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This public-sourced case was named the best finance case of 2013 in the 24th annual awards and competition sponsored by The Case Centre. It was designed for and works well in the latter portion of a GEMBA Financial Management and Policies course and in the early stage of a second-year MBA elective Financial Institutions and Markets course. The case is set in mid-2012 as the new co-CEOs of Deutsche Bank are about to speak in an analyst call. Students are the decision makers and have the opportunity to evaluate the various factors affecting a bank's situation in a changing global industry, such as leverage and credit quality, as well as to discuss the implications on Deutsche Bank and the banking sector more broadly of Basel III, the global regulatory reform. The students also have the opportunity to conduct a valuation of the bank. Investors were anxious to know whether the new co-CEOs would discuss the strategy of how Deutsche Bank planned to meet the new regulatory requirements, what effect Basel III would have on the company's profitability, and what lines of business it would focus on going forward in a new banking environment. They also wanted to know more about the benefits of the 2010 majority stake investment in Postbank, a German commercial bank. In class, this discussion also allows for a broader examination of the universal bank model and the role of banks within society.

Develops principles for banks that want to evaluate the distribution of life insurance as well as non‐life insurance products and identifies key factors for profitability. Analyses the costs of training personnel, the costs of computers and communication, the fixed and variable sales costs, and the costs of administration including customer service. These costs have to be covered by direct benefits in terms of commissions and indirect benefits in terms of more faithful bank customers. Then estimates the profitability of the distribution through a branch network. Develops a model to calculate the “break‐even” sales volume. Identifies five key factors: the number of branches; the number of specialists per branch; the number of customers to the bank; the cross‐selling ratio; and the reduction over time in costs of selling and administration. Gives two examples from the banking sector.

Of the forty banks included in the world’s largest 500 firms, none operate on a global basis. All but one are heavily dependent on their home region, with an average of 78.3 percent of their sales being intra‐regional. The other bank is European owned but has a majority of its sales in North America, i.e. it is host‐region oriented. The insularity of the world’s largest banks is not a sector‐ specific factor only nine of the world’s 500 largest firms are global, and the vast majority are like the banks, home‐region based.

The aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis has accelerated a pre‐existing process of ethical approach in the banking industry. Today, all banks claim to be socially, environmentally and economically committed with the philosophy of sustainable finance. The purpose of this paper is to show that, beyond the outward similarities, there are three different types of banking approach, each reflecting a distinct business model: banks whose ethical/social approach is mainly based on what they say, represented by universal banks; banks whose ethical/social approach is based on what they are, essentially the co‐operative banks; banks whose ethical/social approach is based on what they do, the so‐called ethical banks.

The paper bases its argument on the German banking industry, which is a big European country with a fairly diversified banking sector. The paper examines three types of sources for each of the above‐mentioned categories of banks: the social and environmental reporting, the conformity or not with the principles of the social and solidarity‐based economy and the different types of financial activities as reflected in their balance sheet.

The paper concludes that more ethical behaviour leads to both economic performance and social gains which increase wealth for all partners.

The proposed methodology could be extended to other European banking systems to discuss their implications as regards corporate social responsibility.

This contribution will help the reader to evaluate banking communication as regards corporate social responsibility in their daily activity.

This research will give an insight based on the documents published by banking institutions to measure their implication on corporate social responsibility.

The article seeks to present first findings regarding the nature of discrepancies in communication and action and draws conclusions to induce further research. Although (internationally) operating organisations are far too complex to avoid discrepancies at all in corporate communication and action, monitoring discrepancies and developing strategies to deal with them, can be a contributing factor in avoiding losses of public trust or public trust crises.

Building on the theory of public trust and the ongoing corporate trust study conducted by the University of Leipzig and PMG Presse Monitor GmbH, the authors designed a content analytical study researching the role of discrepancies in the process of public trust.

Owing to the nature of the mass media system and the public sphere emerging out of it, discrepancies start to unfold their effect when crossing the barrier of publics awareness. The upcoming of a large number of discrepancies within a short period of time, and their remainder in the public conciousness for a certain period, makes it more likely that the issue which is subject to the discrepancies is going to be discussed in the public arena and leads to a change in the behavior of the audience and the environment of the organizational system.

Because of the nature of content analysis, only published public trust was researched. Researching public trust would have meant using a survey design, which has to be done in future research.

The study suggests three steps, monitoring and distinction of, and focussing on discrepancies in order to organize corporate communications more effectively.

This study is the first study researching the role of discrepancies in the process of losing/gaining public trust/confidence, regarding organizations in economy.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate post‐crisis measures banks have adopted in a bid to manage liquidity risk. It is based on the fact that the financial liquidity market was greatly affected during the recent economic turmoil and financial meltdown. During the crisis, liquidity risk management disclosure was crucial for confidence building in market participants.

The study investigates if Basel II pillar 3 disclosures on liquidity risk management are applied by 20 of top 33 world banks. Bank selection is based on information availability, geographic balance and comprehensiveness of the language in which information is provided. This information is searched from the World Wide Web, with a minimum of one hour allocated to “content search”, and indefinite time for “content analyses”. Such content scrutiny is guided by 16 disclosure principles classified in four main categories.

Only 25 per cent of sampled banks provide publicly accessible liquidity risk management information, a clear indication that in the post‐crisis era, many top ranking banks still do not take Basel disclosure norms seriously, especially the February 2008 pre‐crisis warning by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

Bank stakeholders should easily have access to information on liquidity risk management. Banks falling‐short of making such information available might not inspire confidence in market participants in events of financial panic and turmoil. As in the run‐up to the previous financial crisis, if banks are not compelled to explicitly and expressly disclose what measures they adopt in a bid to guarantee stakeholder liquidity, the onset of any financial shake‐up would only precipitate a meltdown. The main limitation of this study is the use of the World Wide Web as the only source of information available to bank stakeholders and/or market participants.

The contribution of this paper to literature can be viewed from the role it plays in investigating post‐crisis measures banks have adopted in a bid to inform stakeholders on their management of liquidity risk.

The aim of this paper is to show that there are other options for a firm (or a bank) than just following the mainstream logic of maximizing financial profits. This is the case of the so‐called “social banks”, which appeared in the mid‐1980s. Unlike the “financial green‐washing” of traditional banks, social banks have shown in their everyday practice that a bank can still be a competitive institution whilst committing wholeheartedly to the concept of sustainable development.

The analysis compares social banks to traditional universal banks at two levels: analysis of what they say, namely by looking at their annual report; and analysis of what they do, namely by looking at their activities as reflected in their balance sheet.

Concerning traditional banks, there is a major gap between what they say and what they do, whereas social banks are much more consistent in this regard. This is simply because social banks have put in place a different organization and different management structures and, overall, because they apply a different business model.

All banks are not the same. Beyond the “declarative ethics”, the methodology used in this paper helps to make the difference among them by using concrete evidence for measuring their “social added value”.