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The introduction of the 22 member countries of the 4+10+2+6 model of the Asian economy is the immediate task. Japan, Korea, China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar constitute the now-famous 4+10 model. Following the principle of inclusion, Mongolia, Chinese Taipei, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka, as they belong to the regional map of the continent of Asia, are the eight remaining member countries (see Chapter 1). An overview of Asia's 22 member continental economy the AE-22, with its 3.6 billion people (2006) who have made the region of Asia their home in a land area of 20.5 million km² should be welcome. To put these figures in perspective, the AE-22 comprises only 13.7 percent of the world's land area, but is home to over half the world's population. Tables 2.1–2.4, presented below, illustrate the various figures relating to population, land area, GDP, and GDP per capita of the member nations of the AE-22.

There has long been a prevailing view concerning North Korea, officially known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), that the world’s most reclusive socialist state, in accordance with its “juche” (self-reliance) ideology,¹ shuns capitalism, and discourages entrepreneurship and innovation, and feigns reform to further its nuclear ambitions including the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Under its previous leaders, Kim Il Sung and his son, Kim Jong Il, the DPRK saw little need for and discouraged innovation in the financial sector, particularly that of Western origin. However, since coming to power in December 2011, its current leader, Kim Jong-Un, has placed a strong emphasis on entrepreneurship and innovation, in numerous sectors, including its financial system. Based on research and interviews conducted with international business and entrepreneurship experts that have trained North Koreans, and personal experience as an adjunct business faculty member in the DPRK, this research shows the recent developments including the role played by entrepreneurs in helping the DPRK achieve its goal of economic and technological transformation. The primary focus is on changes in the DPRK’s financial sector.

The author provides us here with a rare and original testimony about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, from the trips he was able to make there and the many contacts he had there. He focuses the readers’ attention more particularly on his interpretation of Juche’s thinking, the principles of which contribute to find the development strategy of this country. The emphasis is primarily on the imperative of autonomy for the economy and the society.

Regulatory authority officials in Korea have been considerably strong enough to affect citizen’s intentions and alter their incentives to take new challenges. But, from the result of steady regulation reform, absurd bureaucratic interventions have been sharply reduced. Corruption in the process of rent seeking has decreased too. It is impossible to exercise regulatory authority that infringes on the essence of the freedom of the people because people who live in a democratic society would not accept these absurd practices.

This chapter introduces some key features of the regulatory management system in South Korea as well as the challenges that need to be overcome. In particular, the bureaucracy has worked hard to chip away at past regulations that produce rents for various private interest groups but provide little to society at large. Regulatory quality is tied closely to democracy as maintaining a fair and even playing field for entrepreneurs is a key freedom. Introducing checks and balances into the regulatory system can be an important way to facilitate this goal. The Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) facilitated to strengthen the logic of regulatory necessity and the logic of improving regulation which increased the level of its institutionalization.

The Hanbo (meaning Korean treasure) scandal or “Hanbogate” occurred on January 23, 1997, with the bankruptcy of Hanbo Iron and Steel Company, the second largest steel company and 14th largest conglomerate in South Korea, as its debt had accumulated to US$5.6 billion. Hanbo's bankruptcy triggered an investigation by the Public Prosecutor's Office that resulted in the imprisonment for 15 years of Hanbo's founder, Chung Tae-Soo, for bribing politicians and bankers to pressure banks to extend hugh bank loans to Hanbo. Nine other persons were also convicted including Chung's son, who was jailed for three years for bribery and embezzlement, and Kim Hyun-Chol, the second son of President Kim Young-Sam, who was sentenced to three years jail and fined US$1.5 million (New York Times, 1997).

This chapter explores the relationship between bureaucracy and the ­democratization of the Republic of Korea by analyzing the roles and responsibilities of the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea (BAI) and how Korea’s unique type of supreme audit institution (SAI) have been involved throughout the democratization process of Korea over the last two decades. Unlike western supreme audit institutions which mainly functioned for financial and performance auditing, Korea’s SAI, BAI bureaucracy, has functioned to reduce corruption, in cooperation with citizen’s participation which gives unique cases for the context of developing countries. The most important finding of this study is that bureaucracy can be an effective vehicle in a country’s political trajectory towards democratization given that the public institutions and agencies have specific traits such as having clear and comprehensive mandates, retaining high ­sensitivity to external needs, and maintaining well-qualified staff with active utilization of Information Technology. The main targets of the analysis are the conditions under which BAI bureaucracy could effectively exert its mandates and successfully fulfill its duties; also the question of how the BAI bureaucracy has facilitated democratization as being the locus of participatory democracy will be addressed.

Despite the privatization of its various components, the bidding process and the preparations for the Olympics are still initiated and tightly managed by central governments. Moreover, intentionally and unintentionally, governments use mega sports events such as the Olympics as a soft power medium in which to pursue their goals such as economic development and social integration and a lot of literature has already reviewed the economic and sociocultural impact of hosting the event. This chapter argues that the Olympics have been used as the medium to assist in the formation of legitimacy for a weakened authoritarian leader in the early phase of democratization in Korea. In addition, the chapter tries to explain how the bureaucracy contributed to the success of the national event and how it eventually impacted political modernization and the attitude of bureaucrats. To these ends, first, this chapter explores the influence of soft power on international competition by providing an empirical statistical analysis. Specifically, the chapter analyzes the process by which countries compete with one another for the privilege of hosting the Olympic Games as an important field of global interaction between political actors Further, the chapter discusses which components of soft power can affect international competition. To investigate the explanatory power and concrete applicability of soft power theory, the chapter looks at the influence of democratic and government dimensions of soft power on the selection of Olympic host cities and the role of bureaucracy during that process.