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The authors characterize the conditions under which a country may eventually split and when it splits within an infinite horizon multi-stage differential game.

In contrast to the existing literature, the authors do not assume that after splitting, players will adopt Markovian strategies. Instead, the authors assume that while the splitting country plays Markovian, the remaining coalition remains committed to the collective control of pollution and plays open-loop.

Within a full linear-quadratic model, the authors characterize the optimal strategies. The authors later compare with the outcomes of the case where the splitting country and the remaining coalition play both Markovian. The authors highlight several interesting results in terms of the implications for long-term pollution levels and the duration of coalitions under heterogenous strategies as compared to Markovian behavior.

In this paper, the authors have illustrated the richness of the simplications of enlarging the set of strategies in terms of the emergence of coalitions, their duration and the implied welfare levels per player. Varying only three parameters (the technological gap, pollution damage and coalition payoff share distribution across players), the authors have been able to generate, among other findings, quite different rankings of welfare per player depending on whether the remaining coalitions after split play Markovian or stay precommited to the pre-splitting period decisions.

The managerial questions of this paper are as follows, and the authors are trying to solve them: How revenue sharing contract (CSR) degree and government subsidy affect the agri-food quality? What kind of model (WPC, revenue-sharing contract [RSC] and cooperative) would be more effective in motivating manufacturers and retailer to increase effort and improve agri-food quality? What kind of model (WPC, RSC and cooperative) would make manufacturer and retailer better off?

Considering the jointing quality effort and contract decision in green agri-food supply chain, this paper proposes six models that consider CSR of manufacturer and retailer, and then the obtained optimal solutions are compared and analyzed. At the same time, the impact of government subsidies is analyzed, and corresponding conclusions are drawn.

The results show that, first of all, whether the increasing CSR of the manufacturer or the retailer can motivate both parties to improve the agri-food quality effort investment. Second, the WPC and RSC contract may play different role in different cases. Finally, under the model with government subsidies, regarding positive influence of government subsidies on efforts of manufacturer and retailer, quality and profits of members is investigated. Based on these conclusions, this study puts forward the following policy suggestions. Firstly, governments should formulate reasonable subsidy policies to support manufacturer and retailer to improve the agri-food quality, thereby promoting green industries' development. Secondly, manufacturer and retailer should actively improve CSR and strengthen the effort of agri-food so as to advance quality. Finally, manufacturer and retailer can choose cooperative model or WPC contract.

In this paper, one manufacturer and one retailer are considered. Since the agri-food supply chain structure in reality is more complicated, the future research direction can consider the supply chain structure with one manufacturer and multiple retailers. In addition, this paper only considers the subsidy, and future research can classify the subsidy into different types.

The study makes two substantive contributions to the body of knowledge in the field of sustainable operations:(1) incorporating quality-based demand function in supply chain and dynamic process of agri-food quality; (2) exploring the impact of CSR awareness of members and subsidy of government on agri-food quality, and comparing the influence in different models.

This study aims to focus on the optimal green R&D of a capital-constrained supply chain under different channel power structures as well as the impact of capital constraint, financing cost, channel power structure and cost-reducing efficiency on green R&D and supply chain profitability.

A two-echelon supply chain is considered. The upstream firm engages in green R&D but has capital constraints that can be overcome by external financing. Green R&D is beneficial to reduce production costs and increase consumer demand. Based on whether or not the upstream firm is capital constrained and dominates the supply chain, four models are developed.

Capital constraints significantly lower green R&D and supply chain profitability. Transferring leadership from the upstream to the downstream firms leads to higher green R&D levels and downstream firm profitability, whereas the upstream firm's profitability is increased (decreased) if green R&D investment efficiency is high (low) enough. Greater financing costs reduce green R&D and downstream firm profitability; however, the upstream firm's profitability under the model in which it functions as the follower increases if the initial capital is sufficient. More importantly, empirical analysis based on practice data is used to verify the theoretical results reported above.

This study reveals how upstream firms in supply chains decide green R&D decisions in situations with capital constraints, providing managers and governments with an understanding of the impact of capital constraint, channel power structure, financing cost and cost-reducing efficiency on supply chain green R&D and profitability.

The major contributions are the exploration of supply chain green R&D by taking into consideration channel power structures and cost-reducing efficiency and the validation of theoretical results using practice data.

In this paper, the author presents a hybrid method along with its error analysis to solve (1+2)-dimensional non-linear time-space fractional partial differential equations (FPDEs).

The proposed method is a combination of Sumudu transform and a semi-analytc technique Daftardar-Gejji and Jafari method (DGJM).

The author solves various non-trivial examples using the proposed method. Moreover, the author obtained the solutions either in exact form or in a series that converges to a closed-form solution. The proposed method is a very good tool to solve this type of equations.

The present work is original. To the best of the author's knowledge, this work is not done by anyone in the literature.

The authors consider the mutual benefits of the ceding company and reinsurance company in the design of reinsurance contracts. Two objective functions to maximize social expected utilities are established, which are to maximize the sum of the expected utilities of both the ceding company and reinsurance company, and to maximize their products. The first objective function, additive, emphasizes the total gains of both parties, while the second, multiplicative, accounts for the degree of substitution of gains of one party through the loss of the other party. The optimal price and retention of reinsurance are found by a grid search method, and numerical analysis is conducted. The results indicate that the optimal solutions for two objective functions are quite different. However, optimal solutions are sensitive to the change of the means and volatilities of the claim loss for both objective functions. The results are potentially valuable to insurance regulators and government entities acting as reinsurers of last resort.

In this paper, the authors apply relatively simple, but in the view significant, methods and models to discuss the optimization of excess loss reinsurance strategy. The authors only consider the influence of loss distribution on optimal retention and reinsurance price but neglect the investment factor. The authors also consider the benefits of both ceding company and reinsurance company to determine optimal premium and retention of reinsurance jointly based on maximizing social utility: the sum (or the product) of expected utilities of reinsurance company and ceding company. The authors solve for optimal solutions numerically, applying simulation.

This paper establishes two optimization models of excess-of-loss reinsurance contract against catastrophic losses to determine optimal premium and retention. One model considers the sum of the expected utilities of a ceding company and a reinsurance company's expected utility; another considers the product of them. With an example, the authors find the optimal solutions of premium and retention of excess loss reinsurance. Finally, the authors carry out the sensitivity analysis. The results show that increasing the means and the volatilities of claim loss will increase the optimal retention and premium. For objective function I, increasing the coefficients of risk aversion of or reducing the coefficients of risk aversion of will make the optimal retention reduced but the optimal premium increased, and vice versa. However, for objective function 2, the change of coefficient of risk aversion has no effect on optimal solutions.

Utility of the two partners: The ceding company and the reinsurance company, may have different weights and different significance. The authors have not studied their relative significance. The simulation approach in numerical methods limits us to the probability distributions and stochastic processes the authors use, based on, generally speaking, lognormal models of rates of return. This may need to be generalized to other returns, including possible models of shocks through jump processes.

In the recent two decades, reinsurance companies have played a great role in hedging mega-catastrophic losses. For example, reinsurance companies (and special loss sharing arrangements) paid as much as two-thirds of the insured losses for the September 11, 2001 tragedy. Furthermore, large catastrophic events have increased the role of governments and regulators as reinsurers of last resort. The authors hope that the authors provide guidance for possible balancing of the needs of two counterparties to reinsurance contracts.

Nearly all governments around the world are engaged in regulation of insurance and reinsurance, and some are reinsurers themselves. The authors provide guidance for them in these activities.

The authors believe this paper to be a completely new and original contribution in the area, by providing models for balancing the utility to the ceding insurance company and the reinsurance company.

我們探討分出公司和再保險公司在再保險合約的設計上、如何能達至互利互惠。研究確立了兩個目標函數，分別為把分出公司和再保險公司兩者之預期效用的總和最大化，以及把它們的產品最佳化。第一個目標函數是加法的，強調兩個參與方的總增益;而第二個目標函數則是乘法的，這個目標函數，闡釋參與方因另一方虧損而有所收益之取代度。再保險的最佳價格和自留額是利用網格搜索法找出的，數值分析也予以進行。研究結果顯示，兩個目標函數的最佳解決方案甚為不同。唯最佳解決方案會對就這兩個目標函數而言的追討損失的波動、以及其平均值之改變產生敏感反應。研究結果將會見其價值於作為在萬不得已的時候的再保險人的保險業規管機構和政府實體。

在這學術論文裡，我們採用了相對簡單、但我們認為是重要的方法和模型，來探討超額賠款再保險策略的優化課題。我們只考慮虧損分佈對最佳自留額和再保險價格的影響，而不去檢視投資因素。我們亦考慮對分出公司和再保險公司兩者的利益，來釐定最佳保費和再保險的自留額，而這兩者則共同建基於把社會效益最大化之上：再保險公司和分出公司的預期效益的總和 (或其積數) 。 我們採用類比模仿方法、來解決尋求在數字上最佳解決方案的問題。

本研究建立了就應對嚴重虧損而設的兩個超額賠款再保險合約的優化模型，來釐定最佳的保費和自留額。其中一個模型考慮了分出公司和再保險公司兩者各自的預期效益的總和。另外的一個模型則考慮了兩者的預期效益的積數。透過例子，我們找到了保費和超額虧損再保險自留額的最佳解決方案。最後，我們進行了敏感度分析。研究結果顯示、若增加追討損失的平均值和波動，則最佳自留額和保費也會隨之而增加。就第一個目標函數而言，若增加風險規避係數、或減少這個係數，則最佳自留額會隨之而減少，但最佳保費卻會隨之而增加，反之亦然。唯就第二個目標函數而言，風險規避係數的改變，對最佳解決方案是沒有影響的。

• – 有關的兩個夥伴之效用性：分出公司和再保險公司或有不同的份量和重要性。我們沒有探討兩者的相對重要性。

• – 我們以數值方法為核心的類比模仿研究法、使我們局限於機率分配和一般而言建基於投資報酬率對數常態模型之隨機過程的使用。我們或許需要調節研究法。以能概括其它回報收益，包括透過跳躍過程而可能達至之沖擊模型。

– 有關的兩個夥伴之效用性：分出公司和再保險公司或有不同的份量和重要性。我們沒有探討兩者的相對重要性。

– 我們以數值方法為核心的類比模仿研究法、使我們局限於機率分配和一般而言建基於投資報酬率對數常態模型之隨機過程的使用。我們或許需要調節研究法。以能概括其它回報收益，包括透過跳躍過程而可能達至之沖擊模型。

在過去20年裡，再保險公司在控制極嚴重災難性的損失上曾扮演重要的角色。例如、再保險公司 (以及特殊的損失分擔安排) 為了2001年9月11日的災難事件而支付多至保險損失的三分之二的費用。而且，重大的災難性事件使政府及作為最後出路再保險人的調控者得扮演更重要的角色。我們希望研究結果能為再保險合約兩對手提供指導，以平衡雙方的需要。

全球差不多每個政府都參與保險和再保險的管理工作，有部份更加本身就是再保險人。研究結果為他們的管理工作提供了指導。

我們相信本學術論文、提供了平衡分出保險公司和再保險公司效用性的模型，就此而言，本論文在相關的領域上作出了全新和獨創性的貢獻。

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether a Nash equilibrium of a two-country trading economy is symmetry-breaking or not.

The approach to tackle this topic is a theoretical treatment by the general equilibrium trade theory and game theory.

If each government's domestic policy serving private production is diminishing to the private production scale, the Nash equilibrium is not symmetry-breaking.

In the existing study of Chatterjee (2017), a similar result is derived by focusing on the properties of each country's GDP function. The authors, however, consider an economy where each country's PPF is strictly concave and show that the Nash equilibrium uniquely exists and this equilibrium is symmetry.

This paper attempts to develop a simple, static model of tax administration that is capable of explaining the widespread collusive petty tax administration corruption observed in developing countries.

This paper utilizes a positivist research framework and adopts a theoretical method of analysis, although secondary data will also be mentioned to support theoretical arguments whenever it is appropriate to do so.

A high rate of collusive tax corruption is inevitable in developing countries.

The model is static and needs to be extended into a dynamic model.

Traditional enforcement tools such as higher audits or a higher penalty regime against tax evasion do not work. Tax simplification can lessen the incidence of tax corruption.

Fighting tax corruption requires significant changes in the attitudes of taxpayers and tax auditors.

This paper combines the literature on Kantian economics and tax compliance in an innovative fashion.

The authors investigate the impact of standards compliance on the participation in the global value chain and labour value-added of Vietnam’s small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

The authors use a three-period panel dataset of SMEs combined with Vietnam’s Provincial Competitiveness Index. The authors also use multiple econometric models; and with each model, the authors include all independent variables that are available from the study's data and that are suggested by the literature.

The authors find that standards compliance by Vietnam’s SMEs improved their participation in the global value chain via subcontracts with FDI multinational firms. The authors also find that standards compliance improved the value-added of labour in Vietnam’s SMEs, which is robust to the choice of econometric models.

The study's results suggest that better outcomes for firms and society will be possible if standards are recognised and respected.

This paper complements scant literature on the impact of standards compliance on global value chain participation via subcontracting work and labour value-added, especially in developing countries.

The current paper aims to present a formal model illustrating how payoff imbalances among the members of a team of decision makers (DMs) who must undertake a project condition the final outcome obtained. This result builds on the fact that payoffs imbalances would lead to different performance levels among the employees and managers who compose a team. The analysis is applied to a strategic environment, where a project requiring coordination among the DMs within the team must be developed.

The intuition behind the strategic framework on which the results are based is twofold. The authors build on the literature on social comparisons and assume that employees and managers acquire information on the payoffs received by other members of the team while being affected by the resulting comparisons, and they follow the economic literature on firm boundaries determined via incomplete contracts. In this case, employees and managers may underperform if they feel aggrieved by the outcome of the contract giving place to deadweight losses when developing the project.

The authors illustrate how a team-based performance reward structure may lead to a coordinated equilibrium even when team managers and employees receive different payoffs and exhibit shading incentives based on the payoff differentials between them. The authors will also illustrate how identical shading intensities by both groups of DMs imply that shading by the managers imposes a lower cost on the profit structure of the firm because it leads to a lower decrease in the cooperation incentives of the other members of the team. Finally, the authors show how differences in shading intensity between both types of DMs trigger a strategic defect mechanism within the team that determines the outcome of the project.

The novel environment of team cooperation and defection through shading introduced in this paper is designed to deal with the strategic decisions taken by DMs when undertaking a project within a group. In particular, the intensity of shading applied by the DMs will be endogenously determined by the relative payoffs received, which allows to account for different scenarios, where relative payoff differentials among DMs determine the outcome of the project.