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The purpose of this study to improve the efficiency of customer acquisition and retention through the design of salary information disclosure mechanism.

This study develops a stylized game-theoretic model of delegating customer acquisition and retention, focusing on how firms choose delegation and wage information disclosure strategy.

The results confirm the necessity for enterprises to disclose salary information. When sales agents are risk neutral, firms should choose multi-agent (MA) delegation and disclose their wages. However, when agents are risk averse, firms may disclose the wages of acquisition agents or both agents in MA delegation, depending on the uncertainty of the retention market.

This paper contributes to the literature on delegation of customer acquisition and retention and demonstrates that salary disclosure can be used as a supplement to the incentive mechanism.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role played by turbulent environments in the evolution of hybrid (i.e. multi-party, cross-sector) partnerships for regional innovation. Although extant research suggests that organizations decide to participate in such partnerships to cope with their turbulent environments, little is known about how actual perceptions of turbulent environments influence the setup and evolution of a partnership.

The qualitative study adopts a longitudinal design to investigate the evolution of a cross-sector regional innovation partnership between ten very different organizations. With the help of the VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity) model proposed by Bennett and Lemoine (2014a), the authors study the relation between partners’ initial perceptions of environmental turbulence and the models adopted for the partnership throughout its lifecycle (emergent, brokering and platform).

The authors show that partners’ intentions to solve perceived environmental turbulence through collaboration can have the unexpected consequence of triggering perceived turbulence inside the collaboration itself. Specifically, the authors show that perceived partnership VUCA at each stage is a result of partners’ attempts to cope with the perceived VUCA in the previous stage.

The study highlights a set of common traps that both public and private organizations engaged in hybrid partnerships might fall into precisely as they try to lower VUCA threats in their environments.

The work accounts for the relationship between external and internal perceptions of VUCA in hybrid partnerships for regional innovation, and, in particular, provides a better understanding of what happens when organizations choose to enter hybrid partnerships in order to deal with perceived threats in their environments.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how leaders’ behaviour and subordinates’ personality can impact subordinates’ feelings of being trusted. Feeling trusted by one’s leader is associated with increased performance, organisational citizenship behaviours and job satisfaction (Baer et al., 2015; Lester and Brower, 2003).

Participants read a vignette in which a leader’s behaviour was manipulated and then rated the extent to which they felt trusted. Participants in Sample 1 consisted of 726 undergraduate students with work experience, and Sample 2 consisted of 1,196 people with work experience recruited over CrowdFlower, a crowd-sourcing website.

Results from both samples indicate that a leader delegating a task increases subordinate felt trust, for Sample 1 p<0.001, d=0.75 and for Sample 2 p<0.001, d=0.90. Further, subordinate felt trust increases when the task delegated is of high importance, for Sample 1 p<0.001, d=0.42 and for Sample 2 p<0.001, d=0.58. The likelihood of the delegated task resulting in negative outcomes and subordinate propensity to trust have negligible effects on felt trust.

Despite the organisational benefits of felt trust, it is still unclear how to elicit subordinates’ felt trust. This study is one of the first to empirically examine leader behaviour that may lead subordinates to feel trusted in the workplace. These findings support theoretical underpinnings of the relational leadership model and the risk-based model of trust.

With the continued expansion of Western organisations and their leadership personnel and practices across national boundaries there is a need for continued critical examination of assumptions about the transferability of these practices into other cultural settings. The purpose of this paper is to focus on one such practice, delegation, and explores its relationship to leader-member exchange (LMX) relationships and work outcomes in a non-Western organisation.

Participants (186) were Chinese subordinate managers in a large transport company in Hong Kong. Data were collected via questionnaire and analysed using a path-analytic model.

The data supported a direct and indirect path between delegation and job satisfaction and an indirect path only between delegation and job performance where LMX was the mediating variable. The results highlight the importance of LMX in the delegation-work outcomes relationship.

The limitations of using a single site for investigation, cross-sectional data and common method bias are discussed in relation to suggestions for future research.

For the company in question, quality LMX relationships are seen as key for improving delegation-work outcome relationships particularly in terms of the potential to “soften” the autonomy requirements of the delegation process for Chinese subordinate managers.

This research adds new knowledge to the literature about the conditions under which delegation may be effective in improving subordinate job satisfaction and performance through the agency of enhanced LMX relationships in a Chinese work context.

The purpose of the chapter is to develop and substantiate the necessity for delegating authorities in the process of decision making in modern business systems, as well as conditions, principles, and criteria of successful delegation in view of the applied approach. The methodology of the chapter is based on the method of analysis of causal connections, which is used for determining the necessity and essence of delegation, evaluating and comparison of the possible concepts and means of its implementation in the process of decision making, and studying the managers' opinions for determining the problems of delegation. This allows determining the conditions and criteria of successful delegation and developing an optimal set of principles that allow for effective implementation of the process of delegating authorities. As a result, the authors determine conditions and limitations that determine the possibility of delegating authorities in the process of decision making and offer criteria of successfulness of the process: preliminary task setting, interest and readiness of employees, briefing, written form of delegating authorities for complex and responsible tasks, accessibility of any necessary information, support from manager, and controllability of the process and result. The concepts of delegation are studied, and priority of its new model is established. Based on this, 11 principles of successful delegation were formulated: determination of goal, certainty, parity of rights and responsibility, adequate support, motivation of effective solutions, participation, “finite character,” structural limitations, complex nature of tasks, succession, and vision of perspective.

Complexities of the process of delegation in the process of decision making in business systems are described – their knowledge helps developing own styles of delegation and improving it.

The purpose of this study is to understand the profit implications of analytics-driven centralized discriminatory pricing at the headquarter level compared with sales force price delegation in the purchase of an aftermarket good through an indirect retail channel with symmetric information.

Using individual-level loan application and approval data from a North American financial institution and segment-level customer risk as the price discrimination criterion for the firm, the authors develop a three-stage model that accounts for the salesperson’s price decision within the limits of the latitude provided by the firm; the firm’s decision to approve or not approve a sales application; and the customer’s decision to accept or reject a sales offer conditional on the firm’s approval. Next, the authors compare the profitability of this sales force price delegation model to that of a segment-level centralized pricing model where agent incentives and consumer prices are simultaneously optimized using a quasi-Newton nonlinear optimization algorithm (i.e. Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno algorithm).

The results suggest that implementation of analytics-driven centralized discriminatory pricing and optimal sales force incentives leads to double-digit lifts in firm profits. Moreover, the authors find that the high-risk customer segment is less price-sensitive and firms, upon leveraging this segment’s willingness to pay, not only improve their bottom-line but also allow these marginalized customers with traditionally low approval rates access to loans. This points out the important customer welfare implications of the findings.

Substantively, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to empirically investigate the profitability of analytics-driven segment-level (i.e. discriminatory) centralized pricing compared with sales force price delegation in indirect retail channels (i.e. where agents are external to the firm and have access to competitor products), taking into account the decisions of the three key stakeholders of the process, namely, the consumer, the salesperson and the firm and simultaneously optimizing sales commission and centralized consumer price.

This paper considers a strategic delegation setting with R&D spillovers in a Cournot market. The game we analyze has four stages. First, owners have the option to hire a manager. If they decide to delegate, then in the contracting stage they have to determine the optimal incentives for the managers. In the R&D stage, the levels of investments in research and development are chosen which reduce production costs. Finally, in the production stage quantities offered on the market are selected. We characterize the sub-game perfect outcomes of this game depending on the level of R&D spillovers and derive the following main insights. First, in a case where no spillovers exist, both owners have the incentive to delegate R&D and production decisions to managers. This leads to higher outputs, higher R&D activities, but lower profits for the firms in comparison with an entrepreneurial (owner-managed) firm. These results still hold if the basic production unit costs are high, independent of the existence of spillovers. In these cases delegation leads to an increase in social welfare. Second, we demonstrate that when spillovers exist and basic unit production costs are low, then there are situations where owners delegate but discourage managers from being aggressive. This “soft” commitment leads to lower outputs, lower R&D, but higher profits for the firms in comparison with an entrepreneurial firm. Here, however, delegation results in lower welfare.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the effectiveness of delegation as a management practice is impacted by various factors such as manager cognition, perceived subordinate competence, and cultural differences. This research may help global business leaders to better understand how cultural differences may impact managerial functions and how to manage culturally diverse employees.

This paper is based upon a conceptual discussion of delegation as it has been studied in the past and a reflection on the ways in which past research can usefully inform current trends in the use of delegation as a management practice.

A model is proposed that suggests that the effectiveness of delegation in a local context is a function of the global leader’s cognitions and perceptions of their subordinates. Further, it suggests that this relationship is moderated by the local cultural context in that some cultures may be opposed to being delegated authority.

This paper presents a conceptual framework and therefore empirical applicability of this model must be proven.

Delegation is an under-researched management practice. This paper contributes to the delegation literature by exploring its value to management in a global context.

Organizational socialization refers to the process by which newcomers learn to perform in their role and adjust to work after organizational entry. Unfortunately, there is little knowledge regarding organizational socialization from the supervisors’ perspectives, although the importance of supervisors in newcomer socialization is one of the most robust findings in the field. The purpose of this paper is to examine how supervisors’ perceived organizational support (supervisor POS) and the quality of their working relationships with newcomers (supervisor leader-member exchange (LMX)) relate to the delegation of authority to newcomers and how delegation in turn relates to newcomers’ work adjustment.

A sample of new employees completed questionnaires that included delegation and socialization outcome measures. Supervisors evaluated their POS and the quality of their working relationships with newcomers (LMX).

The results showed that supervisor POS moderated the relationship between supervisor LMX and delegation. Specifically, supervisors with high POS showed delegation to newcomers irrespective of their LMX. Conversely, when supervisors’ POS was low, a high LMX was related to delegation. The results further showed that delegation was positively related to newcomers’ role clarity, organizational knowledge, and job satisfaction. Finally, the results showed indirect effects of supervisor LMX on newcomers’ role clarity and job satisfaction through delegation contingent on supervisor POS.

This study showed that a supervisor’s social exchange relations both with the organization and with a new employee are important in the delegation of authority and responsibility to a newcomer and that this delegation in turn relates to newcomers’ work adjustment.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse a key research hypothesis: Do firms ruled by managers have a greater rationale to implement a mergers and acquisitions (M&A) than (family) firms managed by their owners?

This paper uses an organizational-delegation-quantity oligopoly game to examine the profitability of M&As for firms that strategically delegate production decisions to managers versus family firms with no strategic delegation. This paper delimits the condition for delegation as aimed at increasing merger profitability: non-family CEOs will implement mergers more frequently than family CEOs and more so for inefficient firms because these require fewer synergies. The paper tests the main propositions with data on all M&As by small and medium firms in Spain in 2017 and 2018.

The greater the average operating margin of a firm, the more likely a merger, which is also more likely between non-family firms. The evidence of higher ex post synergies by firms is not statistically significant due to large variability, suggesting that some family firms did not obtain the expected ex ante synergies. The lesson is that family firms competing in an environment of high marginal costs (e.g. industries in the early stage of the life cycle) seeking to grow through inorganic means such as M&As have an incentive to professionalize management.

This paper models competition in a Cournot fashion, representative of industries where firms compete in terms of sales growth and increased market share. Other results might hold in industries where firms are oriented to price competition or to service differentiation. The empirical research uses proxies for key variables such as the form of firm governance and unit costs, while hypotheses on ex ante synergies driving merger decisions had to be tested through ex post synergies.

M&As by small firms and family firms remain largely unexplored in the literature. This paper contributes with both a theoretical model and empirical research that highlight the implications of strategic delegation contracts for M&A deals.