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The aim of the paper is to analyse the prevalence of corruption in Malaysia since 2004 in relation to political leadership, implementation of anti-corruption measures and the political and business culture based on money politics.

The paper draws from the information and data provided by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, the Malaysian government, international organisations, media reports, and academic papers.

The paper analyses the perceived extent of corruption in Malaysia by examining how successive governments have dealt with the problem through a wide range of measures. Corruption remains widespread because of ineffective implementation, a culture of money politics based on mutually beneficial crony associations between political actors and business leaders, political interference to frustrate enforcement against corruption offenders, especially prominent personalities, and the mixed impact of corruption prevention measures. The paper concludes that the political and business culture and the nature of political leadership have eroded the political will to combat grand corruption in Malaysia.

This paper builds on previous research on corruption in Malaysia and highlights the combined negative impact of political leadership and a business and political culture that tolerates and espouses corruption, especially through money politics, and the consequent weak political will for tackling grand corruption.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the success and challenges of the government of Botswana in combating corruption, and the lessons that policy makers may draw from this experience.

A range of sources are used including on-line materials from Botswana Government websites, DCEC annual reports, reports and on-line materials of international organisations, press articles, conference papers, two theses, articles in journals and chapters in edited collections.

The paper considers the factors that contribute to the success of the Botswana Government in combating corruption. It finds that the role of the anti-corruption body, the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) has been crucial in this endeavour, including its investigative and enforcement work, and also its prevention and education programmes. The progress in combating corruption can also be attributed to procurement reform, measures to reduce red tape and bureaucratic procedures affecting businesses, competition regulation to reduce collusion and bribery, political and parliamentary accountability, and not least political will of Botswana’s leaders to stamp out corruption. In addition, challenges facing the anti-corruption programme are considered, including capacity constraints in the DCEC and the Directorate of Public Prosecutions, and the failure of the courts in some cases to bring to book those in high places who have allegedly committed corruption offences. The paper identifies a number of lessons that can be drawn from Botswana’s experience. In conclusion, the paper points to the need for political will to be sustained in light of evidence that it may have recently weakened.

The paper provides lessons for policy makers in tackling corruption.

The paper is a further contribution to the existing scholarly literature on the anti-corruption programme in Botswana.

The aim of the paper is to examine the various aspects of the 1MDB scandal including the extent and types of corruption that occurred and the action taken to deal with them. In doing this, the paper seeks to identify the reasons for the scandal and the lessons that can be learnt to avoid such a scandal in Malaysia and elsewhere in the future.

The research for the paper is based on evidence from court hearings, reports of watchdog and regulatory agencies, media reports, and various articles and books written about 1MDB.

The paper shows that most of the scandal involved embezzlement, bribery, false declarations and bond mispricing relating to extensive borrowing by 1MDB, and entailed a global network of shell companies and individuals through which the illicit money was passed. It also shows weak governance in 1MDB, poor internal controls within banks, the failure of watchdog and enforcement bodies to take the necessary action partly due to political control over them, and overall the lack of political will to deal with the scandal.

The paper builds on the findings of other papers and books written on the 1MDB scandal. It does this by linking the corruption to the borrowings of 1MDB, the international network of money-laundering and bribery through which illicit money flowed, and the poor internal controls in the organisation. It also builds on previous research by highlighting the failure of banks to identify money-laundering and of watchdog and enforcement bodies to deal with the corruption. A further value of the paper is to identify the lessons that can be learnt about combatting corruption on such a scale.

In many countries, public procurement of goods, services and works is required to serve wider social purposes apart from the needs of the user agencies (which may be referred to as social responsibility procurement). In recent years, reforms have been implemented in the countries of East Asia to promote social responsibility procurement. They have entailed four main types of social responsibility: (a) supporting small and medium enterprises; (b) creating opportunities for small or start up venture firms; (c) fostering environmental sustainability through green purchasing, and environmentally sustainable construction (in the case of public works); (d) promoting work safety in site management in public works. The paper will examine the reforms in the countries of the region under which various preferential arrangements have been implemented to meet these objectives. It will consider why the reforms were adopted and also the differences between the countries of the region in the priority given to each of the reforms.

This chapter discusses reforms to increase customer-centredness, public consultation (including professional, business and community associations), whole-of-government approaches (a case of trafficking in persons), increased budget, personnel and procurement delegation to departments and increased role of statutory boards (autonomous agencies). According to the author the driving force behind public sector reforms emanates from the inner core of ministers, most particularly the prime minister and deputy prime minister, working in close conjunction with senior permanent secretaries, directors of boards and government-linked companies. In Singapore, power is concentrated in the hands of political executives and senior levels of civil service. Ministers set the policy agenda and make final policy decisions on important issues. The administrative service is the elite service (of about 250 persons) within the civil service that shapes policy, especially permanent secretaries and deputy secretaries. Objections to reforms are often avoided through inputs to the reform process by key stakeholders and experts of relevant fields from inter-ministerial and inter-agency committees and through public consultations. Singapore has achieved an exceptional level of prosperity, and according to the author civil service is guided by practices of meritocracy (e.g., in promotion) and strict accountability through audits and anti-corruption steps.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the government of Brunei’s anti-corruption programme.

A range of sources are used including online materials from Brunei government websites, reports of international organisations, press articles, conference papers, a thesis case study, journal articles, a book, chapters in books, and interviews with an officer working with the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) of Brunei.

The paper considers the factors that contribute to government corruption, and the measures to combat it. These include various laws to combat corruption and the work of the ACB in enforcing these laws and in undertaking major initiatives of prevention and education. The effectiveness of these measures are assessed and a number of recommendations are made of direct and indirect measures improve the programme to combat corruption. The paper points to the moderately favourable rankings and ratings that Brunei has earned in combating corruption, which is well above neighbouring countries where corruption is still widespread, but noticeably below the rankings and ratings of the least corrupt countries. However, it argues that further progress to combat corruption may be difficult, as a result of the lack accountability and limited transparency, which are essential features of Brunei’s system of government based on absolute monarchy. Also hindering further progress is the inbuilt protection of the privileges of the Malay community within the country, which protects their role in the civil service and the business sector.

The paper is the first scholarly examination of the anti-corruption programme in Brunei.

The purpose of the paper is to examine features and impact of recent reforms introduced by the Philippines government to deal with the longstanding shortcomings in its procurement system.

The research for the paper is based on reports by international organizations, official documents of the Philippines government, surveys by international and domestic organizations, interviews with relevant officials and media reports.

The findings show that the reforms have focused on fostering competition, increasing transparency, standardizing procedures, enhancing end‐product quality and contractor reliability, ensuring proper planning and budgeting, combatting corruption, and strengthening accountability. These reforms were intended to create a procurement system more in line with international best practices. However the paper shows that the impact has been less than promised. This is due to limitations of certain provisions of the reforms and weaknesses in both implementation and in the accountability of the procuring entities. A key factor in undermining the reforms is widespread corruption, which continues to affect many aspects of the procurement system. The article identifies two important and related reasons for such failings: elite capture of the government and bureaucracy by a powerful network of business leaders from well‐established landed families, who have close links with the political establishment; and second, a long‐established culture of informal influence in the Philippine state bureaucracy (what may be termed the informal bureaucracy), which has been used to maximum effect by the elite network of business leaders. As a result, this network has been able to influence the reforms to serve its own interests and ensure its continued dominance of the procurement market.

The value of the paper is to show how administrative reforms, no matter how well formulated they are, may be readily undermined in the process of implementation by elite groups able to influence government bureaucracy through an informal culture.

Performance budgeting had been tried once and failed. Is there any reason to believe that the new performance budgeting will work? After reviewing existing studies on performance budgeting, the paper proposes that two obstacles continue to undermine its success. They are the poor quality of performance measures and their rare acceptance by budgetary decisionmakers. Unfortunately, these two impediments result from the generic defect of performance budgeting: i.e., its attempt at both comprehensiveness and rationality. The paper concludes by suggesting ways by which performance measures can be better utilized.

The article examines recent reforms in the financial and resource management of government administration in Singapore. The aim of these reforms is to bring the financial and resource management of the public service more into line with practices of large business organizations and broadly correspond with the so-called “managerialist” reforms adopted by government administration in other countries. The reforms include financial delegation, target setting and performance measurement, accrual accounting, output-linked budgeting, the creation of self-managing agencies in government ministries, and periodic zero-based and financial control reviews. In conclusion the article considers the aims of and reasons for these reforms.