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Magnet effect entails a hypothesis in market microstructure entailing a systemic likelihood of prices being sucked toward the theoretical threshold. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the existence of magnet effect in Bursa Malaysia via overnight returns.

This study investigates the existence of magnet effect via overnight returns in Bursa Malaysia by utilizing historical daily price data from 1994 to 2017 by probabilistic regression approaches. The authors divide the study period into three distinct regimes based on regulatory limit mechanisms.

Based on demarcated regimes, the authors find evidence of magnet effect in Bursa Malaysia throughout all regimes, with a heightened magnitude detected between 2002 and 2013. Moreover, upper limit scenarios exhibit a greater propensity for magnet effect. The authors end the paper with implications of the findings for portfolio managers, intraday traders, and policymakers.

The research is the first of its kind in attempting to measure the magnet effect in Malaysia via overnight jumps.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an alternative way of calculating the deadweight loss triangle in oligopolistic markets which takes inefficient use of inputs into account. The author shows that the result of the approach coincides with the one that exists in the economics literature. However, the author explicitly accounts for the inefficient use of inputs.

The market supply curve that is extensively used for competitive markets has been reconsidered for the imperfectly competitive markets. The necessary condition for the efficient use of resources is investigated and a price level is derived at which the market output of oligopoly is produced efficiently. The degree of inefficient use of inputs is reported via the definitions of Input Inefficiency Measure (IIM) and the Ratio of Inefficient usage of Inputs to Total Deadweight Loss (RITD).

The author discovers that the area under the supply curve of the competitive market corresponds precisely to the minimum total costs of producing any given market output. To make this important finding operational in imperfectly competitive markets, the IIM reports the degree of distorted input allocation among firms with differentiated cost structures in producing a given equilibrium imperfectly competitive market output. In measuring the monopoly power, it is known that CRn or HHI market concentration indexes, which are calculated based on the market shares of firms regarding the demand side of the market, are widely used. The measures, which take into account of the distortions in input usage, and hence, the supply side may be considered as an additional index. For example, if the market demand were shared equally by two firms (no dominant firm with respect to the demand side), it is known that the leadership would still arise when the costs of firms differed as in the dominant firm model in favor of the lower cost producing firm.

The author recommends some more theoretical research extensions of the approach suggested here to other oligopolistic markets like the Cournot-Nash, the Stackelberg and other models. In all cases, there is a need for additional work to find some measurable variables in practice in order to estimate the input inefficiency given by the two measures and differentiate it from the inefficiency of units of outputs that are not produced.

It may be interesting to decompose the various estimates of welfare losses due to monopoly power as a percentage of GNP that were discussed in the literature into two inefficiency components: units of outputs that are not produced and units of inputs that are misallocated among firms.

The government officials might be interested in assessing the degree of loss of input usage by firms in addition to output loss in oligopolistic markets summarized by the two inefficiency indexes. Law economists may be inspired in discussing the issue of input inefficiency in the context of on antitrust policy.

The author emphasized that the area under the market supply curve minimized the aggregate cost of producing a given total market output in competitive markets. Having recognized the importance of this finding, the author tried to apply it to imperfectly competitive markets and especially to the calculation of deadweight loss in such markets. The author showed that the total social cost could be calculated by including the input inefficiency which can be defined as the extra cost to society arising from not using the most appropriate economic resource allocation among firms in addition to the usual deadweight loss triangle. Moreover, the author had to introduce some more new terms like the market supply curve allocation, the adjusted competitive price, efficiency gain and so on, as they were necessary along the course of the analysis.

Many governments around the world have strategically privatized their ports. The privatized ports try to maximize profits by setting higher charges for port services and attracting transship cargos. This paper shows that such privatization of ports can be complemented by adjusting the number of ports. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is to derive the optimal number of ports in cases in which ports serve transship and domestic cargos.

This paper constructs a theoretical model in which ports compete with each other for transship and domestic cargos. In the first stage, the government determines the number of ports. In the second stage, the ports compete with each other in quantity to maximize profits. The authors have derived the optimal number of ports that maximizes national welfare.

The optimal number of ports is expressed as a function of the slope of the demand curve, the slope of the supply curve, and the share of domestic demand relative to total demand for port services. It is shown that the optimal number of ports tends to increase as the share of domestic cargo increases. The optimal number of ports, n*, is given as n*=1/(1−θ), where θ denotes the share of domestic demand in total demand for port services, when the unit cost of port services is constant.

The analysis in the present paper is confined to the case of unilateral intervention by the government of the domestic country. Analyzing interaction among governments via competition policy would offer valuable policy implications.

The results of the current research offer important implications for Korean port policy in the context of maritime industrial changes, in particular, China’s New Silk Road initiative. In particular, the findings of this study suggest that Korea’s investment in ports should be concentrated on ports with competitive advantages.

Relatively scant attention has been paid to the possibility, or need, of strategic privatization being complemented by governmental competition policy. Filling this knowledge gap, the authors have shown that the government can mitigate the negative effects of privatization on domestic consumer surplus by introducing competition in the supply of port services.

The author augments an otherwise standard business-cycle model with a rich government sector and adds monopolistic competition in the product market and rigid prices, as well as rigid wages a la Calvo (1983) in the labor market.

This specification with the nominal wage rigidity, when calibrated to Bulgarian data after the introduction of the currency board (1999–2018), allows the framework to reproduce better observed variability and correlations among model variables and those characterizing the labor market in particular.

As nominal wage frictions are incorporated, the variables become more persistent, especially output, capital stock, investment and consumption, which help the model match data better, as compared to a setup without rigidities.

The findings suggest that technology shocks seem to be the dominant source of economic fluctuations, but nominal wage rigidities as well as the monopolistic competition in the product market, might be important factors of relevance to the labor market dynamics in Bulgaria, and such imperfections should be incorporated in any model that studies cyclical movements in employment and wages.

The computational experiments performed in this paper suggest that wage rigidities are a quantitatively important model ingredient, which should be taken into consideration when analyzing the effects of different policies in Bulgaria, which is a novel result.

Despite regulatory claims of straitening volatility and preventing crashes, evidences on circuit breakers' ability to achieve so are nonconclusive. While previous scholars studies general performances of circuit breakers, the authors examine whether Malaysian price limits aggravate volatility, impede price discovery, and interfere with trading activities in both tranquil and stressful periods.

The study uses a combination of parametric and nonparametric techniques consistent with Kim and Rhee (1997) to examine the major ex-post hypotheses in circuit breaker research.

For calm markets, the authors find significant success of upper limits in tempering volatility with low trading interference. Lower limits show mixed results. Conversely, in crisis markets limits fare poorly in nearly all aspects, particularly for lower limits.

Ramifications of the paper's findings are discussed through highlighting the asymmetric nature of price limits' ex-post effects. The paper also contributes to regulatory debate surrounding the quest for an optimal price limit.

The paper is the first of its kind in documenting long-horizon evidence of ex-post effects of a wide-band price limit. Moreover, the paper is unique in its approach in bifurcating circuit breaker performance along the line of market stability periods.

The purpose of this paper is to examine and analyze the impact of governance internal mechanisms on audit report lag. The characteristics of governance used in this study are selected by looking at recent literature review.

Governance internal mechanisms were proxied by the audit committee and director's board characteristics. To test the impact of these characteristics, the authors used a sample of 47 Tunisian companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange (BVMT) during the period from 2014 to 2019. The generalized method of moments (GMM) method of dynamic panel multivariate analysis was used to analyze this study.

The results showed that most corporate governance attributes have a significant effect on audit report lag. Specifically, the audit committee diligence and the audit committee expertise have significant and positive effect on audit report lag. But the diligence of the board has significant and negative effect on audit report lag. However, this study finds no evidence that the audit committee independence, the size, independence and diligence of director's board are associated with the audit report lag. In addition, the results of this study also show that there is a significant effect of some control variables such us gender and performance.

The findings of this article will help to fill the knowledge gap in relation with this research issue in developing countries especially in Tunisian context, because this investigation exposed more than ever the vital role of auditor on the audit report lag. This research will make investors and stakeholders aware of the importance of governance mechanisms put in place in firms to reduce audit report delays in emerging markets, like Tunisia. Then, this work can help researchers and encourage them to deeply and broadly investigate this issue on other emerging markets.

This study extends the existing literature by examining the relationship between different mechanisms of corporate governance and audit delay in an emerging context and which has been very little explored in this sense namely in the Tunisian context. On the empirical level, the study contributes by using a dynamic panel that has not been mentioned much in previous research. Dynamic panel models include lagged dependent variables. The presence of these variables makes it possible to model a partial adjustment mechanism.

THIS report gives a general solution of the problem of the calculation of the Glauert loading of wings with discontinuities of incidence. The three existing variations of the original theory, the Glauert solution, the Gates' least squares solution, and the Lotz' solution, are not entirely satisfactory and may involve a considerable amount of labour. The present solution divides the Fourier series representing the circulation into two parts: (a) a standard solution representing the discontinuities, which includes the slowly convergent part of the solution, and which is expressible as a precise infinite series dependent only upon the position of discontinuities along the span, and (b) a secondary solution due to plan form, aspect ratio, slope of section lift curve, and so on, which is the quickly convergent part of the solution and usually requires a terminated scries of only from four to six terms. Once the standard solution has been computed, the remaining work is little more than for the standard Glauert solution for a flat wing.

Managers are constantly making decisions that affect profit. One of the decision‐making areas which is crucial to all managers concerns profit planning. Attempts to show how cost‐volume‐profit (CVP) analysis, aided by the computer spreadsheet, can be applied to the practical profit planning situation in the hospitality industry. Paradoxically, CVP analysis is one of the most widely referred to techniques in managerial accounting, but all too often it is not used to its full potential in the operating environment. Aims at encouraging greater use of the CVP approach to hospitality profit planning.

Libraries need to develop information processing systems for evaluation, budgeting, planning, and operations. Electronic spreadsheets lend themselves to a variety of applications, but are time‐consuming to create. A model template and macros that can be used in many different types of library data analysis have been developed here. The procedures demonstrated here can build an essential set of tools for meeting fundamental goals of administrative efficiency, effective use of library resources, staff motivation, and rational policy making.

This study aims to empirically examine the impact of the price structure of two-sided markets on transaction volume and market share (MS) in the context of the Korean credit card industry. The Korean credit card market differs from those in the United States (U.S.) or Europe in terms of transaction structure (i.e. a three-party system in Korea vs a four-party system in the U.S. or Europe) and government policy. In addition to the merchant discount rate and the cardholder annual membership fee rate, the authors included and analyzed exogenous variables to eliminate any endogeneity. Based on the analysis results, the authors found that credit card usage performance (i.e. transaction volume) increases with an increase in the relative price ratio (merchant discount rate ÷ cardholder membership fee rate) paid by merchants and cardholders, provided that the total price (merchant discount rate + cardholder membership fee rate) paid by merchants and cardholders remains constant. Therefore, this study is the first to confirm that the Korean credit card market operated as the theoretical mechanism of a two-sided market during the analysis period. This effect can only be observed in specific cases such as the launch of the so-called “Chief Executive Officer(CEO)-designed card.” When a new CEO takes office in a credit card company and launches a “CEO-designed card,” there is a significant increase in not only card usage performance but MS as well owing to the price structure changes caused by expanding the benefits that customers derive from card use.