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Warren Nutter and James M. Buchanan did not revise “Universal Education” to turn against providing tuition grants to segregated schools in 1965. Their revised text contains no call to expel segregation academies from the tuition grant program and does not even express disapproval of the goals or the work of segregation academies. Recent claims to that effect by Fleury (2023) and Levy and Peart (2023) cannot be sustained by either textual or contextual evidence.

Can we model politics as exclusively based on self-interest, leaving virtue aside? How much romance is there in the study of politics? We show that James Buchanan, a founder of public choice and constitutional political economy, reintroduces a modicum of romance into politics, despite claiming that his work is the study of “politics without romance”: Buchanan’s model needs an ethical attitude to defend rules against rent-seeking.

We claim that Adam Smith, more than David Hume, should be considered one of the primary intellectual influences on Buchanan’s public choice and constitutional political economy. It is commonly believed that Hume assumes in politics every man ought to be considered a knave, making him an influence on Buchanan’s idea of politics without romance. Yet, it is Smith who, like Buchanan, describes rent-seeking and suggests that public virtues may be the remedy through which good rules maintaining liberty and prosperity can be generated and enforced. Smith, like Buchanan, rejects sole reliance on economic incentives: the study of politics needs some romance.

This chapter explores a number of relatively unknown aspects of the controversy over Milton Friedman’s March 1975 visit to Chile through the analytical framework provided by James M. Buchanan’s late 1950s assessment of the economist-physician analogy. The chapter draws upon a range of archival and neglected primary sources to show that the topics which generally rear their head in any contemporary discussion of Friedman’s visit to Chile – for example, whether it is appropriate to provide policy advice to a dictator – were aired in a largely private mid-1970s exchange between Friedman and a number of professional associates. In particular, the controversy over Friedman and Chile began several months before Friedman arrived in Santiago.

This article responds to Daniel Kuehn’s critique and expands on the discussion of James Buchanan’s later essay, which has received insufficient attention. The focus is on the 1965 revision of the “Virginia Plan for Universal Education” by Buchanan and Warren Nutter. While the revision is acknowledged by all, its significance is debated. The authors argue that Nutter and Buchanan’s original contribution lies in contrasting implied majority rule with explicit proportional representation, a distinction not found in Milton Friedman’s work. The period between 1959 and 1965 witnessed changes, including the development of an economic approach to constitutions and the attempt to prevent parents from using vouchers for integrated schools. The 1965 addition highlights the importance of alternative democratic decision rules and sets the stage for Buchanan’s subsequent work on racially determined policies. Buchanan’s involvement with racial issues extended beyond the voucher proposal, including his support for affirmative action. The addition to the 1965 voucher proposal addresses the impact of decision rules on minority well-being. The mischaracterization of minority concerns is addressed, drawing on Lani Guinier’s book and quoting Buchanan’s principles of fair representation. The essay concludes by emphasizing the importance of the 1965 addition in Buchanan’s work on racial fairness and its connection to Lani Guinier’s perspectives.

Our approach is largely historical, argument by example. We leave it to the theoreticians and empiricists to take the argument in a more technical direction.¹ Throughout, we suppose that germs are self-interested and they have a research question, for example, how might our species improve the chances of survival, the answer to which might potentially benefit germs (or, harm them by less).

Rawls, most visibly in A Theory of Justice, made numerous references to various topics in economics, and footnoted a significant number of economists. This paper will argue that Rawls made use of the ideal theory of markets as a reference point and as an analytical tool. In their ideal form, markets represent attributes Rawls intended to describe his system, and in their real-world guise embody certain sorts of striving – for instance, after power – that were central to Rawls’s justification of the original position. Markets also serve in Theory as a benchmark against which political forms can be criticized. Additionally, markets in Theory are approved of as allocative and wealth-producing mechanisms, but criticized for their final distributional results. The paper suggests that these assessments in Rawls likely originate in early essays by economist Frank Knight. Knight was, according to Pogge, the probable source for an early version of Rawls’s original position, and is footnoted in key spots in Theory. But the similarities between Knight’s reasoning and Rawls’s appear more significant still. Using Rawls’s extensively annotated copy of Knight’s Ethics of Competition, that supposition is explored.