Search results

Using the case of the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, I argue that the catastrophe was less an example of a low probability-high catastrophe event than an instance of socially produced risks and insecurities associated with deepwater oil and gas production during the neoliberal period after 1980. The disaster exposes the deadly intersection of the aggressive enclosure of a new technologically risky resource frontier (the deepwater continental shelf) with what I call a frontier of neoliberalized risk, a lethal product of cut-throat corporate cost-cutting, the collapse of government oversight and regulatory authority and the deepening financialization and securitization of the oil market. These two local pockets of socially produced risk and wrecklessness have come to exceed the capabilities of what passes as risk management and energy security. In this sense, the Deepwater Horizon disaster was produced by a set of structural conditions, a sort of rogue capitalism, not unlike those which precipitated the financial meltdown of 2008. The forms of accumulation unleashed in the Gulf of Mexico over three decades rendered a high-risk enterprise yet more risky, all the while accumulating insecurities and radical uncertainties which made the likelihood of a Deepwater Horizon type disaster highly overdetermined.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the stock market reaction to the Gulf oil spill and determine if the markets exhibited rational pricing. On April 20, 2010, the US Coast Guard received a report of an explosion and fire aboard Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig. The resulting spill exceeded the Exxon Valdez oil spill as the worst in US history. With the total cost of the disaster reaching almost $54 billion for British Petroleum, clearly the spill had far-reaching effects on its market value. However, the more interesting question is what valuation effects might exist for other oil and gas firms, due to an increase in perceived risk for all offshore drilling and/or the likelihood of an increase in the regulation of the industry.

Because the new information was released piecemeal over time and has the potential to affect a number of firms simultaneously, Gibbon’s (1980) multivariate regression model methodology (MVRM) was used to examine share price reactions of firms in the oil and gas industry in the aftermath of the oil spill. This methodology allows one to test whether significant abnormal returns occur on days where new information is released. Further, one is able to test whether the market reaction was the same for each firm or whether the market differentiated between firms.

Evidence of abnormal returns was found for the majority of the information dates in our investigation. Further, the results reject the notion that the market reaction was the same for all oil and gas firms, leading to the conclusion that the market did differentiate between firms.

This research is important because the results support rational pricing of the US stock markets following this unexpected and catastrophic event. The market was examined over the period following the oil spill on multiple dates when important new information is provided. This study contributes to financial and economic research on market efficiency and reactions to major risk events.

The purpose of the paper is to extend prior research on the psychological effects of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster by developing and testing a conceptual model in which exposure to the oil spill through clean-up activity, physical symptoms, worry about the impact of the oil spill on health, and the disruption of the gulf/ocean-related lifestyle were hypothesized as predictors of depressive symptoms.

The analysis included a randomly selected sample of 354 subjects from the three most Southern Mississippi counties. The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale was used to measure depressive symptoms.

Results indicated that physical symptoms since the oil spill were related to depressive symptoms directly and indirectly through worry about the impact of the oil spill on health and the disruption of the gulf/ocean-related lifestyle. Worry about the impact of the oil spill on health was related to depressive symptoms directly and indirectly through the disruption of the gulf/ocean-related lifestyle.

Study results highlight that uncertainty and worry about the impact of the disaster played a critical role in understanding the psychological effects of the oil spill disaster, especially among coastal residents whose lifestyles were bound up with the gulf/ocean.

The psychological and behavioral consequences of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster were among the most widespread, long term, and costly of all oil spill-related disasters. However, many people were resilient, and understanding the factors associated with resilience in the immediate aftermath of this disaster are needed to guide early interventions. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

In total, 133 adults from the Northeast Gulf Coast participated in a study of mental health outcomes during the oil spill and one year later. Participants completed a battery of measures that assessed their basic demographics, income status, perceived environmental risk (i.e. characteristic way people think about and interpret environmental risks), self-reported resilience (i.e. ability to “bounce back” after a disaster), and mental health status.

Results of univariate analyses indicated similar, elevated levels of mental health problems at both time points; however, environmental risk perception was higher one year post-spill than during the spill. In multivariate analyses, income stability, increased time, higher self-reported resilience, and lower environmental risk perception were associated with better mental health outcomes while age and gender had no association.

Oil spills are protracted disasters, and better mental health outcomes are linked to financial stability, as well as a belief in environmental restoration and one’s own capacity for resilience. Since resilience and environmental worry are potentially modifiable processes, they might be targeted in prevention and early intervention efforts in order to create more robust, prepared individuals in the face of an oil spill disaster.

The purpose of this study is to use a sample of oil and gas firms and examine the relationship between environmental disclosure in the USA Form 10-K and the stock market reaction after the BP oil spill.

The study focused on three important time periods associated with the oil spill: the time period beginning with the explosion on April 20, 2010 and ending August 5, 2010, one day after BP permanently sealed the oil leak; the period beginning with the explosion on April 20 and ending with the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig on April 22; and the period associated with President Obama’s first public comments on the oil spill and his administration’s ban on oil drilling, i.e. April 29-30 and May 3.

The results show a negative relationship between environmental disclosure and stock market reaction.

The findings of a negative association could be the result of higher disclosure by firms with more environmental risk because they indeed are riskier and/or they engage in “window dressing” to legitimize their operations and practices and maintain acceptance by society.

The results in this study run counter to a positive association documented in prior research studying the effects of environmental disasters.

Purpose – This research explores how social movement activists work to influence the framing of oil spill impacts, and related scientific and political processes. It focuses on the Louisiana Bucket Brigade (LABB), an environmental justice organization that has worked in the Gulf Coast, and looks particularly at the experience of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.

Design/methodology – Research is based on qualitative interviews, ethnographic observations, and video data with local social movement organizations, grassroots groups, spill workers, fishermen, local residents, scientists, and government representatives during three time periods, in 2010 within five months of the spill, Fall of 2011, and Summer of 2012.

Findings – Legal institutional constrictions inherent in official oil spill assessments and cleanup processes fostered a transformation in activist tactics and the communities they seek to represent.

Originality/value of the paper – Social movement activism has not often been studied in response to an oil spill. This chapter demonstrates how such an event shapes activism, and how activism has an effect on local responses to the event.

Disasters drastically affect regional industries; consequently, the study of regional resilience is of much interest to organizational researchers. To that end, this study examines the role of entrepreneurial opportunity recognition, stakeholder engagement, and elements of psychological recovery in the US Gulf Coast following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010.

Through a qualitative content analysis of 183 industry-relevant articles published during and after the disaster, this study unpacks the most significant themes at work in the recovery process, including the psychological elements of the oil spill and its aftermath, the role of various internal and external stakeholders, and emerging opportunities for entrepreneurial activity in the region for regional resilience and recovery.

The nine themes that emerged from the data were captured in three categories mapped over time. Category one, psychogical states during and after the oil spill, include denial, coping, and recovery. Category two, regional recovery efforts and the role of stakeholders, includes the themes distractions, bargains, and material support. Category three, emerging opportunities, includes financial support, new markets, and reparations.

By mapping these themes over distinct time periods, this study identifies and explores patterns in the recovery period and use them to draw theoretical and practical implications.

In this chapter, the post-disaster handling of the British Petroleum Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico is analyzed according to the concept of “Public Reserve.” Public Reserve extends the theory of privacy from the individual into the context of corporate behavior and environmental regulation and management by government. Secrecy is viewed as a form of privacy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which self-reported resilience was associated with mental health outcomes four years after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (DWHOS).

Participants included 179 men and women randomly selected from two Northeast Gulf Coast communities as part of a larger, prospective study of behavioral health post oil spill. The majority of the participants were Caucasian (70.8 percent), female (61.5 percent), had a high school education or lower (75.3 percent), and ranged in age from 18 to greater than 60 years old. Participants completed a measure of resilience (Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale, CD-RISC) 2.5 years post oil spill and measures of overall mood disturbance (Profile of Mood States), depression (Beck Depression Inventory), quality of life (World Health Organization Quality of Life-BREF Scale) 4.5 years post oil spill.

Based upon linear regression analyses, elevated self-reported resilience significantly predicted lower scores on mood disturbance (b=−0.63, p<0.01) and depressive symptoms (b=−0.14, p<0.05) and higher scores on psychological (b=0.08, p<0.01) and overall health quality of life (b=0.08, p<0.01). Factor analysis of the CD-RISC identified three factors (hardiness, adaptability, optimism). Each factor predicted some, but not all, of the outcomes with optimism being the least predictive of mental health.

Self-reported resilience two years after the DWHOS was a useful predictor of mental health outcome four years post-spill. Early assessment may facilitate the identification of individuals at risk of longer-term mental health problems for public health prevention or mental health intervention efforts.

The authors study the effect of increasing environmental awareness on shareholders' activism. Specificallly, this study aims to examine whether growing environmental awareness is reflected in more aggressive environmental shareholder proposals.

This study uses the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster as an exogenous event that increased shareholders' environmental awareness. This study analyzes the spill’s effect on the tone of proposals about environmental issues and nonenvironmental topics.

After the disaster, the tone of environmental proposals (i.e. the treatment group) is significantly more negative. In contrast, the tone of nonenvironmental proposals (i.e. the control group) is unaffected. This study interprets this finding as direct evidence that the oil spill led to increased shareholder environmental activism through proposals that targeted the environmental risks surrounding the business more aggressively. By contrast, this study finds no effect of the oil spill on the tone of managers' responses to the proposals, consistent with managers refraining from emphasizing environmental threats.

Anecdotal evidence and recent studies suggest a link between environmental disasters and shareholder pressure for corporate change. However, no prior research has investigated the channel through which shareholders could have exerted such pressure or has looked for direct evidence of it in the negotiations between shareholders and managers. By finding such evidence in shareholder proposals, this study fills in this gap.