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This study aims at identifying the consequences of adopting statutory rather than market basis in assessing damages due to contamination to land. Most valuations undertaken to assess compensation for damages due to contamination on land are done with valuation methods prescribed by law for the compulsory acquisition of land.

A total of 80 registered valuation firms with experience in both compulsory acquisition and damage assessment participated in a questionnaire survey to ascertain the methods adopted in valuing when determining the compensation payable as damages due to land contamination and the need for a framework for such valuations, in addition to some archival documents relating to the relevant laws and some purposively selected valuation reports, which were reviewed.

The results of the analysis indicate that the use of compulsory acquisition valuation methods results in inadequate damages, which engenders conflicts among the stakeholders. The absence of any framework for damage assessment is responsible for the current practice in the Niger Delta, and it is recommended that international best practices utilising market basis of valuation be adopted.

Most valuation methods available are useful for valuing commercial properties regularly traded in the market and not applicable to the Niger Delta, which is mostly rural with very few market transactions. It is expected that this study will enable oil and gas industry operators, professional valuers advising the land owners or operators in the industry and the government to differentiate compensation paid for compulsory acquisition and compensation required to placate those suffering losses due to contamination.

The findings will assist professional valuers to be more professional in valuing contaminated land devastated by oil spills.

Adopting the findings will engender a greater acceptability of the results of valuations undertaken in the wake of an oil spillage disaster and ensure a peaceful environment for the oil operators and the entire populace.

The findings of this study are expected to assist policymakers in emerging economies and professional valuers acting in these environments to avoid precipitating crises by adopting inappropriate valuation techniques when assessing damages due to contamination. This study is original and has not been published elsewhere.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the stock market reaction to the Gulf oil spill and determine if the markets exhibited rational pricing. On April 20, 2010, the US Coast Guard received a report of an explosion and fire aboard Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig. The resulting spill exceeded the Exxon Valdez oil spill as the worst in US history. With the total cost of the disaster reaching almost $54 billion for British Petroleum, clearly the spill had far-reaching effects on its market value. However, the more interesting question is what valuation effects might exist for other oil and gas firms, due to an increase in perceived risk for all offshore drilling and/or the likelihood of an increase in the regulation of the industry.

Because the new information was released piecemeal over time and has the potential to affect a number of firms simultaneously, Gibbon’s (1980) multivariate regression model methodology (MVRM) was used to examine share price reactions of firms in the oil and gas industry in the aftermath of the oil spill. This methodology allows one to test whether significant abnormal returns occur on days where new information is released. Further, one is able to test whether the market reaction was the same for each firm or whether the market differentiated between firms.

Evidence of abnormal returns was found for the majority of the information dates in our investigation. Further, the results reject the notion that the market reaction was the same for all oil and gas firms, leading to the conclusion that the market did differentiate between firms.

This research is important because the results support rational pricing of the US stock markets following this unexpected and catastrophic event. The market was examined over the period following the oil spill on multiple dates when important new information is provided. This study contributes to financial and economic research on market efficiency and reactions to major risk events.

The purpose of the paper is to extend prior research on the psychological effects of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster by developing and testing a conceptual model in which exposure to the oil spill through clean-up activity, physical symptoms, worry about the impact of the oil spill on health, and the disruption of the gulf/ocean-related lifestyle were hypothesized as predictors of depressive symptoms.

The analysis included a randomly selected sample of 354 subjects from the three most Southern Mississippi counties. The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale was used to measure depressive symptoms.

Results indicated that physical symptoms since the oil spill were related to depressive symptoms directly and indirectly through worry about the impact of the oil spill on health and the disruption of the gulf/ocean-related lifestyle. Worry about the impact of the oil spill on health was related to depressive symptoms directly and indirectly through the disruption of the gulf/ocean-related lifestyle.

Study results highlight that uncertainty and worry about the impact of the disaster played a critical role in understanding the psychological effects of the oil spill disaster, especially among coastal residents whose lifestyles were bound up with the gulf/ocean.

The psychological and behavioral consequences of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster were among the most widespread, long term, and costly of all oil spill-related disasters. However, many people were resilient, and understanding the factors associated with resilience in the immediate aftermath of this disaster are needed to guide early interventions. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

In total, 133 adults from the Northeast Gulf Coast participated in a study of mental health outcomes during the oil spill and one year later. Participants completed a battery of measures that assessed their basic demographics, income status, perceived environmental risk (i.e. characteristic way people think about and interpret environmental risks), self-reported resilience (i.e. ability to “bounce back” after a disaster), and mental health status.

Results of univariate analyses indicated similar, elevated levels of mental health problems at both time points; however, environmental risk perception was higher one year post-spill than during the spill. In multivariate analyses, income stability, increased time, higher self-reported resilience, and lower environmental risk perception were associated with better mental health outcomes while age and gender had no association.

Oil spills are protracted disasters, and better mental health outcomes are linked to financial stability, as well as a belief in environmental restoration and one’s own capacity for resilience. Since resilience and environmental worry are potentially modifiable processes, they might be targeted in prevention and early intervention efforts in order to create more robust, prepared individuals in the face of an oil spill disaster.

The paper aims to examine BP’s communications response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster, which caused 11 deaths and a huge oil spillage in the Gulf of Mexico.

It draws on such secondary sources as newspapers, audiovisual material and social-network sites.

It claims that BP lacked some of the tools needed for an effective communications response to the disaster and that the company made mistakes in, for example, putting out a series of advertisements during the clean-up operation.

It puts forward the view that companies ought to have a well-rehearsed crisis-communication strategy that they can easily adapt to the particular circumstances of a given disaster.

It looks at some of the things that BP got right, including its Internet response to the crisis.

It emphasizes the importance of good communication strategies when disaster strikes.

The purpose of this study is to use a sample of oil and gas firms and examine the relationship between environmental disclosure in the USA Form 10-K and the stock market reaction after the BP oil spill.

The study focused on three important time periods associated with the oil spill: the time period beginning with the explosion on April 20, 2010 and ending August 5, 2010, one day after BP permanently sealed the oil leak; the period beginning with the explosion on April 20 and ending with the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig on April 22; and the period associated with President Obama’s first public comments on the oil spill and his administration’s ban on oil drilling, i.e. April 29-30 and May 3.

The results show a negative relationship between environmental disclosure and stock market reaction.

The findings of a negative association could be the result of higher disclosure by firms with more environmental risk because they indeed are riskier and/or they engage in “window dressing” to legitimize their operations and practices and maintain acceptance by society.

The results in this study run counter to a positive association documented in prior research studying the effects of environmental disasters.

The purpose of this article is to provide an interview with Loren C. Steffy, business columnist for the Houston Chronicle. Loren has been recognized by the Society of American Business Editors and Writers, and the Associated Press Managing Editors, and has recently published Drowning in Oil: BP and the Reckless Pursuit of Profit.

This briefing is prepared by an independent interviewer.

Loren's recent publication: Drowning in Oil: BP and the Reckless Pursuit of Profit, provides an in‐depth examination of how a lack of corporate responsibility and government oversight led to the biggest offshore oil spill in US history, explaining that that the Deepwater Horizon disaster was only part of a larger pattern of cost‐cutting, image‐making, and winner‐take‐all corporate culture that compromised safety across BP's operations for years.

The paper provides strategic insights and practical thinking that have influenced some of the world's leading organizations.

The paper provides strategic insights and practical thinking that can have a broader social impact.

There is a lesson for all companies in the case of the Deepwater Horizon disaster: vigilance matters. When companies have complex and potentially dangerous operations, they cannot afford to get complacent. Years of safe operations does not mean you are not moments away from disaster. Human error is always a factor, but companies need processes that account for it.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which self-reported resilience was associated with mental health outcomes four years after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (DWHOS).

Participants included 179 men and women randomly selected from two Northeast Gulf Coast communities as part of a larger, prospective study of behavioral health post oil spill. The majority of the participants were Caucasian (70.8 percent), female (61.5 percent), had a high school education or lower (75.3 percent), and ranged in age from 18 to greater than 60 years old. Participants completed a measure of resilience (Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale, CD-RISC) 2.5 years post oil spill and measures of overall mood disturbance (Profile of Mood States), depression (Beck Depression Inventory), quality of life (World Health Organization Quality of Life-BREF Scale) 4.5 years post oil spill.

Based upon linear regression analyses, elevated self-reported resilience significantly predicted lower scores on mood disturbance (b=−0.63, p<0.01) and depressive symptoms (b=−0.14, p<0.05) and higher scores on psychological (b=0.08, p<0.01) and overall health quality of life (b=0.08, p<0.01). Factor analysis of the CD-RISC identified three factors (hardiness, adaptability, optimism). Each factor predicted some, but not all, of the outcomes with optimism being the least predictive of mental health.

Self-reported resilience two years after the DWHOS was a useful predictor of mental health outcome four years post-spill. Early assessment may facilitate the identification of individuals at risk of longer-term mental health problems for public health prevention or mental health intervention efforts.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the statements by the chairman and CEO in BP plc’s Annual Report 2010 for linguistic evidence of reader positioning. This is based on the premise that reputational fallout from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill would have heightened the need for such positioning to repair the company’s legitimacy.

Applying Halliday’s systemic functional linguistics (SFL) framework, a comparative register analysis was undertaken of the respective statements of the chairman and CEO of BP plc. This was informed by corpus analysis of these statements, of comparative statements from industry competitors and of two larger-scale corpora constructed from the chairman and CEO statements extracted from the annual reports of 25 FTSE100 companies.

The findings suggest that readers’ perceptions are likely to be shaped by the statements of the chairman and CEO of BP plc in the company’s 2010 annual report, but similarities and differences are apparent in the way this positioning is engineered. Broader corpus analysis hints that these similarities and differences are not localised to BP plc.

The analysis relies on the assumptions that the chairman and CEO are the writers of each piece. As with prior research, questions of intent on the part of the corporate authors and impact upon target readers remain unanswered.

This paper demonstrates and highlights the issue of reader positioning through lexico-grammatical choices in corporate disclosures.

This paper makes a contribution to the literature by demonstrating how reader positioning may be engineered through lexico-grammatical choices in corporate disclosures. This paper further responds to a call from Sydserff and Weetman (1999, 2002) for interdisciplinary approaches to investigating corporate narrative reports involving linguistics, through foregrounding Halliday’s SFL framework as an analytical tool.