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Consideration is given to the extent to which the DSM and ICD approach to psychiatric case definition and treatment supports clinical activity. Their validity as a way of defining ‘mental illness’ is found wanting and they do not, in themselves, usefully guide treatment. These conclusions are set in a critical realist approach to ‘mental illness’, which draws attention to the legitimacy of several differing perspectives, each reflecting their own sets of interests and allegiances. DSM‐V and ICD‐11 are due to be published in 2012 and 2014 respectively, and their architects are called upon to be clear about which of these constituencies they are representing.

Purpose – This chapter has two central purposes. The first is to suggest that western, as well as non-western, illness categories are culture bound. The second is to elucidate the diagnostic and treatment implications associated with adopting a reductionistic diagnostic approach, including for psychiatric as well as nonpsychiatric illnesses.

Approach – A comparative approach is used to highlight the differences between American psychiatry's diagnostic system (i.e., DSM) and French child psychiatry's diagnostic system (CFTMEA). The analysis begins by identifying the overarching differences between the systems, then analyzes the differences between their respective versions of the Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder diagnostic category, and ends by tracing the diagnostic and treatment implications of those differences.

Findings – This analysis reveals that the systems differ in three significant ways: (1) theoretical orientation (biological vs. psychodynamic), (2) the view that symptoms should be counted as opposed to understood, and (3) the presence of symptom checklists versus their absence. Additionally, these differences encourage American clinicians to both administer the ADHD diagnosis to a greater number of symptomatic children and to treat these children with psychiatric medications.

Contributions to the field – The analysis makes three contributions to the field: (1) the comparative analysis highlights the limitations of the DSM's ADHD definition; (2) it strengthens the case for seeing western diagnostic categories in general, and the DSM categories in particular, as cultural artifacts; (3) it elucidates the profound relationship between diagnostic systems and both diagnostic rates and treatment practices.

Research objects, such as datasets and classification standards, are difficult to be incorporated into a document-centric framework of citations, which relies on unique citable works. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorder (DSM)—a dominant classification scheme used for mental disorder diagnosis—however provides a unique lens on examining citations to a research object, given that it straddles the boundaries as a single research object with changing manifestations.

Using over 180,000 citations received by the DSM, this paper analyzes how the citation history of DSM is represented by its various versions, and how it is cited in different knowledge domains as an important boundary object.

It shows that all recent DSM versions exhibit a similar citation cascading pattern, which is characterized by a strong replacement effect between two successive versions. Moreover, the shift of the disciplinary contexts of DSM citations can be largely explained by different DSM versions as distinct epistemic objects.

Based on these results, the authors argue that all DSM versions should be treated as a series of connected but distinct citable objects. The work closes with a discussion of the ways in which the existing scholarly infrastructure can be reconfigured to acknowledge and trace a broader array of research objects.

This paper connects quantitative methods and an important sociological concept, i.e. boundary object, to offer deeper insights into the scholarly communication system. Moreover, this work also evaluates how versioning, as a significant yet overlooked attribute of information resources, influenced the citation patterns of citable objects, which will contribute to more material-oriented scientific infrastructures.

To examine how clinicians navigate providing treatment to Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) in the context of the DSM 5, deinstitutionalization, and the biomedical model.

We conducted 39 interviews with mental health providers in the United States in a two-year period preceding and following the release of the DSM 5. Using Constructivist Grounded Theory, we analyzed the data for themes that emerged.

Clinicians faced pressures from insurance companies, the DSM categories, and their professional training to focus on biomedical treatments. These treatments, which emphasized pharmaceuticals and short courses of care, were ill-suited to BPD, which has a strong evidence base recommending long-term therapeutic interventions. We term this contradiction a “biomedical mismatch” and use Gidden’s concept of structuration to better understand how clinicians navigate the system of care. Providers ranged in their responses to the mismatch: some championed biomedicine, others were complicit, and a final group behaved as activists, challenging the paradigm. The sum of the strategies had downstream effects which included crisis reinstitutionalization and a discourse of untreatability. Ultimately, we discuss how social factors such as gender bias, stigma, and trauma are insufficiently represented in the biomedical model of care for BPD.

BPD fits poorly within the biomedical underpinnings of the current system. Accordingly, it illuminates the structuration of health care and where the rules of care break down. More precisely, deinstitutionalization was designed to remove patients from long courses of inpatient care. Many patients with BPD have failed to experience this outcome, with some patients now cycling through long courses of short-term crisis reinstitutionalization instead of having effective outpatient care over long periods. This unintended consequence of deinstitutionalization calls for a more biopsychosocial response to BPD.

Purpose – The DSM-III reflected American psychiatry's shift from a dynamic approach to a descriptive diagnostic approach. This chapter seeks to elucidate the implications of this shift for the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness.

Methodology/approach – To shed light on this issue I analyze the diagnosis and treatment implications of this shift for Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD).

Findings – The transition to the diagnostic approach has had three consequences for the handling of ADD, and later Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD): first, it increased the number of children diagnosed with the disorder; second, it encouraged clinicians to treat the disorder with psychostimulants; and third, it expanded the pool of clinicians who could prescribe stimulants.

Contribution to the field – Beyond illuminating the specific cases of ADD and ADHD, this analysis contributes to the medicalization literature by demonstrating that there is more to be studied than merely the expansion or contraction of diagnostic categories. Researchers also have to analyze the implicit assumptions within the diagnostic definitions, which have implications for the prevalence and treatment of illness.

We sought to evaluate the capacity of the Edinburgh Postnatal Depression Scale (EPDS) in discriminating mental disorders other than depression in pregnant women in northern Mexico. Three hundred pregnant women attending prenatal consultations in a public hospital in Durango City, Mexico submitted a validated EPDS and were examined for mental disorders other than depression using the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - 4th Ed. (DSM-IV) criteria. Sensitivity and specificity of cut-off points of the EPDS, and positive and negative predictive values were calculated. Of the 300 pregnant women studied, 21 had mental disorders other than depression by the DSM-IV criteria. The best EPDS score for screening mental disorders other than depression was 8/9. This threshold showed a sensitivity of 52.4%, a specificity of 67.0%, a positive predictive value of 11.5%, a negative predictive value of 95.4%, and an area under the curve of 0.643 (95% confidence interval: 0.52-0.76). The EPDS can be considered for screening mental disorders other than depression in Mexican pregnant women whenever a cut-off score of 8/9 is used. However, the tool showed small power to separate pregnant women with and without mental disorders other than depression.

Purpose – This chapter discusses the proposed changes in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), which eliminates Asperger's disorder (AD) and replaces it as “autism spectrum disorder.” Implications of these changes on the identity of adults with AD and the influence of everyday life experiences will be addressed.

Methodology/approach – This research is based on 19 interviews with adults diagnosed or self-diagnosed with AD. Central themes surrounding issues of identity and everyday life experiences were determined using grounded theory approaches.

Findings – This study demonstrates how the diagnosis and self-diagnosis of AD is fused with individual identity. It also shows how Asperger identity is positively embraced. The proposed changes to eliminate AD in DSM-V threaten these assertions of Asperger identity, which could potentially enhance stigma experienced by people with AD. Regardless of its removal, Asperger identity must be considered within the broader context of people's everyday lives and how experiences in social interaction and communication can be strong agents of identity construction.

Social implications – The proposed changes to eliminate AD in DSM-V is a social issue that will impact individuals with Asperger's and their families, as well as health-care professionals, health insurers, researchers, state agencies, and educational providers.

Originality/value of paper – This chapter offers a unique insight into identity construction based on the diagnosis and self-diagnosis of AD.

Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to theorize the relationship between diagnosis and medicalization through an examination of the medicalization of childhood gender variance and the Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood diagnosis.

Methodology/approach – The chapter examines textual data (published clinical and research literatures, and critiques of the diagnosis appearing in a range of venues) to track how childhood gender variance is medicalized over time and the role of diagnosis in that medicalization.

Findings – While diagnosis certainly plays a role in shoring up medicalization, this case study reveals the many ways in which diagnoses may also become key tools in attempts to curtail medicalization.

Research limitations/implications – As a case study, the findings are not generalizable to all diagnoses. As a study of an instance of the medicalization of deviance, these findings may be particularly applicable to analogous cases.

Social implications – These findings show the sometimes tenuous nature of medicalization processes, and the social uses of diagnoses in those processes.

Originality/value of paper – This chapter sheds light on a relationship that is often assumed to be unidirectional (e.g., that the formation of diagnosis results in increased medicalization), and answers calls for a more nuanced sociology of diagnosis, including greater attention to the relationship between diagnosis and medicalization.

The classification of psychological suffering stumbles on the challenge of quantifying the ‘un-quantifiable’ upon the systematic categorising and description of affective and mental states and their transformation into illnesses and disorders. In this chapter, the author will explore the affect of anxiety through a critical recent history of its diagnosis and treatment in the context of psychological care. By unpacking the strategies employed by mainstream psychiatry in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), published by the American Psychiatric Association since the mid-twentieth century, it is possible to unveil the dynamics of a reduction of the subject to a productive-biological body in the last decades. This chapter thinks through what happens to the equation ‘body-world’ through the critical genealogy of affect and its relation to diagnoses and treatments of anxiety and depression. It grapples with the ethics of techno-scientific global financial capitalism – heralded by pharmacological corporations and governmentality – which replicates a modern scientific view of the body, affect and suffering in a world of renewed paradigmatic demands. The author argues that by consistently pathologizing and working towards the elimination of anxiety, the hegemonic clinic erases the possibility of such ‘subjective truth’, reducing the subject to the status of ‘dividual’.

The purpose of this paper is to determine: the extent to which an intellectual disability diagnosis meets current diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM) diagnostic criteria; the prevalence of reported autism spectrum disorders (ASD); and the extent to which assessment of developmental issues is central to the diagnosis of psychotic disorder, in patients discharged with a diagnosis of psychotic disorder and intellectual disabilities.

Of all patients discharged with psychotic disorder during a four‐year period (n=3339), chart reviews were completed on those also diagnosed with intellectual disability or borderline IQ.

The findings if this paper are threefold: only 39 percent of the 41 individuals discharged with a diagnosis of psychotic disorder and intellectual disability met documented DSM criteria for intellectual disability; the prevalence of reported ASD was much lower than expected; and the average number of different discharge diagnoses per individual over time was 4.8. Schizophrenia diagnoses were made early in the diagnostic process and tended to persist even when ASD concerns were documented.

The results support the need to systematically assess the developmental issues of patients with intellectual disability as part of the psychiatric diagnostic formulation. Differential diagnoses of psychotic‐like behaviours seen in people with intellectual disability, and alternative frameworks for understanding these behaviours, which in turn should guide more effective interventions and treatment, are discussed.