Search results

Research on strategic choices available to the firm are often modeled as a limited number of possible decision outcomes and leads to a discrete limited dependent variable. A limited dependent variable can also arise when values of a continuous dependent variable are partially or wholly unobserved. This chapter discusses the methodological issues associated with such phenomena and the appropriate statistical methods developed to allow for consistent and efficient estimation of models that involve a limited dependent variable. The chapter also provides a road map for selecting the appropriate statistical technique and it offers guidelines for consistent interpretation and reporting of the statistical results.

Longitudinal regression analysis is conducted to clarify causal relations and control for unwanted influences from actor heterogeneity and state dependence on theoretically important coefficient estimates. Because strategic management contains theory on how firms differ and how firm actions are influenced by their current strategic position and recent experiences, consistency of theory and methodology often requires use of longitudinal methods. We describe the theoretical motivation for longitudinal methods and outline some common methods. Based on a survey of recent articles in strategic management, we argue that longitudinal methods are now used more frequently than before, but the use is still inconsistent and insufficiently justified by theoretical or empirical considerations. In particular, strategic management researchers should use dynamic models more often, and should test for the presence of actor effects, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity before applying corrections.

This paper examines the relationship between environmental uncertainty and tax avoidance at the firm level. We posit that managers faced with more uncertain environments are likely to engage in more tax avoidance activities. We find a significant and negative relationship between environmental uncertainty and effective tax rates, and our results persist through a battery of robust checks. We further find that managerial ability mitigates the above relationship. Moreover, we find that small, highly leveraged, and innovative firms operating in uncertain environments engage in more tax avoidance.

As a field, we should put more emphasis on interpreting the magnitude of coefficient estimates rather than only assessing statistical significance. To support this claim, I demonstrate how focusing only on statistical significance can lead to incorrect and incomplete conclusions in many common applications of the linear regression model. Moreover, I demonstrate why interpreting coefficient estimates in common non-linear estimators (e.g., probit, logit, Poisson, and negative binomial estimators) requires additional care compared to the linear regression model.

This paper is the main section on quantitative data analysis. It explains the concepts at a greater detail to help non-Math/Stat scholars to understand the basics easily. Proper data analysis is critical to any research. If data are not properly analyzed, then it may give results which either cannot be properly interpreted or wrongly interpreted. This section covers univariate, multivariate analysis and then, factor analysis, cluster analysis, conjoint analysis, and multidimensional scaling (MDS) techniques.

Using initial public offering (IPO) involuntary delisting data, this chapter examines whether and how motivated institutional investors affect the survivability of IPO firms. The empirical evidence shows that the likelihood of future delisting is much lower for IPOs with more motivated institutional investors. This impact is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry. The motivated institutional investors also facilitate better post-IPO operating performance. The results are consistent with the prediction of the limited attention theory.

Efficiency wage theory predicts that firms can induce worker effort by the carrot of high wages and/or the stick of monitoring worker performance. Another option available to firms is to tilt the remuneration package over time such that the lure of high future earnings acts as a deterrent to current shirking. On the assumption that firms strive for the optimal trade-off between these various instruments, we develop a two-period model of efficiency wages in which increased monitoring attenuates the gradient of the wage-tenure profile. Our empirical analysis, using two cross sections of matched employer-employee British data, provides robust support for this prediction.

In this chapter, we are among the first to investigate the actual course of affairs in AGMs with respect to shareholder forum rights. In the first part of the chapter, we provide descriptive statistics on the use of the right to ask questions and speak in AGMs in the Netherlands. We find that in an average meeting there are around 42 questions and remarks made by around 8 shareholders. Most of these questions and remarks seem to be relevant; with a categorization framework of 14 topics, we could already identify over 50% of these questions and remarks. However, we also find that the average number of shareholders that physically ask questions is only 8. Next, we consider the determinants of the use of these forum rights. In several panel data analyses with a Poisson distribution and a negative binomial distribution, we, inter alia, found that the ‘importance of the meeting’ generally contributes to the amount of questions and remarks and the number of shareholders that actively engage in discussions. We have also found that the number of speakers – and the number of private investors – that actively attend the AGM depends on previous attendance numbers. This may imply that there is a small base of very active (private) investors in the Netherlands. We conclude that the forum function of AGMs is definitely relevant, but given the low number of shareholders that make use of these rights, amendments may be considered.