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The purpose of this paper is to enhance the understanding of consumer empowerment in the relationship between consumers and service providers. It draws on self-efficacy theory to conceptualize consumer empowerment and explain the impact on perceived performance risk in insurance decision making.

This study employs data collected from an online survey involving 487 consumers in Switzerland, who recently decided on an insurance service. A structural equation model quantifies both the psychological effects on consumers’ perception of insurance services and behavioral effects on their decision-making process.

Perceived consumer empowerment is conceptualized by perceived self-efficacy and perceived controllability. Both have a significant impact on perceived performance risk, while the former is partially mediated by the preference to delegate the decision to a surrogate. Moreover, customers’ involvement in the purchase process moderates both the direct and indirect effect of perceived self-efficacy on perceived performance risk.

The results are based on consumers’ perceptions from a single country. Furthermore, consumers’ perceptions were surveyed with a time lag after the decision-making process. To increase rigor, perceptions should be collected during decision making.

Results show that consumer empowerment can be employed as a risk reduction strategy. Consumers with self-efficacy and controllability beliefs perceive significantly less performance risk; however, practitioners should consider that consumers are also motivated to make decisions independently rather than delegating their decisions. Furthermore, consumer empowerment depends on consumer will. For largely indifferent consumers, empowerment does not affect risk or decision delegation preference.

The study is among the few empirical works to examine the effects of consumer empowerment on the consumer-service provider relationship on an individual level. Furthermore, applying consumer empowerment in relationship marketing implies a shift in research focus to the question of how consumers construe decision-making situations rather than objectively measuring the state of consumer relationship.

Because steadily growing consumption is not beneficial for nature and climate and is not the same as increasing well-being, an anti-consumerism movement has formed worldwide. The renouncement of dispensable consumption will, however, only establish itself as a significant lifestyle if consumers do not perceive reduced consumption as a personal sacrifice. Since prior research has not yielded a consistent understanding of the relationship between anti-consumption and personal well-being, this paper aims to examine three factors about which theory implies that they may moderate this relationship: decision-control empowerment, market-control empowerment and the value of materialism.

The analysis is based on data from a large-scale, representative online survey (N = 1,398). Structural equation modelling with latent interaction effects is used to test how three moderators (decision-control empowerment, market-control empowerment and materialism) affect the relationship amongst four types of anti-consumption (e.g. voluntary simplicity) and three different well-being states (e.g. subjective well-being).

While both dimensions of empowerment almost always directly promote consumer well-being, significant moderation effects are present in only a few but meaningful cases. Although the materialism value tends to reduce consumers’ well-being, it improves the well-being effect of two anti-consumption styles.

Using only one sample from a wealthy country is a limitation of the study. Researchers should replicate the findings in different nations and cultures.

Consumer affairs practitioners and commercial marketing for sustainably produced, high-quality and long-lasting goods can benefit greatly from these findings.

This paper shows that sustainable marketing campaigns can more easily motivate consumers to voluntarily reduce their consumption for the benefit of society and the environment if a high level of market-control empowerment can be communicated to them.

This study provides differentiated new insights into the roles of consumer empowerment, i.e. both decision-control empowerment and market-control empowerment, and the value of materialism to frame specific relationships between different anti-consumption types and various well-being states.

Despite the benefits of delegation, anecdotal and survey-based evidence suggests that firms do not optimally delegate decision-making authority. However, to date, no quantifiable evidence supports this claim.

We design an experiment to explore the superior’s choice between delegation and information elicitation. We also examine the effect of the superiors’ choice on the amount of effort provided by subordinates to gather decision-facilitating information.

We find that, compared to economic predictions, superiors delegate less often than they should. Subordinates exert lower effort when superiors elicit information than when superiors delegate the decision to them. As a result, superiors earn lower profit when they elicit information than when they delegate decision-making authority.

Our empirical evidence supports two main tenets espoused in the literature on the allocation of decision rights. First, the evidence of under delegation contributes to the literature which maintains that superiors’ tendency to under-delegate leads firms to become overly centralized.

By designing a novel experimental, we identify systematic ways in which behavior deviates from economic theory and contribute to the discussion on how firms utilize information. In particular, under delegation prevents firms from exploiting economies that arise from local capabilities and task specialization, and results in forgone profits.

We investigate whether giving workers autonomy through delegation of contract choice intrinsically motivates effort. In a novel laboratory experiment that controls for contract preferences and outcomes, principals can either choose the contract under which agents work on a real-effort task, or delegate the contract choice to the agents. We evaluate whether agents exert higher effort when they are allowed to choose the contract versus when the contract is imposed on them. We find no difference between the two conditions, even after controlling for baseline ability and for locus of control. Because our design excludes the possibility that preferences play a role, and because workers engaged in a real-effort task, this result casts doubt on an intrinsic link between the autonomy granted through delegation and the motivation of employees in the workplace. Our results do not deny, however, the possible instrumental benefits of autonomy (which did not play a role in our design) and their potentially powerful impact on motivation.

We investigate the role of group identity in delegated decision-making. Our framework considers the impact of group identity (based on racial segregation in post-Apartheid South Africa) on decisions to appoint a representative in a trust game with delegated decision-making, where information on the race group of other players is either common or private knowledge. We test our framework experimentally on a sample of young South Africans who had never been exposed to experimental economics research. By exogenously matching parties according to their race group, we observe their endogenous trust and delegation behavior. Our results suggest that white players try to use information about group identity to increase profits, albeit unsuccessfully. This may help to explain distrust and coordination failures observed in real-life interactions.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how misalignments between the organizational climate (measured as information‐processing demand) and the leadership style (measured as information‐processing capability) may result in negative performance consequences.

The empirical part of the paper is based on questionnaire data. Key informant is the CEO and thus there is a focus on the CEO's perception of climate and leadership style. Data are subjected to regression analysis.

The results indicate that misalignments between climate and leadership style are problematic for organizational performance. This is supported by the empirical findings that show partial support for three out of four hypotheses and full support for the fourth hypothesis.

Data cover information on Danish small‐ and medium‐sized firms. These cross‐sectional data and cannot study the effects of misalignments over time.

Because the findings show that misalignments between climate and leadership style are problematic to organizational level of performance, this implies that in case of misfits either the climate or the leadership style must be changed.

The main contribution of the paper is that the framework allows an explicit understanding of which managerial actions are needed to manage particular types of climate. Further, the framework enables an understanding of how misalignments may result in poor performance.

Numerous Chinese management studies have demonstrated significant differences between Chinese and Western management. This exploratory paper investigates the impact of Chinese culture and Western traditions on China's contemporary school leaders' views of leadership and management, particularly in the areas of relationship building, delegation, and promotion. Data were drawn from questionnaires completed by school leaders and individual interviews with principals from different parts of China. The findings indicate that the differences between Chinese and Western management practices in Chinese schools are not static and should not be over-stressed. To different extents, the respondent school leaders of China were affected by both Chinese and Western values and practices in school leadership and management. Specifically, they were more influenced by Chinese culture in the areas of school management and organization and by Western values and practices in the areas of relationship building, staff performance, and promotion. Their leadership and management preferences were also influenced by other factors, including gender, domestic politics, and development.

Despite its strategic importance, researchers have given little attention to when CEOs are willing to delegate decisions to top management team members. Prior studies and conventional wisdom suggest that CEOs will be more willing to delegate in times of good performance. Drawing from prospect theory, we suggest an alternative view: that CEOs will be risk‐averse and, therefore, less willing to delegate when their firms have performed well. Our findings provide support for both perspectives.

This chapter examines one of the specific manifestations of political–administrative relationships, namely the delegation of powers to managers. The first part of the chapter is a literature review of political–administrative relationships in both developed and developing countries. This is followed by a discussion of the framework for delegation in South Africa that was laid down in the late 1990s. Next is an analysis of the implementation of delegation in the 2000s, along with the National Planning Commission recommendations in 2012, which has led to a resurgence in delegation initiatives. There is a well-developed government monitoring system of delegation that has led to some improvement in compliance with delegation, but the overall delegation levels are on the low side. Delegation to officials is often thwarted by Ministers who wish to retain control and/or promote patronage. Further, in some cases, managers lack capacity or are unwilling to manage and take responsibility for delegated authority.