacturing managers with a structured approach to improving both environmental and organizational performance through environmental collaboration and monitoring with customers and suppliers.

Board monitoring should affect a firm's access to debt financing because it improves firm performance and the board is ultimately responsible for the firm's debt. In this study, we show empirically that access to debt financing indeed benefits in two ways from board monitoring: directly from the monitoring and indirectly from improvement in performance. The methodological challenge is in separating the two effects from each other and from those of other drivers of debt financing.

Faced with the financing problem of small-medium enterprises (SMEs), China has attempted to establish as many as third party's collateral institutions. The paper aims to study the design of collateral arrangements including collateral fee rates, risk sharing, collateral capital requirements, types of collateral institutions and recollateral institution, etc.

The paper extends the model of Holmstrom and Tirole to develop the analytic framework of the theory of financing collateral. From the perspective of contract design, the paper establishes a moral hazard model focusing on the minimum capital requirement of the borrower under the condition of risk neutral and limited liability, while considering the structure of lender-collateral institution-borrower.

According to the research, only under certain conditions can third party's collateral arrangements tackle the financing problems of SMEs. Diversification, anti-collateral and linked-transactions are three means to improve financing conditions, but the most important way is efficient monitoring by collateral institutions, especially when it has relative advantage over the lender. In order to improve financing conditions of SMEs, China should rely more on efficient monitoring by banks not on excess development of collateral institutions, meanwhile relax rigid collateral supervision policies. Collateral institutions should be industry-specific, association or transaction-related type.

First, from the perspective of contract design, the paper analyzes the comprehensive institutional arrangements of third party's collateral considering mutual relationships of component elements and develops the analytic framework of the theory of third party's collateral, especially points out necessary conditions of its efficient arrangements. Second, the paper studies various efficient financing mechanisms under the institutional arrangements of third party's collateral and focusing on the role of monitoring and monitors, and the paper also has important policy implications, i.e. the paper should develop specific collateral institutions and promote monitoring role of credit institutions.

This study investigates the relationship between personal values and feedback‐seeking behaviors. Feedbackseeking behaviors, or the way by which individuals in organizations actively seek information about their performance, has recently become an important research topic in the management literature. However, the large majority of this research has been conducted in the United States. This study aims to test the relationships between the personal values of a multinational sample and feedback‐seeking behaviors. An integrated set of hypotheses regarding the influence of values on feedback seeking are outlined and tested empirically using samples from Canada, China, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United States. As predicted, results indicate that significant aspects of feedback seeking were related to personal values. The perceived cost of feedback seeking, the clarity of the feedback from others, and the use of feedback‐seeking behaviors were all linked to personal values. The study also uncovered substantial variations in feedback‐seeking behaviors across nations. The implications of these findings for research on feedback‐seeking behaviors and for feedback practices are discussed.