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This study examines how accounting practices used by Deutsche Bank could conceal its role in the destruction of Jewish financial life (bios) as part of the Nazis' Aryanisation policy to eliminate Jews from German business as a prelude to their annihilation.

This study uses a close-reading method that draws upon a wide range of primary and secondary sources. The study is informed by Giorgio Agamben's theorisations on the state of exception and the duality of the example and exception.

The successful implementation of the Nazis' corporative economic model necessitated the cooperation of Aryan businesses to instrumentalise the financially exploitative process of Aryanisation. Accounting was part of the Nazi-Deutsch rhetoric used to disguise expropriation of Jewish businesses and other assets and, thereby, facilitate the eradication of the financial bios of Jews who owned German banks. Unknown to the Nazi authorities, Deutsche Bank, while a significant medium for Aryanisation, sought to ameliorate the long-term effects on Jewish owners, thereby recognising that not all those within Nazi Germany were fully committed disciples of Nazism.

The findings of this study identify how accounting practices were part of a Nazi policy designed to eliminate Jews from the German economy. The use of accounting as a form of “Nazi-Deutsch” functioned to disguise Aryanisations. The importance of these contributions of accounting practices calls for further research into the role of business and accounting in the attempted eradication of people.

The paper is the first to consider the process of Aryanisation in Nazi Germany (1933–1945) as a specific historiographical subject. Presented through the examination of the Aryanisation actions of Deutsche Bank, this study demonstrates the tension between Nazi ideology, the capitalist model and the culpability of accounting practices as a means to reinterpret morality to create the exception that allowed the Nazis to effectively remove all legal protections for Jews.

The rising interconnectedness between international banks, at one end, allow participants to share risk and diversification which leads to stable local lending and increase in competitiveness, however, at the other end poses potential for volatility spillover and thereby contagion phenomena. Therefore, investigating the presence of co-integration amongst international banks can provide useful information about risk spillover in times of financial turbulence

The authors employ wavelet correlation and wavelet multiple cross-correlation strategies, following an initial decomposition of returns series through maximal overlap discrete wavelet transformation (MODWT).

The results indicate high integration level between Citibank and Deutsche Bank whereas potential of diversification exists between pairs of Citibank–Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and Bank of America–Deutsche Bank, with former more evident in short- and medium-term relationship and later in long-run investment horizon. This paper carries implications for investors, fund managers and policymakers in foreseeing the prospects of contagion attributable to high level integration levels.

Implications for cross-border banking integration includes the presence of common lender effect which appears as a dominant factor for cross-border contagion. Therefore, banks based in different countries should focus more on funds diversification rather than borrowing much from any single creditor. Furthermore, foreign operations based on subsidiaries instead of relying on direct cross-border lending can help in reducing volatility of the foreign financial resources. Nevertheless, based on the results and significant strand of existing literature, the presence of contagion is inevitable, and therefore, a careful consideration of cross-border banking supervision and co-operation by the financial authorities can help in mitigating the volatility of global capital flows.

First, this study fills gap in the existing literature regarding the discussion on portfolio diversification opportunities in the banking sector. The banking sector is usually perceived as a main source of fixed income securities or financing; however, on the contrary, investors may also be interested for investments in publicly listed bank's stock. Most of the work regarding portfolio diversification revolves around capital market instruments; however, publicly listed shares of largest bank also present an avenue for diversification. Second, major fundamentals and the associated factor for banks performance are reflected in the its profits, either these profits result from large customer base or proper allocation of bank's assets, etc. Therefore, returns of these banks serve as a barometer for their performance and co-movement between any two banks can highlight the presence and extent of their underlying association. Third, the authors apply the latest extensions in wavelet techniques after decomposing returns series through the MODWT framework. This decomposition followed by wavelet estimations allow us to investigate banks integration level across different time and frequency space thereby carrying implications for both short- and long-run investors. Fourth, by analysing the presence of returns co-movements, the authors can predict the extent of plausible contagion since the recent global financial crisis of 2008–2009 used banks as the main medium of propagation of shocks. Fifth, the work presents many implications for the investment community, major trading partners associated with banks through different instruments and for policymakers so that the effect of contagion can be anticipated or at least mitigated in case of future financial turbulence.

Highlights

1. We investigate portfolio diversification opportunities in the banking sector.

2. Time-frequency returns co-movements is measures by applying wavelet multiple correlation and cross-correlation techniques on decomposed return series.

3. Deutsche Bank and Bank of America act as highest transmitter and recipient of volatility, respectively using the spillover approach of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012).

4. Citibank and Deutsche Bank exhibit high pairwise correlation indicating no diversification benefits.

5. Citibank exhibits high level of integration with other banks in the short- and medium-run whereas Deutsche Bank exercises high integration levels in the long-run investment period.

We investigate portfolio diversification opportunities in the banking sector.

Time-frequency returns co-movements is measures by applying wavelet multiple correlation and cross-correlation techniques on decomposed return series.

Deutsche Bank and Bank of America act as highest transmitter and recipient of volatility, respectively using the spillover approach of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012).

Citibank and Deutsche Bank exhibit high pairwise correlation indicating no diversification benefits.

Citibank exhibits high level of integration with other banks in the short- and medium-run whereas Deutsche Bank exercises high integration levels in the long-run investment period.

In the mid-1990s, market demands for around-the-clock (24/7) banking and financial transacting began to converge with advances in internet-based technologies. This confluence of forces gave rise to the birth of internet banking. Building upon the relevant literature, this paper aims to develop a set of propositions to address the following questions: what brand strategy or strategies were used at the birth of internet banking roughly 25 years ago? In the years since then, have merger and acquisition transactions involving internet or “direct” banking businesses only come to fruition where the direct bank was previously under a specific brand strategy? And finally, where there have been changes in internet banking brand strategy, have these invariably been in the ultimate direction of one particular brand strategy?

Because of the exploratory nature of the research question, this paper uses a case study examination as the research approach. In addition to gaining deeper insight into issues involving internet bank branding as these actually existed, this paper aims to propose preliminary and tentative conclusions that can later be tested empirically with larger sample size. The case studies specifically examine German commercial banks with direct bank businesses.

In the examination of the German commercial banks, this paper finds that their internet banking activities some 25 years ago were, in fact, never launched using an umbrella brand strategy but rather with a combined brand strategy or multi-brand strategy. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions involving internet-based direct banks were only consummated where the direct bank had previously been operated by the parent bank using a multi-brand strategy. Where the brand strategies of internet-based direct banks have been changed by their parent banks, this has invariably been in the direction of an umbrella brand strategy.

Within the marketing and banking literature, there are no in-depth examinations of internet banking brand strategies to be found. This paper, in addressing this research topic, marks the first full survey of German commercial banks with internet-based direct banking businesses. This survey, moreover, examines branding not only at the time that internet-based direct banks were first established starting in 1994 but also the subsequent development of internet banking brand strategies to the present day.

Develops principles for banks that want to evaluate the distribution of life insurance as well as non‐life insurance products and identifies key factors for profitability. Analyses the costs of training personnel, the costs of computers and communication, the fixed and variable sales costs, and the costs of administration including customer service. These costs have to be covered by direct benefits in terms of commissions and indirect benefits in terms of more faithful bank customers. Then estimates the profitability of the distribution through a branch network. Develops a model to calculate the “break‐even” sales volume. Identifies five key factors: the number of branches; the number of specialists per branch; the number of customers to the bank; the cross‐selling ratio; and the reduction over time in costs of selling and administration. Gives two examples from the banking sector.

Of the forty banks included in the world’s largest 500 firms, none operate on a global basis. All but one are heavily dependent on their home region, with an average of 78.3 percent of their sales being intra‐regional. The other bank is European owned but has a majority of its sales in North America, i.e. it is host‐region oriented. The insularity of the world’s largest banks is not a sector‐ specific factor only nine of the world’s 500 largest firms are global, and the vast majority are like the banks, home‐region based.

The aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis has accelerated a pre‐existing process of ethical approach in the banking industry. Today, all banks claim to be socially, environmentally and economically committed with the philosophy of sustainable finance. The purpose of this paper is to show that, beyond the outward similarities, there are three different types of banking approach, each reflecting a distinct business model: banks whose ethical/social approach is mainly based on what they say, represented by universal banks; banks whose ethical/social approach is based on what they are, essentially the co‐operative banks; banks whose ethical/social approach is based on what they do, the so‐called ethical banks.

The paper bases its argument on the German banking industry, which is a big European country with a fairly diversified banking sector. The paper examines three types of sources for each of the above‐mentioned categories of banks: the social and environmental reporting, the conformity or not with the principles of the social and solidarity‐based economy and the different types of financial activities as reflected in their balance sheet.

The paper concludes that more ethical behaviour leads to both economic performance and social gains which increase wealth for all partners.

The proposed methodology could be extended to other European banking systems to discuss their implications as regards corporate social responsibility.

This contribution will help the reader to evaluate banking communication as regards corporate social responsibility in their daily activity.

This research will give an insight based on the documents published by banking institutions to measure their implication on corporate social responsibility.

The article seeks to present first findings regarding the nature of discrepancies in communication and action and draws conclusions to induce further research. Although (internationally) operating organisations are far too complex to avoid discrepancies at all in corporate communication and action, monitoring discrepancies and developing strategies to deal with them, can be a contributing factor in avoiding losses of public trust or public trust crises.

Building on the theory of public trust and the ongoing corporate trust study conducted by the University of Leipzig and PMG Presse Monitor GmbH, the authors designed a content analytical study researching the role of discrepancies in the process of public trust.

Owing to the nature of the mass media system and the public sphere emerging out of it, discrepancies start to unfold their effect when crossing the barrier of publics awareness. The upcoming of a large number of discrepancies within a short period of time, and their remainder in the public conciousness for a certain period, makes it more likely that the issue which is subject to the discrepancies is going to be discussed in the public arena and leads to a change in the behavior of the audience and the environment of the organizational system.

Because of the nature of content analysis, only published public trust was researched. Researching public trust would have meant using a survey design, which has to be done in future research.

The study suggests three steps, monitoring and distinction of, and focussing on discrepancies in order to organize corporate communications more effectively.

This study is the first study researching the role of discrepancies in the process of losing/gaining public trust/confidence, regarding organizations in economy.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate post‐crisis measures banks have adopted in a bid to manage liquidity risk. It is based on the fact that the financial liquidity market was greatly affected during the recent economic turmoil and financial meltdown. During the crisis, liquidity risk management disclosure was crucial for confidence building in market participants.

The study investigates if Basel II pillar 3 disclosures on liquidity risk management are applied by 20 of top 33 world banks. Bank selection is based on information availability, geographic balance and comprehensiveness of the language in which information is provided. This information is searched from the World Wide Web, with a minimum of one hour allocated to “content search”, and indefinite time for “content analyses”. Such content scrutiny is guided by 16 disclosure principles classified in four main categories.

Only 25 per cent of sampled banks provide publicly accessible liquidity risk management information, a clear indication that in the post‐crisis era, many top ranking banks still do not take Basel disclosure norms seriously, especially the February 2008 pre‐crisis warning by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

Bank stakeholders should easily have access to information on liquidity risk management. Banks falling‐short of making such information available might not inspire confidence in market participants in events of financial panic and turmoil. As in the run‐up to the previous financial crisis, if banks are not compelled to explicitly and expressly disclose what measures they adopt in a bid to guarantee stakeholder liquidity, the onset of any financial shake‐up would only precipitate a meltdown. The main limitation of this study is the use of the World Wide Web as the only source of information available to bank stakeholders and/or market participants.

The contribution of this paper to literature can be viewed from the role it plays in investigating post‐crisis measures banks have adopted in a bid to inform stakeholders on their management of liquidity risk.

The aim of this paper is to show that there are other options for a firm (or a bank) than just following the mainstream logic of maximizing financial profits. This is the case of the so‐called “social banks”, which appeared in the mid‐1980s. Unlike the “financial green‐washing” of traditional banks, social banks have shown in their everyday practice that a bank can still be a competitive institution whilst committing wholeheartedly to the concept of sustainable development.

The analysis compares social banks to traditional universal banks at two levels: analysis of what they say, namely by looking at their annual report; and analysis of what they do, namely by looking at their activities as reflected in their balance sheet.

Concerning traditional banks, there is a major gap between what they say and what they do, whereas social banks are much more consistent in this regard. This is simply because social banks have put in place a different organization and different management structures and, overall, because they apply a different business model.

All banks are not the same. Beyond the “declarative ethics”, the methodology used in this paper helps to make the difference among them by using concrete evidence for measuring their “social added value”.

Despite a raft of important qualitative reservations and at best poor empirical evidence, the argument that, in case of business problems, large banks are more likely to be bailed out by government intervention than smaller banks (‘too big to fail’) cannot be dismissed entirely. The question, though, is whether or to what extent this has any implications for competition or the stability of the banking system. Under realistic assumptions, especially with respect to incentives for bank management and shareholders, too big to fail hardly leads to excessive risk taking by large banks. The impact of too big to fail on a bank's rating and, accordingly, its refinancing conditions is only marginal, as a breakdown of the various rating components clearly documents. This suggests that the effects on competition of too big to fail come nowhere close to the refinancing advantages enjoyed by public sector banks in Germany. The refinancing advantage of the Landesbanken afforded by state guarantees (Anstaltslast and Gewährtragerhäftung) comes to as much as 50 basis points. Given the continual narrowing of lending margins, an advantage on this scale plays a decisive role in competition. Too big to fail has substantial implications for the architecture of banking supervision. Suitable institutional arrangements need to be created in order to deal with large banks in case of a, potentially systemic, crisis. With banking becoming increasingly global and the number of cross‐border mergers on the rise, this requires solutions at an international, if not at a global, level. Implementing the concept of a European Liko‐Bank, as suggested by the Bundesbank, will require that the supervisory authorities and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) first create appropriate public sector counterparts.