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The purpose of this paper is to investigate firm behaviors on patent examination request under the deferred patent examination system in Korea. The authors examine firm decisions on whether and when to request patent examinations when they face both uncertainty about invention’s value and market competition.

The authors provide a simple theoretical model and test a couple of hypothesis using Korea patent data. The authors employ KIPO (Korean intellectual patent office) patent applications data during 2006–2009 and incorporate it with firm financial data retrieved from1 Korea investor service-financial analysis system (KIS-FAS) database in Korea. The authors use the variation in the probability of lapsed patent applications filed in the same year and in the same technology field (at the four-digit IPC class level) of a patent application i as a proxy for the value of uncertainty, and further use one minus a firm’s market share (at the three-digit SIC industry level) as an indicator of the market competition faced by the firm/applicant.

The authors find that the examination requests of firms in Korea have interesting bipolar distribution, and both uncertainty about an invention’s value and market competition have significant impacts on firm’s decision for examination request. Applicants tend to utilize option value of waiting when uncertainty is high, but market competition attenuates the option value: the higher the competition, the less likely applicants are to delay or forego examination.

The authors’ study makes interesting contributions to the literature on the optimal design of the patent system in general and the deferred patent examination request system in particular. By considering the roles of both uncertainty and market competition in firm decisions, it provides a more comprehensive perspective on the deferred patent examination system. The study also provides empirical evidences on the broader research topic regarding firm decision for irreversible investment when faced with both uncertainty and competition, for which a strand of theoretical literature exists but empirical literature is largely limited. This study, which explicitly takes into account uncertainty and market competition, extends this line of empirical literature and fills the gap in the literature.

Four major changes in patent law—the British Patents Act, European Patent Convention, Community Patent Convention and the Patent Co‐operation Treaty are described. Comments are made on their likely effect on information scientists and commercial information services and some predictions are made on likely usage of the European Patent Convention by British firms.

Of significance for patents information during the past decade or so have been the major changes in patents legislation, improvements to the publications of the principal patenting systems, and the transforming effects of computerized databases. The review covers these changes and outlines the current publication procedures of the European Patent Convention, Patent Cooperation Treaty, and the major national systems. The importance of the patent specification as a source of information, and developments during this period in its construction and bibliographic data are explained. Official and non‐official publications associated with the specification are covered. Particular emphasis is given to computer databases covering patents, since they now form a powerful, numerous and growing means of searching specifications in the majority of subject fields. Reference is made to efforts to increase general awareness of the value of patents as information and to improve their availability by schemes such as the UK's Patents Information Network.

In preparing this paper I was faced with the problem of not knowing how much you know about patents. I do not wish to bore those of you who are knowledgeable or confuse those who are expert in other subjects.

I begin with a dispute over a fox hunt, by which to understand the law of tangible property, then develop that metaphor for the major types of intellectual property. I start with domestic U.S. patent law for the sake of concreteness, and generalize to other jurisdictions and types of intellectual property. In the latter parts of the paper I discuss the international implications of intellectual property, including especially the effects of information spillovers. The last part of the paper describes the hazards in analogizing “trade” in intellectual property rights to trade in goods, and particularly in interpreting international patent data. These hazards motivate the search for a structural model specially adapted to the purpose of valuing international intellectual property rights and rules. The goal is to give economists a simple and integrated framework for analyzing intellectual property across time, jurisdiction and regime type, with an eye towards eventually developing other incentive systems that have the advantages of property (such as decentralized decision-making), but fewer of the disadvantages.

From its first patent statute, the United States awarded patents to the first person to invent. The rest of the world eventually adopted “first to file” regimes, in which the first person to file a patent application was awarded the patent. In 2013, the United States moved closer to harmonizing with the rest of the world. The America Invents Act created a “first inventor to file” system, representing the most dramatic change in US patent law in over fifty years. This chapter explores the new provisions by offering a basic operation of how they operate. It then discusses the myriad of new administrative procedures at the United States Patent and Trademark Office that were created in the America Invents Act. These procedures have the potential to challenge patents more cheaply than in litigation. The chapter discusses the various requirements and limitations of these provisions.

Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., United Shoe Machinery (USM) was found guilty of illegal monopolization due to its leasing practices. Existing scholarship on this case largely focuses on the issue of leasing versus selling. In this article, we provide a more comprehensive analysis of this important decision. In addition, we examine USM’s antitrust experience before and after the famous 1953 case. We find that USM’s business practices were largely procompetitive and, therefore, did not warrant condemnation.

In Table IV. are given the averages of the three samples of each cow's milk given morning and evening. The average fat for the three samples of the milk of cow A is 3.92; cow B, 3.26; and cow C, 3.24, and if these were all mixed together the average fat would be 3.45 for the morning milk. The average fat of the three samples taken from the cows A, B, and C in the afternoon is—A, 5.08; B, 3.08; and C, 3.54; and the average of the three milks is 3.85. In the same table are shown the first two samples of each cow's milk mixed together both morning and evening. By referring to Tables II. and III. under cow A it will be seen that the milk fat of the first and second samples is 2.30 and 3.67, and these added together are shown on Table IV. under cow A, and similarly with cow B and cow C night and morning. It will also be seen that the milk fat in the morning milk of cow A is 3.21; cow B, 2.49; and cow C, 2.15, and if these were mixed together the average fat would be 2.61. The average fat of two samples of milk taken from cow A in the afternoon is 4.50; cow B, 2.67; cow C, 2.12, and if mixed together the average fat is 3.08. It is interesting to note that if cow B was milked for six minutes in the morning, and the milk sold, the sample would be .51 deficient in fat, and the dairyman could honestly say that the milk was sold as it came from the cow. There is also a deficiency in the fat of the milk of cow C in the morning, and cows B and C in the afternoon.