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Structural models' inflation forecasts are often inferior to those of naïve devices. This chapter theoretically and empirically assesses this for UK annual and quarterly inflation, using the theoretical framework in Clements and Hendry (1998, 1999). Forecasts from equilibrium-correction mechanisms, built by automatic model selection, are compared to various robust devices. Forecast-error taxonomies for aggregated and time-disaggregated information reveal that the impacts of structural breaks are identical between these, helping to interpret the empirical findings. Forecast failures in structural models are driven by their deterministic terms, confirming location shifts as a pernicious cause thereof, and explaining the success of robust devices.

There is a long-lasting debate on the relationship between democracy and economic growth, though it remained inconclusive. On the other hand, corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world that lessens the efficiency of a good government, distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector and particularly hurts the poor. Moreover, the corruption–growth relationship has been shown to be contingent upon the political regime. This chapter has chosen a set of emerging market economies (EMEs), which consists of democratic as well as authoritarian countries, to throw light on democracy–growth relationship through the channel of corruption using a system generalized method of moments estimation of a panel of 27 countries for a period of 2006–2018. Results show that democracy is growth-enhancing but corruption dampens its positive impact to some extent. However, for authoritarian countries corruption can enhance growth.

This paper applies the logic of economic calculation to the actions of autocrats. We model autocrats as stationary bandits who use profit-and-loss calculations to select institutions that maximize their extraction rents. We find in many cases autocrats achieve rent maximization through creating and protecting private property rights. This in turn yields high levels of production, with expropriation kept low enough to incentivize continued high production. Importantly, while this leads to increasing quantities of available goods and services over time, it does not lead to true development; that is, the coordination of consumer demand with producer supply through directing resources to their highest-valued uses. We apply our model to the authoritarian governments of Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, showing how they function as quasi-corporate governance organizations in the business of maximizing appropriable rents.

Using original mass public surveys in nine East European, European Union (EU) member countries (2007), I develop a micro-level approach linking individuals’ perceptions of inequality and corruption. Merging an instrumental variables approach with an emerging body of comparative scholarship, I demonstrate that individuals’ perceptions of inequality can be seen to contribute to their perceptions of corruption based on individuals’ normative concerns of the failure of democratic institutions to address issues related to inequality. Thus, for these countries, this region, the EU, as well as other new democracies, we can better understand these potential threats to the development of stable, sustainable democracy.

One of the noteworthy developments in the world economy is the cryptocurrency in general and the bitcoin in particular. Although several types of cryptocurrency are in operation in the current digital economy, the most prevalent is the bitcoin, which was launched formally in 2009 by an individual or group known under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto. The value of bitcoin has increased to such an extend that it reached 19.7 billion US dollars by January 2, 2018 (Statista, 2018). As the bitcoin price touches a new high day by day, various terrorist organizations are using this cryptocurrency to anonymously finance their grotesque terrorist activities around the world by bypassing the surveillance mechanism of the banking system of the respective countries. Against this backdrop, this chapter aims to understand the mechanism of cryptocurrencies in general and the bitcoin in particular. Finally, it also endeavors to identify the trend of the bitcoin economy and its impact on nefarious activities in general and terrorism financing in particular. It has been revealed from the study that cryptocurrency economy has become so popular across the world that it has created an alternative virtual economy devoid of regulations from a specific country or a group of countries. By using vector error correction model (VECM), it had been observed that there exists a statistically significant long-run association between terrorist incidences and bitcoin transaction/circulation in the panel of 12 countries for 2010–2016. However, there is a huge concern over its way of operation and its unholy nexus with terrorism financing.

The objective of this chapter is to explain how an innovation-driven economic development model can help to mitigate corruption and facilitate competitiveness in Nigeria.

With the use of descriptive narratives, Nigeria was examined in comparison with other countries such as South Korea. The chapter argues that Nigeria has not experienced development as much as South Korea because of her primary dependence on crude oil for economic sustenance.

Evidence from the statistics showed that innovation-driven economies are more competitive and less corrupt compared to natural resource-driven economies such as Nigeria. Nigeria has performed poorly in terms of competitiveness, transparency, and governance owing to her dependence on natural resources as a major means for economic sustenance.

Helps to explain why an innovation-driven economic development model is the solution to mitigating corruption and facilitating competitiveness in Nigeria.