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According to Whitman, Hayek’s conception of MI pertains just to the relationship of individual psychology and the social sciences, and is neutral on broader questions about reductionism in other scientific domains. Since hypotheses of group selection frequently concern organisms that are taken to be mindless (e.g. viruses and social insects), it is clear that they do not come into contact with MI thus construed. And even when group selection hypotheses make claims about human evolution, as do the hypotheses we discuss in Chapters 4 and 5 of Unto Others, there is, once again, a relationship of mutual irrelevance. The reason is that MI addresses what biologists call the question of proximate mechanism, whereas hypotheses about natural selection are part of the project of ultimate explanation (Mayr, 1961). An example used in Unto Others helps to illustrate this distinction. If one asks why sunflowers turn towards the sun, there are two ways in which this question might be understood. One might wish to understand how the machinery inside of each plant causes the plant to exhibit phototropism. Or one might want to understand the evolutionary processes that caused this behavior to evolve. Both types of understanding are important, and there is no conflict between them. By the same token, when a human society exhibits some property – e.g. the type of egalitarianism among adult males that Boehm (1999) argues is characteristic of nomadic hunter-gatherers – we might seek both a proximate and an ultimate explanation of that arrangement. MI constrains the former problem; it asserts that a group’s having that property must be understood in terms of the beliefs and desires of the individuals in the group (with properties of the physical environment brought in where necessary). But even if the question of proximate mechanism gets answered in the way that MI insists, the question is left open as to whether the group phenotype is the result of natural selection, and if it is, whether group selection was involved. MI says nothing about the form that an evolutionary explanation must take; it concerns proximate explanation only.

We review our work as collaborators over nearly 40 years as researchers and OD practitioners on the human, cultural, and organizational aspects of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). This chapter addresses (1) how our thinking, research methods, and practices developed over time, (2) accounts of deriving theory from practice and contrariwise of applying theory to practical matters, (3) how our respective shifts from academe toward scholarly-practice influenced our thinking and how we write, and (4) varieties of scholarly collaboration – ranging from intensive interchange to sequential pitch and catch. Early work covers a study of a “white-knight” acquisition and then advising on post-merger integration in a hostile takeover, revealing the stages of a deal, dynamics of buyers and sellers, and human factors that produce the “merger syndrome.”

Throughout we talk about confronting challenges of the scholar-practitioner divide as it pertains to role definition and boundary management as well to our theorizing, writing, and publication agenda. The chapter concludes with reflections on doing applied research in collaboration with a colleague (and friend).

This chapter examines whether professional auditors’ affect toward client management influences fraud likelihood judgments and whether accountability and experience with fraud risk judgments moderate this effect. This research also explores the process by which affect influences fraud judgments by examining affect’s influence on the evaluation of fraud evidence cues. Results indicate that more positive affect toward the client results in lower fraud likelihood judgments. Accountability is found to moderate this effect, but only for experienced auditors. These findings have implications for fraud brainstorming sessions where all staff levels provide input into fraud risk assessments and because client characteristics are especially salient during these assessments. Importantly, results also support the proposition that affect impacts inexperienced auditors’ fraud assessments through errant attribution of client likability to evidence cues that refer to management, rather than biasing all client-related evaluations. Together, these findings suggest that education and training can be improved to better differentiate relevant and irrelevant cues in fraud judgment.

The phenomenon of the ethnically homogeneous middleman group (EHMG) or ethnic trade network – the Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia, the Gujarati-Indians merchants in East Africa, the Jewish merchants in medieval Europe, etc. – is ubiquitous in stateless societies, pre-industrial and in less-developed economies (Curtin, 1984). Neoclassical (Walrasian) theory of exchange cannot explain the existence of merchants let alone the phenomenon of the EHMG. This is because Neoclassical theory of exchange is a static theory of frictionless, perfectly competitive markets with the Walrasian auctioneer costlessly coordinating the plans of anonymous producers (sellers) and consumers (buyers) so as to achieve equilibrium. There is no role for merchants in the Neoclassical theory of exchange.

This article is a response to Carpenter’s ‘Virtue Ethics in the Practice and Review of Social Science Research: The Virtuous Ethics Committee’. While applauding his attempt to introduce the concept of ‘virtue ethics’ into the contemporary discourse about the practice and review of social science research, I suggest that his thinking is overly dependent on the work of Macfarlane (2009 & 2010); particularly with respect to drawing a sharp contrast between this concept and the use of principles to construct an ethical framework for research and its review. I argue that Carpenter’s article would have benefited from a critique of the conceptual limitations of Macfarlane’s work, particularly in a context where social science research is increasingly participatory. Following O’Neill (1996), I argue that ethical principles can be understood as universal values that orientate practical reasoning or deliberative inquiry into what constitutes virtuous action in particular cases. Such deliberative inquiry may also be guided by what Nussbaum (1990) depicts as ‘rules of thumb’; summaries of good concrete judgements and decisions that are the cumulative outcomes of past deliberations about how to realise ethical principles in action. I argue that these ‘rules’ do not prescribe action since they cannot be considered as ethically prior to concrete descriptions of cases. Rather, they evolve out of the deliberative process of case study itself. As Nussbaum (1990) points out, Aristotle argued for the ethical priority of concrete description over any general rule that might be applied to it. This does not, however, deny the practical significance of summaries of judgements based on a constant comparison of cases. Instead, such rules can be understood as practical hypotheses to be tested by participants in a social practice within each new concrete situation. I argue that one limitation of the dispositional frameworks that Carpenter cites as providing a basis for the practice and review of social research is their highly generic character. Much research aimed at achieving social ends is shaped by more specifically orientated professional and social practices governed by particular ends-in-view that can be conceptually linked to them. In conclusion, I suggest that, since much social research explicitly aspires to be a participatory and democratic process of knowledge construction, it should provide a starting point for ethical review, where engagement between ‘the committee’ and ‘researchers’ transcends the bureaucratic exercise of reviewing documents.

As world society develops and nations become embedded in it, cultural patterns that began as properties of Western modernity diffuse to other areas. Individualism has long been noted as a unique feature of American nationalism (Arieli, 1964; Greene, 1993; Lipset, 1963, 1996). But both the spread of democracy and the declining legitimacy of dictatorship and racism after WW II opened the gates for forms of egalitarianism and individualism to spread transnationally (see Elliott & Lemert, 2006; Gaddis, 2005, p. 164ff). This chapter considers the consequences of this transformation.

Prior social movement research has focused on the role that axes of inequality – particularly race, class, gender, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) status – play for who participates and how they do so. Age is another important axis of inequality. The pervasiveness of a youth deficit model, which casts young people as deficient and requiring benevolent adult tutelage, is of particular concern for youth. This chapter assesses whether the internalization of the deficit model influences young people's activism and how they perceive their engagement. Drawing on interviews with 40 high school and college students from a southwestern US city, we find that many young people have internalized deficit-model assumptions, affecting when and how they participated. This was most evident among high school students, who limited their participation because they were “not old enough” or gravitated toward more “age-appropriate” forms of activism. Interestingly, we found college students were more willing to engage in online activism but also felt compelled to do significant research on issues before participating, thereby distancing themselves from the deficit model's assumptions of their political naivety. Finally, some participants felt discouraged by the perceived ineffectiveness of protest, which resonated with deficit model narratives of the futility of youth engagement. These findings highlight the importance of understanding the impacts of an internalized deficit model as well as considering age as an axis of inequality in activism. Youth engagement is best supported by seeing young people as capable actors with unique interests, capacities, and points of view.

The purpose of this study is to examine the fulfillment of Panda’s mission statement in the organization’s macro and minor storytelling and provide a close look at the function of the organizational culture to enhance the fulfillment of organization missions. The study employs qualitative methodology and participant observation to inspect the fulfillment of Panda’s mission statement in the organization’s macro storytelling first. The fulfillment of the mission statement in the micro storytelling is examined at a local store. By comparing the macro and the micro storytelling, the study presents the consistency and inconsistency of fulfillment of the organization’s mission statement at different hierarchies of the organization. Lastly, the study discusses the function of organizational culture in enhancing the fulfillment of the mission statement of the organization. The first finding of this study is that there are consistencies and inconsistencies in fulfilling Panda’s mission statement in its macro- and micro-level storytelling. The second finding of the study readdresses that organizational culture can work as a buffer to enhance the fulfillment of the mission statement and mitigate the inconsistency between the macro and micro storytelling.