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Accounting can affect and determine power relations. Previous studies have emphasized how accounting has been used by “central” powers; less is known from the perspective of “local” power and its capacity to resist and protect its interests. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the Archbishop’s Seminary of Siena (ASS) (local) and Roman ecclesiastic institutions (central). This study contributes to filling the existing gap in the literature regarding how accounting could be used as a tool for deception in local/central power relations.

The research methodology is based on a case study and archival research. The ASS case study was analyzed through its archive, made up for the most part of accounting books. As to the approach adopted, the authors used the Foucault framework to observe power relations in order to identify possible ways in which accounting can be employed as a factor of deception.

Power relations between the ASS and Roman ecclesiastic institutions were maintained through a system of reporting that limited the influence of the ecclesiastical power of Rome over the Seminary’s administration and control. The relationship thus runs contrary to the findings in previous studies. The accounting system was managed as a factor of deception in favor of local interests and the limitation of central ecclesiastic power.

This study contributes to enhancing the existing literature on governmentality, proposing a different perspective in which power relations are based on the use of accounting. The Foucaldian approach demonstrates its validity, even though the power relations under consideration have the unusual feature of occurring within the context of religious institutions.

This study on the ASS has allowed the identification of two relevant points: the local/central dichotomy is consistent with the logic of power relations as theorized by Foucault, even in cases where it highlights the role of a local power in limiting the flow of information to a central one; and the ASS accounting system was used as a factor of deception.

Past studies on corruption and anticorruption efforts in Africa lacked the systemic perspective. Yet, efforts of a constellation of state and non - state anticorruption institutions tends to yield not less but more corruption. Focusing on Cameroon (West Africa), this study is a holistic attempt at an institutional appraisal of the scope and effectiveness of the anticorruption system. It is based on a thorough description and a critical analysis of essential structures, functions and processes of the system, with an emphasis on their missions, goals, activities, structures as well as their actual outcomes and limitations. The researcher suggests that, because of the numerous structural and functional weaknesses, Cameroon’s anticorruption system has failed. Clear suggestions for effective reform of the system and rapid corruption minimization are made.

The effect of corruption in South Africa has seriously constrained development of the national economy and has significantly inhibited good governance in the country. South Africa's complex political design is a contributing factor to the rise of corruption, which has adversely affected stability and trust and which has damaged the ethos of democratic values and principles. Although the South African government has been instrumental in systems to fight the evils of corruption, practical problems have increasingly emerged over the years. The most notable problems are: insufficient coordination of anti‐corruption work within the South African public service and among the various sectors of society; poor information about corruption and the impact of anti‐corruption measures and agencies; and the impact of corruption on good governance. This paper is a part of a broader study undertaken on corruption. It addresses issues related to corruption and good governance in the South African (National) Public Service. To articulate and analyse the challenges confronting the country, issues regarding coordination of anti‐corruption agencies will be explored.