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Cyber-attacks that generate technical disruptions in organisational operations and damage the reputation of organisations have become all too common in the contemporary organisation. This paper explores the reputation repair strategies undertaken by organisations in the event of becoming victims of cyber-attacks.

For developing the authors’ contribution in the context of the Internet service providers' industry, the authors draw on a qualitative case study of TalkTalk, a British telecommunications company providing business to business (B2B) and business to customer (B2C) Internet services, which was a victim of a “significant and sustained” cyber-attack in October 2015. Data for the enquiry is sourced from publicly available archival documents such as newspaper articles, press releases, podcasts and parliamentary hearings on the TalkTalk cyber-attack.

The findings suggest a dynamic interplay of technical and rhetorical responses in dealing with cyber-attacks. This plays out in the form of marshalling communication and mortification techniques, bolstering image and riding on leader reputation, which serially combine to strategically orchestrate reputational repair and stigma erasure in the event of a cyber-attack.

Analysing a prototypical case of an organisation in dire straits following a cyber-attack, the paper provides a systematic characterisation of the setting-in-motion of strategic responses to manage, revamp and ameliorate damaged reputation during cyber-attacks, which tend to negatively shape the evaluative perceptions of the organisation's salient audience.

The increasing number of cyber attacks has transformed the “cyberspace” into a “battlefield”, bringing out “cyber warfare” as the “fifth dimension of war” and emphasizing the States’ need to effectively protect themselves against these attacks. The existing legal framework seem inadequate to deal effectively with cyber operations and, from a strictly legal standpoint, it indicates that addressing cyber attacks does not fall within the jurisdiction of just one legal branch. This is mainly because of the fact that the concept of cyber warfare itself is open to many different interpretations, ranging from cyber operations performed by the States within the context of armed conflict, under International Humanitarian Law, to illicit activities of all kinds performed by non-State actors including cybercriminals and terrorist groups. The paper initially presents major cyber-attack incidents and their impact on the States. On this basis, it examines the existing legal framework at the European and international levels. Furthermore, it approaches “cyber warfare” from the perspective of international law and focuses on two major issues relating to cyber operations, i.e. “jurisdiction” and “attribution”. The multi-layered process of attribution in combination with a variety of jurisdictional bases in international law makes the successful tackling of cyber attacks difficult. The paper aims to identify technical, legal and, last but not least, political difficulties and emphasize the complexity in applying international law rules in cyber operations.

The paper focuses on the globalization of the “cyber warfare phenomenon” by observing its evolutionary process from the early stages of its appearance until today. It examines the scope, duration and intensity of major cyber-attacks throughout the years in relation to the reactions of the States that were the victims. Having this as the base of discussion, it expands further by exemplifying “cyber warfare” from the perspective of the existing European and International legal framework. The main aim of this part is to identify and analyze major obstacles that arise, for instance in terms of “jurisdiction” and “attribution” in applying international law rules to “cyber warfare”.

The absence of a widely accepted legal framework to regulate jurisdictional issues of cyber warfare and the technical difficulties in identifying, with absolute certainty, the perpetrators of an attack, make the successful tackling of cyber attacks difficult.

The paper fulfills the need to identify difficulties in applying international law rules in cyber warfare and constitutes the basis for the creation of a method that will attempt to categorize and rank cyber operations in terms of their intensity and seriousness.

The paper aims to analyze the impact of cyber attacks on stock returns of companies operating in the hospitality sector. The fast development of information and communication technologies has been posited as both an opportunity and a challenge to the United Nations Global Sustainable Development Goals. Digital technologies are significant tools for sustainable development, but if they are not addressed appropriately, they can potentially hinder the progress toward sustainability. Among negative impacts, it is necessary to consider cyber risk, a major concern today, in particular for industries which work with sensitive data, such as tourism businesses. Hospitality businesses have to adequately manage cyber insecurity and digital privacy issues, to prevent losses and contribute to socioeconomic sustainable growth.

Using event-study methodology, the paper provides empirical evidence on the effect of announcements of 170 information security breaches on the market value of firms operating in the hospitality sector in the past five years.

The study focuses on identifying potential threats of cyber attacks for the economic value of listed companies. The authors find that negative market returns occur following announcements of cyber attacks suffered by hospitality companies. Adequate investments in technology for cyber security and staff training are relevant in the hospitality sector to reduce cyber risk.

The paper contributes to identifying potential threats of cyber attacks for the economic value of listed companies operating in the hospitality sector. The analysis is carried out by collecting an original sample of global cyber attacks from newspaper announcements sourced from the LexisNexis database.

论酒店业的网络攻击：股票市场的反应

信息通讯技术的快速发展, 对UN全球可持续发展战略目标带来机遇和挑战。电子技术对可持续发展起到重要作用, 但是如果它们未被合理使用, 则对可持续性构成潜在威胁。在众多负面影响中, 网络攻击不可忽视, 成为现今重大担忧, 尤其是对于处理敏感数据的行业, 比如旅游产业。酒店业必须具备管理网络安全和处理电子隐私的能力, 以防止损失, 对社会经济可持续增长做出贡献。

本论文分析酒店业内因网络攻击而遭受股票的影响。借用事件分析法, 本论文研究了近五年来, 170项信息安全泄露消息对酒店市场价值的影响。

本论文主要确立了上市公司因网络攻击而受到的经济价值影响。我们发现, 酒店公司在宣布网络攻击后, 其市场收益受到负面影响。充足的网络安全技术投入和人员培训与酒店减少网络攻击有一定的联系。

本论文分析了酒店业中上市公司因网络攻击而带来的潜在经济价值的损失。研究分析样本来自Lexis Nexis数据库中的全球网络攻击的新闻报道。

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of ransomware cyber-attacks “WannaCry” and “Petya” on stock prices of publicly traded companies in the European Union. The study analyses a set of case studies related to largest recent cybercrime events, which happened in the first half of 2017. The study answers two questions, what is the impact of cybercrime to public companies? How do cybercrime announcements and publications affect stock prices?

Using archival financial data, an event study methodology was used to assess the impact of cybercrime activity on market value of European companies affected during WannaCry and Petya ransomware attacks in 2017.

The results suggest that announcements of information breaches because of ransomware exploits have impact on stock market returns. There is evidence of positive investors` reactions to the announcements. Specifically, there was little impact of “Wannacry” ransomware attack on market returns. Although stock market reactions differ by the sector, the market was positively affected in general. Our analysis of the impact of the more aggressive “Petya attack,” aimed at destroying affected data found evidence that such information security breach leads to increased market returns. There were significant abnormal returns starting from the third day of the announcement. These findings contradict previous results and the literature related to the impact of cyber-attacks.

Contrary to previous findings, the results suggest that ransomware attacks lead to positive market returns. However, cybercrime and other types of cyber-attacks pose serious threats whose implications deserve further investigation. Different attacks may have different consequences and could be potentially damaging to a firm’s reputation. Thus, it is necessary for companies to avoid becoming victim of cybercrime. Information systems should be continuously monitored for vulnerabilities.

Industry 5.0 has shown a new approach to integrating enterprises, particularly fintech firms. It would be interesting to see whether we are ready to implement Industry 5.0 across domains and enterprises while there are still obstacles to overcome, such as cybercrime impacting fintech organizations. Using empirical analysis of the fintech stocks that make up the KBW index, the author uncovered the influence of cybercrime on investor herding behavior in a highly interdependent environment provided by Industry 4.0. The cross-sectional standard deviation has been shown to rise after a cyber attack on a company anywhere on the globe. Furthermore, the author established the long-term equilibrium of the volatilities of gold and bitcoin returns, as well as the volatility of Keefe, Bruyette, and Woods (KBW) returns, in the sample after the firms’ cyber assault using Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) and Vector error correction model (VECM) models. Following the cyber assault, there is a decrease in the volatility of KBW returns while the volatility of bitcoin returns rises, suggesting a volatility transfer from one market to the other. These results show that during times of crisis, investors should be more careful in their approach to investment diversification, and any Industry 5.0 implementations should be done with the constraints in mind.

Railways are a well-known example of complex critical infrastructure, incorporating socio-technical systems with humans such as drivers, signallers, maintainers and passengers at the core. The technological evolution including interconnectedness and new ways of interaction lead to new security and safety risks that can be realised, both in terms of human error, and malicious and non-malicious behaviour. This study aims to identify the human factors (HF) and cyber-security risks relating to the role of signallers on the railways and explores strategies for the improvement of “Digital Resilience” – for the concept of a resilient railway.

Overall, 26 interviews were conducted with 21 participants from industry and academia.

The results showed that due to increased automation, both cyber-related threats and human error can impact signallers’ day-to-day operations – directly or indirectly (e.g. workload and safety-critical communications) – which could disrupt the railway services and potentially lead to safety-related catastrophic consequences. This study identifies cyber-related problems, including external threats; engineers not considering the human element in designs when specifying security controls; lack of security awareness among the rail industry; training gaps; organisational issues; and many unknown “unknowns”.

The authors discuss socio-technical principles through a hexagonal socio-technical framework and training needs analysis to mitigate against cyber-security issues and identify the predictive training needs of the signallers. This is supported by a systematic approach which considers both, safety and security factors, rather than waiting to learn from a cyber-attack retrospectively.

The purpose of this study is to examine cyber security risks in globalized supply chains (SCs). It has been seen to have a greater impact on the performance of SCs. The information and communication technology of a firm, which enhances the efficiency and effectiveness in the SC, could simultaneously be the cause of vulnerabilities and exposure to security threats. Researchers have primarily focussed on the cyber-physical system (CPS) vulnerabilities impacting SC. This paper tries to categorize the cyber security risks occurring because of the SCs operating in CPS.

Based on the flow of information along the upstream and downstream SC, this paper tries to identify cyber security risks in the global SCs. It has further tried to categorize these cyber security risks from a strategic point of view.

This paper tries to identify the various cyber security risk and cyber-attacks in globalized SC for improving the performance. The 16 cyber security risks have been categorized into three categories, namely, supply risk, operational risk and demand risk. The paper proposes a framework consisting of different cyber-attacks across the information that flows in global SCs along-with suitable mitigation strategies.

The paper presents the conceptual model of cyber security risks and cyber-attacks in globalized SCs based on literature review and industry experts. Further validation and scale development of these risks can be done through empirical study.

This paper provides significant managerial insights by developing a framework for understanding the cyber security risks in terms of the drivers of these risks and how to deal with them. From a managerial perspective, this framework can be used as a decision-making process while considering different cyber security risks across the stages of globalized SCs.

The major contribution of this study is the identification and categorization of cyber security risks across the global SCs in the digital age. Thus, this paper introduces a new phenomenon to the field of management that has the potential to investigate new areas of future research. Based on the categorization, the paper provides insights on how cyber security risks impact the continuity of SC operations.

As cyber-attacks continue to grow, organisations adopting the internet-of-things (IoT) have continued to react to security concerns that threaten their businesses within the current highly competitive environment. Many recorded industrial cyber-attacks have successfully beaten technical security solutions by exploiting human-factor vulnerabilities related to security knowledge and skills and manipulating human elements into inadvertently conveying access to critical industrial assets. Knowledge and skill capabilities contribute to human analytical proficiencies for enhanced cybersecurity readiness. Thus, a human-factored security endeavour is required to investigate the capabilities of the human constituents (workforce) to appropriately recognise and respond to cyber intrusion events within the industrial control system (ICS) environment.

A quantitative approach (statistical analysis) is adopted to provide an approach to quantify the potential cybersecurity capability aptitudes of industrial human actors, identify the least security-capable workforce in the operational domain with the greatest susceptibility likelihood to cyber-attacks (i.e. weakest link) and guide the enhancement of security assurance. To support these objectives, a Human-factored Cyber Security Capability Evaluation approach is presented using conceptual analysis techniques.

Using a test scenario, the approach demonstrates the capacity to proffer an efficient evaluation of workforce security knowledge and skills capabilities and the identification of weakest link in the workforce.

The approach can enable organisations to gain better workforce security perspectives like security-consciousness, alertness and response aptitudes, thus guiding organisations into adopting strategic means of appropriating security remediation outlines, scopes and resources without undue wastes or redundancies.

This paper demonstrates originality by providing a framework and computational approach for characterising and quantify human-factor security capabilities based on security knowledge and security skills. It also supports the identification of potential security weakest links amongst an evaluated industrial workforce (human agents), some key security susceptibility areas and relevant control interventions. The model and validation results demonstrate the application of action research. This paper demonstrates originality by illustrating how action research can be applied within socio-technical dimensions to solve recurrent and dynamic problems related to industrial environment cyber security improvement. It provides value by demonstrating how theoretical security knowledge (awareness) and practical security skills can help resolve cyber security response and control uncertainties within industrial organisations.

Building information modelling (BIM) creates a golden thread of information of the facility, which proves useful to those with the malicious intent of breaching the security of the facility. A cyber-attack incurs adverse implications for the facility and its managing organisation. Hence, this paper aims to unravel the impact of a cybersecurity breach, by developing a BIM-facilities management (FM) cybersecurity-risk-matrix to portray what a cybersecurity attack means for various working areas of FM.

This study commenced with exploring cybersecurity within various stages of a BIM project. This showcased a heightened risk of cybersecurity at the post-occupancy phase. Hence, thematic analysis of two main domains of BIM-FM and cybersecurity in the built environment led to the development of a matrix that illustrated the impact of a cybersecurity attack on a BIM-FM organisation.

Findings show that the existing approaches to the management of cybersecurity in BIM-FM are technology-dependent, resulting in an over-reliance on technology and a lack of cybersecurity awareness of aspects related to people and processes. This study sheds light on the criticality of cyber-risk at the post-occupancy phase, highlighting the FM areas which will be compromised as a result of a cyber-attack.

This study seeks to shift focus to the people and process aspects of cybersecurity in BIM-FM. Through discussing the interconnections between the physical and digital assets of a built facility, this study develops a cyber-risk matrix, which acts as a foundation for empirical investigations of the matter in future research.