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Air carriers and aircraft manufacturers are investing in technologies and strategies to reduce fuel consumption and associated emissions. This chapter reviews related issues to assess airline fuel efficiency and offers various empirical evidences from our recent work that focuses on the U.S. domestic passenger air transportation system. We begin with a general presentation of four methods (ratio-based, deterministic frontier, stochastic frontier, and data envelopment analysis) and three perspectives for assessing airline fuel efficiencies, the latter covering consideration of only mainline carrier operations, mainline–subsidiary relations, and airline routing circuity. Airline fuel efficiency results in the short run, in particular the correlations of the results from using different methods and considering different perspectives, are discussed. For the long-term efficiency, we present the development of a stochastic frontier model to investigate individual airline fuel efficiency and system overall evolution between 1990 and 2012. Insight about the association of fuel efficiency with market entry, exit, and airline mergers is also obtained.

The following materials were presented at a session of the History of Economics Society at its annual meeting, on July 6, 2003, at Duke University. Organized and chaired by Dan Hammond, the principal participants at the Roundtable were also, in order of speaking, Malcolm Rutherford, Ross Emmett, Warren Samuels, Brad Bateman, and Steven Medema.

Dan Hammond’s written comments on a paper I presented at the ASSA/HES meetings in January on Chicago economics and institutionalism (Hammond, 2003; Rutherford, 2003a) questioned the usefulness of the concept of “institutional economics” as a category with which to discuss the history of American economics from about 1918 on. My paper and Hammond’s comments form the background to this roundtable discussion. Although my original piece is not reproduced here, I will begin with some direct comments on what I take to be Hammond’s main points of contention.

I will use Malcolm Rutherford’s paper, “Chicago Economics and Institutionalism,” as the basis for general comments about the historical enterprise of writing and evaluating the history of institutional economics (or institutionalism). In doing so I will take liberties with Rutherford’s paper, some of which he may not approve. The thrust of my comments is to take Rutherford’s thesis (“There is an important sense in which Chicago economics has always been institutional,” p. 21) and run with it to find implications for the very idea of institutional economics. My conclusion is that the category institutional economics (or institutionalism) may have little historiographic value.

This paper attempts to understand how the interaction of natural disasters and human behaviour during wartime led to famines in three regions under imperial control around the Indian Ocean. The socio-economic structure of these regions had been increasingly differentiated over the period of imperial rule, with large proportions of their populations relying on agricultural labour for their subsistence.

Before the war, food crises in each of the regions had been met by the private importation of grain from national or overseas surplus regions: the grain had been made available through a range of systems, the most complex of which was the Bengal Famine Code in which the able-bodied had to work before receiving money to buy food in the market.

During the Second World War, the loss of control of normal sources of imported grain, the destruction of shipping in the Indian Ocean (by both sides) and the military demands on internal transport systems prevented the use of traditional famine responses when natural events affected grain supply in each of the regions. These circumstances drew the governments into attempts to control their own grain markets.

The food crises raised complex ethical and practical issues for the governments charged with their solution. The most significant of these was that the British Government could have attempted to ship wheat to Bengal but, having lost naval control of the Indian Ocean in 1942 and needing warships in the Atlantic and Mediterranean in 1943 chose to ignore the needs of the people of Bengal, focussing instead on winning the war.

In each of the regions governments allowed/encouraged the balkanisation of the grain supply – at times down to the sub-district level – which at times served to produce waste and corruption, and opened the way for black markets as various groups (inside and outside government ranks) manipulated the local supply.

People were affected in different ways by the changes brought about by the war: some benefitted if their role was important to the war-effort; others suffered. The effect of this was multiplied by the way each government ‘solved’ its financial problems by – in essence – printing money.

Because of the natural events of the period, there would have been food crises in these regions without World War II, but decisions made in the light of wartime exigencies and opportunities turned crises into famines, causing the loss of millions of lives.

This chapter provides a presentation about Chapter 1 of The Balance of the National Economy, 1923–24, edited by Pavel Illich Popov. The Balance was issued in June 1926 by the Central Statistical Administration (CSU or TsSU) of the USSR, which Popov had headed from July 1918 to January 1926. In the first part of our chapter, we show how Popov’s work on the balance of the national economy was rooted in the specific scientific and political culture of zemstvo statisticians inherited from the Tsar. Statistical inquiry was considered an objective scientific process based on international standards. Furthermore, like zemstvo statisticians, CSU statisticians developed great autonomous political power. The balance of the national economy was built according to these principles, which met harsh criticism from revolutionaries and Bolsheviks. In the second part, we analyze the contents of Popov’s Chapter 1, especially the theoretical foundations of the balance and its connection with Soviet planning. In the third part, we discuss the balance’s significance in the years 1926–1929, years which ended the NEP and launched the first Five-Year Plan, so as to understand how CSU’s balance didn’t become a standard Soviet statistical instrument and was discarded as a “bourgeois” device.

The modern concept of labor hoarding emerged in early 1960s, and soon became a standard part of mainstream economists’ explanation of the working of labor markets. The concept represents the convergence of three important elements: an empirical finding that labor productivity was procyclical; a framing of this finding as a “puzzle” or anomaly for the basic neoclassical theory of the firm, and a proposed resolution of the puzzle based on optimizing behavior of the firm in the presence of costs of hiring, firing, and training workers. This paper recounts the history of each of these elements, and how they were woven together into the labor hoarding concept. Each history involves people associated with various research traditions and motivated by an array of questions, many of which were unrelated to the questions that the modern labor hoarding concept was ultimately created to address.