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This study builds on the practice-based view of strategy to examine whether the three most commonly prescribed strategic planning best practices – scanning, communication openness and participative decision-making – actually strengthen the planning-performance relationship.

The study uses objective performance data and data from a survey of 159 managers from 43 publicly listed US firms to test the hypothesized moderation effects of best practices. The analysis uses hierarchical regression.

At high levels of planning, firms high in participative decision-making and low in openness and scanning outperform firms low in participation and high in openness and scanning. The results reverse at low levels of planning.

This is a cross-sectional study with a small sample. The response rate was modest; hence, the results should be treated as exploratory. Since the sample is not random, the results may not be generalizable.

While managers may find a best practice label helpful, the best practices implemented within a firm need to fit existing planning processes in order to increase planning effectiveness.

While academic scholarship sometimes struggles with generating actionable prescriptions for improving strategic planning, recommendations by practitioners lack empirical backing. This study builds on the practice-based view of strategy to bridge this gap. These results are consistent with both academic and practitioner literature on strategic planning in finding that the best practices of scanning, openness and participative decision-making strengthen the planning-performance relationship at different planning levels, possibly by underpinning the firm’s dynamic capabilities.

Planning is a perennially popular management tool with an ambiguous relationship to learning and performance. The purpose of this study attempts to resolve this ambiguity. The authors suggest that the critical question is not whether firms need learning for planning to influence performance, but when different firms experience different performance outcomes. The authors propose firms will benefit from strategic planning only when they learn from planning and have the resources to act on their learning.

The authors collected data from a survey of 293 individuals from 191 publicly listed US firms.

Organizational learning mediates the relations between strategic planning and organizational performance. This mediated relationship is positively moderated by high levels of human resource slack and moderate to high levels of financial slack.

The study provides evidence for previous theoretical arguments on the planning–learning relationship while extending this research by finding a complicated moderating effect of slack. The study also adds to the existing debate on optimal slack levels by suggesting that having bundles of slack resources may matter more than having uniformly high or low levels of slack. A cross-sectional study means the authors cannot infer causation.

While strategic planning is a common practice, companies may vary in their planning methodologies, influencing the outcomes of planning. Firms seeking to benefit from planning need to have both the mechanisms to learn from planning and slack to deploy these mechanisms.

These findings clarify the planning–learning–performance relationship while challenging the assumption of an average effect of planning on performance across firms.

Can (and should) strategy scholarship attempt to find general prescriptions for business strategy that are applicable to all firms across all business conditions? We suggest that a universal theory of business strategy is a chimera: attractive but completely illusory. Our argument is based on two fundamental insights namely, organizations do not automatically adopt all practices and activities that could benefit them (even if knowledge about those activities is in the public domain), and theories and empirical work can address portions of the strategy problem usefully without attempting or achieving a general theory of strategy. Based on this, we believe strategy scholarship can fruitfully build on a variety of mid-range theories to offer three things from a prescriptive standpoint: (1) understanding the structure and processes inherent in organizations and markets; (2) offering productive ways to frame and analyze problems; and (3) offering recommendations for stratagems that appear successful. More generally, organizations might find immense value in strategy scholarship that offers specific tools, prescriptions, and alternative ways of looking at a problem, and that raise performance, on average.

This paper elucidates the role of anger in error management (EM) and organizational learning behaviors. The study explores how anger can catalyze learning, emphasizing its strategic implications.

A double-layered moderated-mediated model was developed and tested using data from 744 Chinese CEOs. The psychometric properties of the survey instrument were rigorously examined through structural equation modeling, and hypotheses were tested using Hayes's PROCESS macros.

The findings reveal that anger is a precursor for recognizing the value of significant errors, leading to a positive association with learning behavior among top management team members. Additionally, the study uncovers a triple interaction effect of anger, EM culture and supply chain disruptions on the value of learning from errors. Extensive experience and positive grieving strengthen the relationship between recognizing value from errors and learning behavior.

This study uniquely integrates affect-cognitive theory and organizational learning theory, examining anger in EM and learning. The authors provide empirical evidence that anger can drive error value recognition and learning. The authors incorporate a more fine-grained approach to leadership when including executive anger as a trigger to learning behavior. Factors like experience and positive grieving are explored, deepening the understanding of emotions in learning. The authors consider both negative and positive emotions to contribute to the complexity of organizational learning.