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Since World War II, the United States has played a leading role in development assistance in both volume of funds and role. Though the largest bilateral development agency, USAID is somewhat of an outlier in modes of operation, scope and nature of activities, and place within government. This chapter examines the development and character of U.S. foreign assistance. Like others, the United States provides foreign aid for multiple reasons – to relieve suffering and promote long-term economic and social development, to gain favor with allies, to open markets, to help ensure national security. Security and diplomacy do play a large role in U.S. foreign aid, even in basic education. In the context of U.S. internal politics, both humanitarian/development and diplomatic/security rationales have been necessary to sustain public and government support for foreign aid. Still neither rationale has prevailed; the budget is split nearly in half. The need for a humanitarian rationale may be characteristic of U.S. foreign assistance along with the emphasis on democracy. Yet these programs have sometimes been distorted by the diplomatic rationale and the security needs of the state. Many of these tensions and the constant need to justify foreign aid likely derive from the perennial periodic isolationist thread of U.S. politics, the particular adversarial institutions of U.S. policymaking, and the transparency which leaves these processes open. Even so, U.S. development assistance has played a prominent role in the trajectory of international development post-World War II, and has worked to address many of the great challenges of the times.

The purpose of this paper is to integrate two main strands of the aid-development nexus in assessing whether institutional thresholds matter in the effectiveness of foreign-aid on institutional development in 53 African countries over the period 1996-2010.

The panel quantile regression technique enables us to investigate if the relationship between institutional dynamics and development assistance differs throughout the distributions of institutional dynamics. Eight government quality indicators are employed: rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, corruption, voice and accountability, control of corruption, political stability and democracy.

Three hypotheses are tested and the following findings are established: first, institutional benefits of foreign-aid are contingent on existing institutional levels in Africa; second, but for a thin exception (democracy), foreign-aid is more negatively correlated with countries of higher institutional quality than with those of lower quality; third, the institutional benefits of foreign-aid are not questionable until greater domestic institutional development has taken place. The reverse is true instead. government quality benefits of development assistance are questionable in African countries irrespective of prevailing institutional quality levels.

This paper contributes to existing literature on the effectiveness of foreign-aid by focussing on the distribution of the dependent variables (institutional dynamics). It is likely that best and worst countries in terms of institutions respond differently to development assistance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether initial levels in GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and inequality adjusted human development matter in the impact of aid on development. In substance its object is to assess if threshold development conditions are necessary for the effectiveness of foreign aid in Africa.

The panel quantile regression technique enables us to investigate if the relationship between development dynamics and development assistance differs throughout the distributions of development dynamics.

Three main findings are established. First, with slight exceptions, the effectiveness of aid in economic prosperity (at the macro level) increases in positive magnitude across the distribution. This implies high-growth countries are more likely to benefit from development assistance (in terms of general economic growth) than their low-growth counterparts. Second, the positive nexus between aid and per capita economic growth displays nonlinear patterns across distributions and specifications, with the correlations broadly higher in top quantiles than in bottom quantiles after controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity. Third, the aid-human development nexus is negative and almost similar in magnitude across distributions and specifications.

As a policy implication, there is need to improve management of aid funds destined for health and education projects in the sampled countries. Moreover, given the magnitude of the nexuses, while blanket aid initiatives could be applied for policies targeting the human development index (due to the absence of significant differences in the magnitude of estimated coefficients), such are unlikely to succeed for aid targeting economic prosperity at macro and micro levels. From the weight of the findings, given a policy of balancing the impact of aid, it could be inferred that low-growth countries would need more aid than their high-growth counterparts because of the less positive effects in the former countries.

This paper contributes to existing literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid by focussing on the distribution of the dependent variables (development dynamics). It is likely that high- and low-growth countries respond differently to development assistance.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of similarities and distinctions between development and educational assistance in the USA as compared with other countries, this paper provides a general review of relevant materials on US foreign aid.

The paper reviews published books and articles as well as US government budget and Congressional reporting materials and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development statistics.

Beginning with the Marshall Plan following Second World War, the USA has always been a leader in foreign aid. In many ways, US development agencies resemble counterparts in other countries – foreign aid is part of larger network of bilateral relationships, funding requests must compete with requests from other sectors, etc. In other ways, the US stands apart. Because of US Congressional reporting requirements and for philosophical reasons, the US has been reluctant to join other countries in provision of budgetary support. The US coordinates its work with host country governments, but generally organizes its activities in project mode, relying largely on US contractors. The US Agency for International Development and the Department of State are the largest US government development agencies. Still, unlike other donors, development funding and technical assistance is provided by up to 25 agencies with relatively little coordination. US foreign aid has always included a security as well as humanitarian and development dimensions. In recent years, as development assistance is increasingly coordinated with diplomacy and defense, the military dimension has been heightened. Perhaps the most original finding is the notion that public and government support of US foreign aid has required both security and development/humanitarian rationales to remain viable.

The paper brings together information from a range of existing sources, but provides a unique perspective on US foreign aid in education.

This chapter highlights the characteristics of Asia through the analysis of policy-related documents by five donor countries, namely Japan, South Korea, China, India and Thailand. It will also examine the roles played by regional bodies such as the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) and ASPBAE (the Asia South Pacific Association for Basic and Adult Education) as the horizontal channels influencing aid policies in respective countries. Together with the analysis of the national and organizational policies, the regional process of building consensus on the post-2015 agenda is examined, with a particular focus on the Asia-Pacific Regional Education Conference (APREC) held in August 2014.

The analysis reveals that the region has two faces: one is imaginary and the other is functional. There is a common trend across Asian donors to refer to their historical ties with regions and countries to which they provide assistance and their traditional notions of education and development. They highlight Asian features in contrast to conventional aid principles and approaches based on the Western value system, either apparently or in a muted manner. In this sense, the imagined community of Asia with common cultural roots is perceived by the policymakers across the board.

At the same time, administratively, the importance of the region as a stage between the national and global levels is recognized increasingly in the multilateral global governance structure. With this broadened participatory structure, as discussed in the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’, the expected function of the region to transmit the norms and requests from the global level and to collect and summarize national voices has increased.

The emergence of the Chinese aid consensus has come to have profound implications for sustainability. The Beijing Consensus “sovereignty doctrine” of non‐interference, presents a stark contrast to the Washington Consensus architecture of imposed conditionalities and the serving of geopolitical interests. For this reason, from Africa's perspective, the Beijing Consensus appears to represent the preferred comprehensive meta‐narrative for Africa. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the attributes of “good” aid architecture in relation to the peculiarities of Africa's challenges.

In examining its principles, objectives, framework differences and impact, the Beijing model shows that it supports the human rights which “unleash”, empower and protect self‐directed development grounded in ownership and in the strategic interests of recipients.

The Washington Consensus has been problematic for African development because it is economistic and exclusively instrumentalist. While conceding to this shortcoming, the inability of the consensus to appreciate the unique and complex development problems of Africa is more troubling. Comparing the two, the Beijing Consensus, which is multidimensional and encompasses the intrinsic and non‐economic roles of development aid, with the consequence of over‐emphasizing expanding local policy, is adjudged practical for Africa. The conclusion is that the dominant Washington Consensus is too poorly articulated and structured to respond to declared determination for ownership, mitigating capabilities deprivation, and improving development control.

This paper has argued that the basic approach of the Beijing Consensus has been more generous and more attractive for sustainable development in Africa. Much more important, perhaps, is the ability of the consensus to appreciate the unique and complex development problems which occur as a consequence of donor deafness on limited rights and conditionalities. In sum, the Beijing Consensus results in exclusionary changes of “less magnitude and speed” and promotes poverty reduction and sustainable development. Taken together, these factors and practices mean that the Beijing Consensus best serves the staircase of a nation's pathway to indigenous development, when compared with the Washington Consensus. Such a comprehensive meta‐narrative that builds alliances and creates a foundation for enlightened and effective politics of development aid will “unleash”, empower and protect the full potential of Africa.

Adjustment to a post‐Doha trading regime will be disproportionately costly and difficult for developing countries. Increased aid is vital for the poor countries if they are to grasp the opportunities provided through trade and meet transition costs. With aid‐for‐trade, for the first time, the developed countries have another bound and meaningful commitment that they can offer developing countries. Our proposal to provide new resources to meet adjustment needs, however, does not suggest that trade, when combined with aid, will be a panacea for developing countries. Interactions between trade, aid, and broader development policies and reforms are important.

Fragile states (FS) are often neglected and categorized as “aid orphans”. In extreme circumstances, they are loaded with aid beyond their absorptive capacity. However, whether they receive little or too much, there is a compelling imperative to coordinate aid aimed at capacity development effectively. In an ever shrinking pot of funds from donors mainly due to the current global economic downturn, it is extremely important to coordinate and harmonise aid delivery. FS cannot afford to waste any money trapped under rubble of multi‐donor aid bureaucracy. Due to the multidimensional nature of fragility, we draw on case studies and interdisciplinary insights from Authority‐Legitimacy‐Capacity (ALC), Country Development Framework (CDF) and other models and frameworks of donor coordination. A number of asymmetries (e.g. technical, cultural and, financial) between donors and recipients need to be addressed. Donors can harmonise their respective Africa strategies reports and give priority to infrastructure instead of focusing exclusively on the social agenda as in the past. FS should fight the local culture of corruption, avoid fungibility, protect vulnerable groups in society, focus on reintegration as well as demobilizing ex‐combatants with employment provisions. Donors should not give mixed signals to recipients and need to be flexible in their operational procedures. Finally, we discuss the implications of key emerging issues that threaten or facilitate sustainable reconstruction, development and poverty reduction in post‐conflict environments.

South Asia has been an important destination of foreign aid over the past decades. Since a large part of aid is disbursed for social and economic infrastructure development in South Asian countries, and the volume of aid has tremendously increased in recent years, the purpose of this study is to investigate how far various categories of foreign aid affects economic growth rate in these countries. In addition, as the trend of each category of aid transfer appears to have been volatile, this study also investigates whether the volatilities inhibit growth rate in these countries.

In this study, South Asia refers to India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The Random effects approach is employed incorporating panel data for the period of 1995‐2008. The aggregate foreign aid is classified into various categories to have a comprehensive investigation.

Foreign aid positively associated with growth whereas the volatility of aid hurts it. Long‐impact aid promotes growth more than short‐impact aid does. The volatility of short‐impact aid hurts growth, whereas the volatility of long‐impact aid has no effect on it. Pure aid and its volatility have no effect on growth.

This study has identified the structure of foreign aid disbursed in these countries, and explored how far each category and respective volatility affects growth. These findings would be useful to the scholars and policy makers in the recipient countries as well as donors, to make foreign aid much more effective in future.

This chapter aims to investigate and interpret China’s educational aid by analyzing its history, philosophies, and practices in Africa. The study is based on review and analysis of governmental documents, reports, academic papers, and news by Chinese and foreign scholars on China’s aid, particularly educational aid to Africa. The analysis unveils three transformations of China’s aid “from pro-ideology to de-ideology,” “from single area to multiple areas,” and “from pragmatic economy driven to sustainable and humane economy focused” in Africa. Meanwhile, it indicates a continuity of the philosophy of solidarity, morality, and reciprocity in China’s South-South cooperation with African educational development.

The analysis also shows China’s educational aid does not match well with the framework of the Western donors. China, under the FOCAC framework, is devoted to higher education cooperation, human resources training program, scholarship, and Chinese language education with African partners. With the growth of its economic and political influence, China will play multiple roles as the biggest developing country and as an active promoter and provider for South-South cooperation in the negotiation and construction of the post-2015 agenda. Nevertheless, we assume China will keep a pragmatic higher education cooperation with its developing country partners to inclusively link it with business, technology transfer, and people-to-people exchange.

This study delivers a comprehensive review and analysis of paradigm shift, philosophy, mechanism, and practice of China’s educational aid to Africa to fill up the literature gap in this field. It also timely presents China’s stance toward discussion on the post-2015 agenda.