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This study aims to examine the effects of participating in physical activities on female college graduates' starting salaries. We used an instrumental variable (IV) approach to address the possible endogeneity problem. By using the Taiwan Higher Education Dataset, we discovered that participating in physical activities during college increased an individual's earnings by 3.06%. The significant positive effect of physical activity on salary demonstrated in this study is consistent with that in other relevant studies. This study also discovered that both the intensity and the persistence of participation in physical activities affected salary outcomes. Individuals earned 0.17%–2.41% more if they exercised for an additional hour per week, suggesting the importance of the intensity of participation in physical activities. In addition, persistent participation in physical activities was associated with a 3.08% higher salary.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how blockchain technology – which permits the Internet-based exchange of value (digital assets) – enables supply chain finance banks to overcome the challenges they face when attempting to create win–win transactions for supply chain participants. Traditionally, buyers and suppliers linked together in a supply chain have conflicting objectives as manifested by a zero-sum payoff structure. Suppliers want their invoices to be paid quickly in order to reduce their need for working capital. In contrast, buyers want to delay payment of invoices as long as possible in order to reduce their need for working capital. In other words, suppliers want a short cash conversion cycle; buyers want a long cash conversion cycle. This conflict is eliminated by the insertion of a financial intermediary (supply chain finance bank) between the buyer and the supplier. The bank eliminates the conflict by: (1) using its balance sheet to decouple the cash conversion cycles of the buyer and supplier; and (2) providing cheaper financing to impatient suppliers and reluctant buyers (since the bank has a higher credit rating than both the supplier and the buyer).

This study first replicates, then perturbs, the centipede game as implemented by McKelvey and Palfrey (1992). It is thus both a replication study and an original research study. We use controlled laboratory experiments, with computer interfaces for each treatment, anonymous round-robin matching among the subjects across rounds, multiple (10) rounds within each treatment, and incremental changes between adjacent treatments allowing for an assessment of effects at the margin of different game configurations. We find unraveling to the subgame perfect equilibrium somewhat faster than did McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), when using their exact design. Perturbations to that design show that setting non-taker payoffs to zero induces earlier unraveling, as does the use of higher stakes (as in Murphy, Rapoport, and Parco (2006), and Rapoport, Stein, Parco, and Nicholas (2003), respectively). Other, subsequent perturbations show: that there is at most a subtle effect associated with using a 10-second timer with a default move, relative to untimed active moves; and that clock format versus tree format has a minimal effect in common information, unchanging payoff-parameterization environments. We verify the robustness of some key past findings in real-time games. We also explore in a common information environment, the effect of design features previously used in independent private values settings; here we find new evidence that features which might modulate information acquisition and/or processing in an independent private values setting may not restrict behavior in a common information setting.

This chapter offers an empirical examination of the impact of World Governance indicators (WGIs) on stock market development. The understanding is based on the premise of institutional economics that strong institutional governance, in terms of laws and regulations, results in positive developments in financial institutions.

The data which covers the years 1996–2016, include all world countries where a stock market operates. The authors use standard statistical tools that include Johansen co-integration test, linearity, normality tests, and regression analysis, together with discriminant analysis as a robustness check.

The empirical findings show that (a) a negative association exists between Voice and Accountability and stock market development, (b) a positive association exists between each of Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption, and stock market development for most World’s regions stock markets, (c) both Voice and Accountability and Political Stability indicators are the major influential indicators for the stock market development across world stock markets.

This chapter offers quantitative evidence about the benefits of strong institutional governance to stock market development. In addition, the chapter offers significant guidelines to policymakers regarding the institutional factors that can be enhanced to promote stock market development.

We replicate and extend the social history treatment of the Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) investment game, to further document how the reporting of financial history influences how laboratory societies organize themselves over time. We replicate Berg et al. (1995) by conducting a No History and a Financial History session to determine whether a report summarizing the financial transactions of a previous experimental session will significantly reduce entropy in the amounts sent by Investors and returned by Stewards in the investment game, as Berg et al. (1995) found. We extend Berg et al. (1995) in two ways. First, we conduct a total of five sessions (one No History and four Financial History sessions). Second, we introduce Shannon’s (1948) measure of entropy from information theory to assess whether the introduction of financial transaction history reduces the amount of dispersion in the amounts invested and returned across generations of players. Results across sessions indicate that entropy declined in both the amounts sent by Investors and the percentage returned by Stewards, but these patterns are weaker and mixed compared to those in the Berg et al. (1995) study. Additional research is needed to test how initial conditions, path dependencies, actors’ strategic reasoning about others’ behavior, multiple sessions, and communication may mediate the impact of financial history. The study’s multiple successive Financial History sessions and entropy measure are new to the investment game literature.

This research examines stock traders' disposition effects and contrarian/momentum behavior in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE). Specifically, we first investigate disposition effects across all trader types and then examine the relationships between disposition effects, trader types, and order characteristics. Next, we explore contrarian and/or momentum behavior and analyze the relationships among the contrarian/momentum behavior, investor type, and order characteristics. Finally, the links among trader types, order characteristics, and investment performance are detected. This chapter yields the following findings. (1) Individual investors exhibit the strongest disposition effects compared to other investors. (2) Foreign investors, investment trusts, and individual investors tend to use large orders to sell loser stocks. (3) Investment trusts are inclined to be momentum traders, while individual investors tend to perform contrarian strategies. (4) Institutional aggressive and large orders perform better than individuals' orders. (5) The performance of foreign investors' selling decisions is better than that of retail investors.

We investigate the role of group identity in delegated decision-making. Our framework considers the impact of group identity (based on racial segregation in post-Apartheid South Africa) on decisions to appoint a representative in a trust game with delegated decision-making, where information on the race group of other players is either common or private knowledge. We test our framework experimentally on a sample of young South Africans who had never been exposed to experimental economics research. By exogenously matching parties according to their race group, we observe their endogenous trust and delegation behavior. Our results suggest that white players try to use information about group identity to increase profits, albeit unsuccessfully. This may help to explain distrust and coordination failures observed in real-life interactions.

Law enforcement agents enforce rules that they might transgress in their private lives. Building from a theory of “hypocrisy aversion” where agents incur psychological costs from imposing a sanction on others for rules that they might break, the authors design a two-player game in which players are simultaneously placed in the roles of enforcer and potential transgressor. In this model, discretionary enforcement is endogenous to the size of the sanction. Conditional on rewards to enforcement and punishment that are both sufficiently small in the status quo, the authors demonstrate that price effects can be dominated by second-order hypocrisy effects, leading to rates of transgression that increase with larger sanctions. The authors test the model within a laboratory experiment where individuals can simultaneously gamble at the expense of a third party and punish those they observe gambling. Examining the comparable testable predictions of models of (i) selfish agents, (ii) pro-social agents, and (iii) pro-social agents who are averse to hypocrisy, the authors find evidence of hypocrisy aversion in the rates of gambling, sanctioning, and the changing composition of agent strategies. Our results suggest that increasing sanctions can backfire in the deterrence of common criminal and non-criminal offenses.

Institutional changes, in a historical context, through simultaneous evolutionary and metamorphic processes either deform or reform long-enduring institutions. The chapter delves into the Persian history from the early days of the reign of Nāṣer al-Dīn Shāh-e Qājār in 1848 to the recent years and traces Persian institutions' historical transformations, which culminated to the Persian women entrepreneurship. Thus, the chapter first sets the historical context in each period and then sheds light on the pivotal issues of each period's women. The undergirding base of the discussions is the assumption of the change in institutions as natural metamorphosis in the animate. Finally, the discussions contribute to the conceptualization of the Institutional Triangulation and in the case of Persia, a cultural-driven triangulation, which has paved the way to the formation of a stupendously hegemonic patriarchal and masculine sociopolitical economy in Persia, that has historically affected women's institutionalization, subjugation, subordination, marginalization, socialization, emancipation, and most recently Islamization phases.

William J. Baumol was one of the most prolific economists of his generation, analyzing a broad range of central economic issues addressing real problems of the world. In this essay, we present and critically evaluate Baumol’s research contributions in entrepreneurship economics and point to areas for future research. Baumol contributed an impressive number of important insights, increasing our understanding of entrepreneurship from both a macro and a micro perspective. He also devoted a large part of his writings to discussing public policy, linking his theoretical insights with policy issues in practice. His analyses are rooted in contemporary mainstream neoclassical economics, and one of his main objectives was to integrate the entrepreneur into this tradition. Today, Baumol is best known for his tripartite distinction between productive, unproductive, and destructive entrepreneurship and his associated idea that the institutional framework, “the rules of the game,” will determine how entrepreneurs allocate their time and effort across different – productive or unproductive – activities. An institutional environment that encourages productive entrepreneurship and spontaneous experimentation while disincentivizing unproductive activities becomes, through this insightful lens, the driving force of economic growth. As an economist, Baumol was knowledgeable and well acquainted with earlier scholars and their writings about entrepreneurship. Baumol’s writings were greatly inspired by Joseph Schumpeter’s views on entrepreneurship, and he made several attempts to formalize Schumpeter’s concept of the innovative entrepreneur. Baumol was in all senses an innovative contributor to entrepreneurship economics. His work has inspired the research community of entrepreneurship scholars, but like all great scientists, he also encountered criticism. His effort to integrate entrepreneurship into the mainstream theory of the firm was only partly successful.