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Freeport-McMoRan's acquisition of Phelps Dodge created the world's largest publicly traded copper company. JPMorgan and Merrill Lynch advised the acquirer and arranged $17.5 billion in debt financing and $1.5 billion in credit facilities. In addition, these two firms underwrote $5 billion in equity capital through simultaneous offerings of Freeport-McMoRan common shares and mandatory convertible preferred shares. These financings created an optimal capital structure for the company that resulted in stronger credit ratings. The activities of the equity capital markets and sales groups at the underwriting firms are explored and the structure and benefits of mandatory convertible preferred shares is explained.

To understand the role of investment banks in advising a large corporation regarding an acquisition and related financings in the capital markets. As part of this, the activities of an investment banking firm's equity capital markets group and their underwriting risks are analyzed. Finally, the structure of a mandatory convertible security is reviewed in terms of benefits to both issuers and investors.

In recent years Lehman Brothers, one of the five largest investment banks in the United States, had grown increasingly reliant on its fixed income trading and underwriting division, which served as the primary engine for its strong profit growth. The bank had also significantly increased its leverage over the same timeframe, going from a debt-to-equity ratio of 23.7x in 2003 to 35.2x in 2007. As leverage increased, the ongoing erosion of the mortgage-backed industry began to impact Lehman significantly and its stock price plummeted. Unfortunately, public outcry over taxpayer assumption of $29 billion in potential Bear losses made repeating such a move politically untenable. The surreal scene of potential buyers traipsing into an investment bank's headquarters over the weekend to consider various merger or spin-out scenarios repeated itself once again. This time, the Fed refused to back the failing bank's liabilities, attempting instead to play last-minute suitors Bank of America, HSBC, Nomura Securities, and Barclay's off each other, jawboning them by arguing that failing to step up to save Lehman would cause devastating counterparty runs on their own capital positions. The Fed's desperate attempts to arrange its second rescue of a major U.S. investment bank in six months failed when it refused to backstop losses from Lehman's toxic mortgage holdings. Complicating matters was Lehman's reliance on short-term repo loans to finance its balance sheet. Unfortunately, such loans required constant renewal by counterparties, who had grown increasingly nervous that Lehman would lose the ability to make good on its trades. With this sentiment swirling around Wall Street, Lehman was forced to announce the largest Chapter 11 filing in U.S. history, listing assets of $639 billion and liabilities of $768 billion. The second domino had fallen. It would not be the last.

This case covers the period from the sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan to the conversion into bank holding companies by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, including the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America. The case explains the new global paradigm for the investment banking industry, including increased regulation, fewer competitors, lower leverage, reduced proprietary trading, and-potentially-reduced profits.

During December 2012, Jorge Paulo Lemann, a co-founder and partner at 3G, proposed to Warren Buffett that 3G and Berkshire Hathaway acquire H. J. Heinz Company. Lemann and Buffett, who had known each other for years, jointly decided that the Heinz turnaround had been successful and that there was significant potential for continued global growth. 3G informed Heinz CEO William Johnson that it and Berkshire Hathaway were interested in jointly acquiring his company. Johnson then presented the investors' offer of $70.00 per share of outstanding common stock to the Heinz board.

After much discussion, the Heinz board and its advisors informed 3G that without better financial terms they would not continue to discuss the possibility of an acquisition. Two days later, 3G and Berkshire Hathaway returned with a revised proposal of $72.50 per share, for a total transaction value of $28 billion (including Heinz's outstanding debt).

Following a forty-day “go-shop” period, Heinz, 3G, and Berkshire Hathaway agreed to sign the deal. But was this, in fact, a fair deal? And what might be the future consequences for shareholders, management, employees, and citizens of Pittsburgh, the location of the company's headquarters? Last, what was the role of activist investors in bringing Heinz to this deal stage?

After reading and analyzing the case, students will be able to:

• Understand the influence of investment bankers on M&A transactions

• Consider synergies that drive M&A

• Consider the role of activist investors in corporate strategic decision-making

• Understand the impact of M&A on key corporate stakeholders

• Apply core valuation techniques to support M&A valuation

Understand the influence of investment bankers on M&A transactions

Consider synergies that drive M&A

Consider the role of activist investors in corporate strategic decision-making

Understand the impact of M&A on key corporate stakeholders

Apply core valuation techniques to support M&A valuation

In August 2007 the Mainsail II SIV-Lite was frozen by its trustee as a result of the ongoing credit crisis. The state of Maine held $20 million of Mainsail commercial paper in its Cash Pool portfolio, a short-term portfolio that puts temporary, excess state revenues to work. When word of the potential loss became public, the Treasurer came under attack. The case introduces the functions of a state Treasury department, with particular emphasis on the investment objectives and guidelines for the cash pool as well as its composition. The case reviews the events leading up to and including August 2007, the month when the credit markets first began to seize and when the financial crisis effectively began. It examines securitization, structured finance, and the Mainsail SIV-Lite structure in some detail.

Xyberspace Consulting, Inc. is reconsidering the allocation of the costs associated with its Training and Educational Services Group (TESG), a shared-services or support department to its user departments. Currently, the company uses a single departmental rate to allocate actual training costs to the user groups, using the user groups' actual usage of TESG resources. The company is exploring whether it should allocate TESG fixed and variable costs separately, whether it should use budgeted or actual allocation rates and whether it should allocate costs based on budgeted or actual usage. This case is intended to give students exposure to allocating shared-services or support-department costs, understanding the implications of different allocation strategies, and evaluating whether and how allocation systems can facilitate strategy implementation.

Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Freres & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. “You can't mean that,” he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. “I'll have to get back to you.” Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?

An analysis of the fall of Bear Stearns facilitates an understanding of the difficulties affecting the entire investment banking industry: high leverage, overreliance on short-term financing, excessive risk taking on proprietary trading and asset management desks, and myopic senior management all contributed to the massive losses and loss of confidence. The impact on the global economy was of epic proportions.

This case is one of a pair of cases used in a merger negotiation. It is designed to be used with “British Petroleum, Ltd.” (UVA-F-1263). One-half of the class prepares only the British Petroleum (BP) case, and one-half uses this case. BP and Amoco are considering a merger, and are in the process of negotiating a merger agreement. Macroeconomic assumptions, particularly forecasting future oil prices in an uncertain environment, and assumptions about Amoco's ability to reduce exploration and production costs make Amoco's future cash flows difficult to predict.

This case is one of a pair of cases used in a merger negotiation. It is designed to be used with “Amoco Corporation” (UVA-F-1262). One-half of the class prepares only the Amoco case, and one-half uses this case. BP and Amoco are considering a merger, and are in the process of negotiating a merger agreement. Macroeconomic assumptions, particularly forecasting future oil prices in an uncertain environment, and assumptions about Amoco's ability to reduce exploration and production costs make Amoco's future cash flows difficult to predict.

January 27, 2005, was an extraordinary day for Gillette's James Kilts, the show-stopping turnaround expert known as the “Razor Boss of Boston.” Kilts, along with Proctor & Gamble chairman Alan Lafley, had just orchestrated a $57 billion acquisition of Gillette by P&G. The creation of the world's largest consumer products company would end Kilts's four-year tenure as CEO of Gillette and bring to a close Gillette's 104-year history as an independent corporate titan in the Boston area. The deal also capped a series of courtships between Gillette and other companies that had waxed and waned at various points throughout Kilts's stewardship of Gillette. But almost immediately after the transaction was announced, P&G and Gillette drew criticism from the media and the state of Massachusetts concerning the terms of the sale. Would this merger actually benefit shareholders, or was it principally a wealth creation vehicle for Kilts?

To understand the factors that persuaded shareholders of both P&G and Gillette to merge their companies, the valuation metrics involved in determining the merger consideration, compensation packages for key managers, and the politics (internal, local government, and regulatory) that impact major mergers.

In January 2008, Citi and Merrill Lynch are trying to steer their ships back to calm waters. The new CEOs, Vikram Pandit (Citi) and John Thain (Merrill), have been at the helm of their companies for less than three months. This case focuses on their steps to counteract the massive losses resulting from their firms' investments in subprime-mortgage structures. What actions have these leaders taken thus far and what actions should they consider going forward? See also “Warren E. Buffett, 2008” (UVA-F-1550).