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This paper aims to further contribute to the growing stream of literature on the CEO's impact on corporate social responsibility (CSR). The authors shed light on the implications of attunement theory on which relatively less research has been done. Furthermore, this paper strives to reconcile contradictory findings of the effect of CEO tenure on CSR and use the immediate changes of CSR enacted by the new CEO upon firm value.

The empirical strategy of the paper is centered around CEO transition. Applying first difference model, the authors identify a tenure-varying pattern of CEO influence on CSR. Moreover, the authors base the analyses of CSR value relevance on the sudden change of CSR during CEO transition, and use a within-industry matching approach as the inferential strategy. Manual data collection is conducted extensively for robustness checks.

The authors find that CSR activities change drastically at the beginning of the new CEO's ascendancy. One exception to this general pattern of CSR policy change is when the new CEO is brought from outside the organization, a result supporting the attunement theory. The authors find that firm value increases (decreases) when the new CEO increases (decreases) the CSR investment above (below) the industry norm.

This paper is among the first ones in the extant literature that directly examines the analytical implications of attunement theory concerning the CEO's impact on the firm's CSR policies. Furthermore, the positive association between CSR and firm value corroborates the arguments of instrumental stakeholder theory.

This paper aims to propose several factors which can explain the negative relationship between financial constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivity.

The author uses traditional fixed effects model and minimum distance panel estimation by Erickson and Whited (2000) to estimate investment-cash flow sensitivity in the cash flow-augmented investment equation. In addition, principal component analysis is used to construct a financial constraints measure.

First, it was found that substitutability between cash holdings and free cash flow can partially explain why financially constrained firms do not depend on cash flow as heavily as we expect. Second, it was confirmed that the level of net external financing can also partially explain the investment-cash flow sensitivity puzzle. Furthermore, it was argued that the influence of cash holdings and external financing on investment-cash flow sensitivity is caused by the low level of internal cash flow for financially constrained firms. This argument is supported by our findings from an examination of investment-cash flow sensitivity for bank-dependent firms during the recession periods.

This paper contributes to the literature by suggesting possible partial explanations for the contradictory relationship between investment-cash flow sensitivity and financial constraints.