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Over the past decade most central governments across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have begun to decentralize some fiscal, political, and administrative responsibilities to lower-levels of government, local institutions, and the private sector in pursuit of greater accountability and more efficient service delivery, often in an attempt to solve broader political, social, or economic problems (SARA, 1997). Education, in particular, has been fertile ground for such decentralization efforts. From Ethiopia to South Africa, SSA countries have engaged in some form of education decentralization, though the pace has been quite uneven. Ethiopia, Uganda, Senegal, and South Africa, for example, are proceeding fast, while Ghana, Mali, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe are under way more slowly. Guinea, Niger, Zambia, and Nigeria are at the other end of the continuum. Decentralization of social services, including education appears to be embedded in the political changes occurring in the region. In almost all SSA countries the introduction of decentralized systems are accompanied by popular elections for local councils as part of the general trend of the introduction of or return to democratization.

During the last decade, there has been a growing interest in decentralization among the governments of a number of Third World countries, especially, but not only, in Africa. Countries that have introduced significant organizational reforms described as, or having elements of, ‘decentralization’ – or are in the process of doing so – include Tanzania, Zambia, the Sudan, Nigeria and Ghana in Africa (Adamolckun & Rowlands, 1979; Conyers, 1981a; Mawhood & Davcy, 1980; Rondinelli, 1981; Tordoff, 1980), Sri Lanka (Craig, 1981) and a number of countries in the South Pacific, including Papua New Guinea (Conyers, 1981a, 1981b; Ghai, 1981; Tordoff, 1981). Several other countries in Africa and Asia are attempting to achieve some degree of decentralization within the existing organizational structure. In Latin America, government structures have generally remained more centralized and there appears to be little prospect of any major change in the near future; nevertheless, calls for decentralization recur periodically and there have been a few attempts, albeit generally of limited duration and success, to introduce some measure of decentralization (Graham, 1980).

The study aims to add to the knowledge of governance and control aspects of intrafirm relationships by exploring a transaction costs economics perspective (TCE perspective) on governance and management control structure choices related to the development of a shared service center (SSC).

The notion of governance and control in SSC organizations is explored and a TCE model is developed to analyze management control structure choices for SSC governance. The nature of internal transactions is related to the dimensions of transactions. Then an example case study is used to illustrate the application of the theoretical model.

The theoretical analysis broadens existing frameworks of management control structures by particularly pointing to the possibility of including governance structures for internal transactions and exit threats (connected to a market mechanism) in the management control structure of an organization. Confrontation with the case example illustrates that the possibility of an exit threat was not explicitly considered by top management (“the designer” of management control). Although the TCE model may be a useful tool for analysis purposes, it has little explanatory power in this particular case. Organizational change processes toward SSCs are complex and can only partly be examined with conventional economics-based approaches such as TCE.

Governance and control of SSCs is conceptually theorized, using an instrumental economics approach. The case study is not generalizable but illustrates the use of the model in a particular situation. To understand governance and control change within SSC organizations, more longitudinal case studies are needed.

A TCE approach to governance and control choices regarding SSCs might provide practitioners with insights into the efficiency of specific management control structures.

This chapter contributes to the extant knowledge by both exploring and challenging a TCE perspective on SSC-related changes in management control.

Cambodia is embarking on a major programme of decentralisation and deconcentration (D&D) reforms, which have the potential to transform the way the country is governed and to build greater accountability into its governmental system. The D&D reforms promise to transfer much greater powers and capabilities to province and district level administrations. Provincial public servants will have the responsibility to deliver most services and to be accountable to elected councils. Potentially, they will move government closer to the people in important ways. However, if they are to do this responsively and accountably, a great deal will have to change in the ways that public administration – and especially human resource management (HRM) in the civil service – is structured and operated.

This chapter integrates current Chinese education reform into the unique socioeconomic context of China in a transitional time and explores the complexity of education decentralization in China through an in-depth analysis on changes in education finance, administration, and curriculum development. Mark Hanson's theory of education decentralization is cited to build a conceptual framework for examining education decentralization in China. Previous studies, government documents, laws, and regulations related to the current wave of Chinese education reform are reviewed to capture a true picture of education decentralization in China. In investigating the background, actual actions, and motive of the current Chinese education reform, the chapter demonstrates that the on-going Chinese education reform is moving toward a centralized decentralization. Linking education with the unified national goal of economic modernization, the paradoxical mixture of centralization and decentralization is a strategic means to avoid loss of centralized control. Literature on decentralization reform in Chinese education primarily concentrates on changed Chinese education policies in the reform. This chapter places the focus on the contextual factors that shape the decentralization trend in current reform.

Such rural development programs are quite demanding in their organizational requirements. First, the implementing agency must have a special commitment to the delivery of program services to the rural poor. In social systems it is unnatural for benefits to be dispensed equally, much less redistributed toward the disadvantaged. Some inner or outer dynamic force must motivate the organization to overcome the momentum of inequality.

The first contribution to this section is by Richard Schmalensee titled “Thoughts on the Chicago school legacy in U.S. antitrust.” It appears the purpose of this essay is to set up a target for the rest of the contributors to shoot at – a target that is emphatically pro-Chicago. In his essay, Schmalensee reviews some of the aspects of U.S. antitrust policy that outraged Chicago school lawyers and economists in the 1970s. He takes a brief look at some of Chicago's subsequent victories that he claims are now generally accepted as positive changes. And finally, he argues that some of Chicago's lost battles also constitute positive aspects of its legacy. His discussion is focused on four broad issues: the objectives of antitrust, the past policy toward “no-fault” concentration, the treatment of productive efficiency, and the evaluation of non-standard business conduct (pp. 11–12).

Schonhardt-Bailey's goal is to explain the repeal of the Corn Laws. This case is of obvious substantive importance. Schonhardt-Bailey also identifies a good historical puzzle in the details of trying to explain legislative voting behavior on Repeal. First, politicians seemed to act against their personal economic and political interests when voting for it. Second, they also acted in a puzzling way when justifying their own behavior. Specifically, Schonhardt-Bailey shows that the politicians voted as delegates of their constituents. Intriguingly, these same politicians justified their votes in terms of a trustee theory of representation in which they acted on behalf of the nation in accordance with their personal best judgment. These votes, though not the justifications, would seem to violate the mandates on which many had been elected, since most had personal mandates and were not sent to the Commons as delegates.