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This study aims to identify structural breaks in the current account and the periods between these breaks, which the authors name stability spells, and study their characteristics and determinants.

Using data from the IMF and the World Bank, this study applies the Lee and Strazicich test to endogenously identify breaks and the Heckman selection model to simultaneously study the determinants of structural breaks and current-account changes after breaks.

This study identifies 212 significant structural breaks and 341 stability spells. These spells become shorter and more volatile the further they are from equilibrium, and half of them last 10 years or less. The results show that economic growth and foreign-exchange piling are particularly useful to prevent breaks, while lower per capita income increases exposure to break risks.

This study introduces the concept of current-account stability spells to refer to the periods between structural breaks. These spells are then studied to determine their main characteristics. The authors also apply a global perspective in their analysis, using a wide sample of 181 economies between 1980 and 2018 and considering positive and negative breaks in both level and trend.

The purpose of this paper is to establish a model to study the determinants of financial flows, portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, and the impact of these determinants on economic variables in samples of developing and advanced countries. The analysis then turns to an evaluation of the effects of external flows on economic activity.

To that end, the paper follows a two‐step procedure. First, the paper estimates a series of reduced‐form equations in differenced form, using annual data, for the current and the financial account balances as well as important underlying components, using a number of macroeconomic indicators reflecting the state of the business cycle as explanatory variables. These include not only a measure of economic growth, but also other factors that vary cyclically, such as the exchange rate and energy prices. In addition, the paper examines the effect of positive and negative shocks to these and other cyclical variables on components of the balance of payments. Second, the results are summarized in three directions. First, cross‐country correlations evaluate time‐series co‐movements between the current account balance and external flows with respect to major determinants of cyclicality across the samples of advanced and developing countries. Second, time‐series regressions evaluate the direct effects of financial flows on the current account balance within the samples of developing and advanced countries. Third, cross‐country regressions evaluate the impact of movements in trend and variability of financial flows on major economic indicators across the samples of developing and advanced countries.

The results are summarized in three directions. Across the samples of advanced and developing countries, the pervasive evidence highlights the negative correlation between the responses of the current account balance and the financial balance with respect to the various sources of cyclicality in the time‐series model. Second, using time‐series regressions the bulk of the evidence indicates that an increase in financial flows helps finance a widening current account deficit. Third, cross‐country regressions evaluate the impact of movements in trend and variability of financial flows on major economic indicators across the samples of developing and advanced countries. While FDI flows appear significant in differentiating growth performance within and across developing countries, their effects appear to be limited on growth performance in advanced countries. Portfolio flows are more relevant, compared to FDI flows, to financing a wider current account deficit, both in developing and advanced countries.

Overall, the evidence presented in this paper establishes the importance of financial flows to external balances and macroeconomic performance within and across the samples of developing and advanced countries. In light of this evidence, macroeconomic policies should target a combination of external balances that can be easily financed by external inflows and align domestic policies to achieve the desired cyclicality in external balances, available financing, and macroeconomic performance.

Since the 1970s, many global political economists have been seeing the US as a declining hegemon. After four decades into this hegemonic decline, performance of economies having been regarded as candidates for new hegemons such as Germany/Europe and Japan fell far short of these expectations, while US share of the global economy and its military supremacy remained stable. This staying power of the US stems from the “dollar standard,” under which the US dollar is the dominant foreign reserve currency and international transaction medium in the world economy. The dollar standard originated in the Cold War era when all major capitalist powers relied on the US for military protection. It persisted after the end of Cold War, thanks to the continuous mutual reinforcement of the dollar standard and the global domination of the US military. The recent rise of China, which is the first major capitalist power outside the orbit of US military protection, poses a serious dilemma to the US. On the one hand, China’s export-oriented development drives China to purchase US Treasuries on a massive scale, hence lending support to the short-term viability of the dollar. On the other hand, US’s skyrocketing current account deficit, much attributable to China, precipitates a crisis of confidence over the dollar’s long-term prospects. China is likewise caught in a dilemma between sustaining its export-driven growth and shifting to a domestic-consumption-driven economy. The development of the US–China currency conflict, together with the transformation of the Chinese developmental model, will be the most important determinant shaping the future of the dollar standard and US global power in the years to come.

The equation of unified knowledge says that S = f (A,P) which means that the practical solution to a given problem is a function of the existing, empirical, actual realities and the future, potential, best possible conditions of general stable equilibrium which both pure and practical reason, exhaustive in the Kantian sense, show as being within the realm of potential realities beyond any doubt. The first classical revolution in economic thinking, included in factor “P” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of a model of ideal conditions of stable equilibrium but neglected the full consideration of the existing, actual conditions. That is the main reason why, in the end, it failed. The second modern revolution, included in factor “A” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of the existing, actual conditions, usually in disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium (in case of stagnation) and neglected the sense of right direction expressed in factor “P” or the realization of general, stable equilibrium. That is the main reason why the modern revolution failed in the past and is failing in front of our eyes in the present. The equation of unified knowledge, perceived as a sui generis synthesis between classical and modern thinking has been applied rigorously and systematically in writing the enclosed American‐British economic, monetary, financial and social stabilization plans. In the final analysis, a new economic philosophy, based on a synthesis between classical and modern thinking, called here the new economics of unified knowledge, is applied to solve the malaise of the twentieth century which resulted from a confusion between thinking in terms of stable equilibrium on the one hand and disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium on the other.

Energy represents an important component of production costs and therefore, an increase in energy prices directly impacts economic productivity, unemployment, inflation, and balance of payments equilibrium – often engendering currency devaluations. Until recently, the growth in demand for conventional fuels, mainly oil and gas, has widened imbalances between demand for and supply of energy. The effects of the surge in oil prices ripple across the entire global economy resulting in a redistribution of international liquidity. The latter creates global imbalances characterized by increasing balance of payment deficits and deteriorating the terms of trade, reducing the flow of non‐energy goods and services and increasing uncertainty of future global transactions. The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the impact of higher fuel prices on global liquidity management.

Norway is a small nation state on the northernmost coastline of Western Europe, integrated in the Western world economy. For centuries Norway's integration in the world economy had been based on exports of raw materials such as fish and timber, as well as shipping services. In the early 20th century, furnace-based metals (made possible by cheap hydropower) were added to this export basket. Just as the world economy entered an increasingly unstable phase in 1970s, another natural resource was discovered in Norway: petroleum – that is, oil and natural gas from the North Sea. This chapter analyses the challenges and possibilities inherent in the Norwegian strategy of developing an oil economy in a world economic situation influenced by new and stronger forms of international integration through the four decades between 1970 and 2010.

The article provides a comparative critique of the financial underpinnings of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the recent wave of financial crises. The collapse of the financial systems in many developing nations, the bankruptcies in the Anglo-Saxon corporate sectors and a threat of more sovereign defaults on behalf of emerging markets suggest that the current wave of global financial fragility and recession rivals that of the Great Depression of the 1930s. The paper examines key elements that account for the crisis-prone nature of global capitalism: the political discipline of neo-liberalism, debt-driven expansion of the privatised financial markets, and the profound disarticulation of the financial and real economies. These factors suggests that the risk of a global depression is by no means hypothetical, and unless effective and collaborative efforts are made to tame the inherently unstable regime of global finance, even major world economies are faced with a prolonged period of financial turbulence and economic stagnation. The paper concludes by pondering the possibility of a paradigmatic shift in the transnational political consensus that can prevent a global repetition of the 1930s. While the increased awareness of financial instability and crisis may indeed prompt some ad hoc adjustments in national and foreign economic policies of major capitalist powers, in the long run these measures will be insufficient to prevent a major financial and economic disaster.

The purpose of this paper is to report and comment on the High Court ruling on Icelandic bank's challenge to HM Treasury's use of emergency powers during 2008.

The paper outlines the facts surrounding the case and comments on the decision.

The High Court disagreed that the claimant's view of events accorded with the way the treasury in fact acted.

This appeal shows how two very differently motivated, yet equally well‐intentioned, regulatory regimes can come into conflict.