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To investigate the extent to which finance managers in non‐financial firms speculate in the currency markets and particularly to investigate the effect of individual‐owners on such speculation.

This paper uses survey data in order to analyse the extent of currency speculation in non‐financial firms. It uses survey data and publicly available data in an ordered probit regression analysis in order to analyse the decisive factors behind the extent of currency speculation in non‐financial firms.

Currency speculation is widespread among non‐financial firms and takes the form of selective hedging as well as speculation not related to the underlying business. The extent of speculation is positively related to the size of the firm, to the international involvement of the firm, and to the conservatism of its capital structure. If an individual (often the founder or a descendant of the founder) is the largest shareholder in the firm, the extent of such speculation is significantly reduced.

The findings are based on Danish, non‐financial firms listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange.

The contribution of this paper is to provide evidence on the negative relationship between individual‐owners (ownership structure) and the extent of currency speculation in non‐financial firms and more generally to investigate the factors behind such speculation.

The national objectives of forward exchange controls are to restrain speculation in foreign exchange, to limit international capital flows and to affect the forward exchange rates. Restrictions on forward transactions are economic welfare costs for enterprises and banks, which are analysed in terms of risk‐return and supply‐demand theory. Empirical answers to whether forward exchange control is really necessary await collection and disclosure of company currency exposure, which itself may contribute to the national objectives implicit in forward exchange controls.

The latest European Union summit in the fall of 2002 revealed that over 11 countries (Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania) have expressed their desire to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) and convert their currency to the “euro”. The European Commission will have to completely equalize interest rates and inflation rates of all these countries before admitting them to join the EMU or there will be arbitrage profits and currency speculation, which will slow down the growth of the overall European Community and negatively affect the value of the euro.

The purpose of this study is to explore the influence of founder families in medium‐sized manufacturing firms and to investigate the impact of such influence on risk management – more specifically foreign exchange hedging and speculation.

This empirical study uses survey data and publicly available data for descriptive analysis and ordinary least squares/ordered regression analysis.

The authors find that two thirds of medium‐sized manufacturing firms are founder family firms in which the founder of the firm or members of his/her family are active in the management team, are members of the board of directors, and/or are shareholders of the firm. The study finds no difference between such founder family firms and other firms in terms of the use/non‐use decision related to foreign exchange derivatives but a marked difference in terms of the extent decision. Thus, founder family firms tend not only to hedge but also to speculate more extensively than other firms.

The findings are based on medium‐sized manufacturing firms in Denmark.

This study provides empirical evidence on the influence of founder families in medium‐sized firms and adds to the sparse literature on the impact of founder family influence on risk management.

The purpose of this paper is to examine proposals for a Tobin tax to curb currency speculation in global markets.

Financial markets are viewed from the perspective of Michel Serres.

Managing volatility is really about managing relationships that can buffer governments against risk. The resolution of a paradox is embracing the paradox.

The work of Michel Serres has not previously been used in analyses of global currency markets. His theory of parasitical relationships offers a novel response to proposals for a Tobin tax.

This chapter identifies three crisis warning indicators driven from trading in emerging markets’ carry trades, and empirically examines whether these indicators could predict two major financial crises that hit the global financial markets in the last decades — The 1997–1998 Asian crisis and the 2007–2008 global crisis. The probit regression is used to examine the power of the three indicators in forecasting financial crises, using data from eight Asian emerging countries which serve as proxies for emerging markets, independent of the origination of the crisis. I use both fixed effect and random effect estimation to measure crisis impacts. The empirical results show that financial crises could have been predicted. Probit estimation show that carry trade returns can predict a financial crisis, and the estimation results are robust to both panel level and country-level analysis. These three indicators are by no means an exhaustive list of all possible predictors of financial crisis. The literature suggests other fundamental indicators of financial crises such as the current account deficit and foreign debt. However, this chapter cannot fully consider these indicators for lack of data at this point in time. Although financial crisis may be better predicted by the well-known fundamental indicators, the contribution of this chapter is simply that carry trade-related indicators can help in predicting crises.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the characteristics of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market, IPO underpricing and the long-run performance of IPOs and to find out the ex ante difference in the market structure between the pre-, during and post-periods of the Unremunerated Reserve Requirement (URR) at the 30 per cent rate.

The sample is a total of 245 IPOs listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) and the Market for Alternative Investment (mai), during the period 2001-2012. The explanatory variables consist of the age of the firm, the offer size, the time-lag between the IPO date and the first trading date, the proportion of shares owned by the government and the IPO subscription rates by foreign and institutional investors. In further analysis, the authors adopt a two-stage least squares approach to derive unbiased estimates of the relationship between government ownership, IPO underpricing and firm quality.

We find the ex ante uncertainty and earning management partially explain the IPO underpricing phenomenon in the Thai IPO market. Our findings support the impresario hypothesis shown by the negative relation between underpricing and the three-year after-market. In addition, the 30 per cent URR imposition by the Thai Central Bank promptly reduced the number of IPO issues and the proportion of foreigners and institutions subscribing to IPOs. However, it was able to enhance the degrees of IPO underpricing and the long-run performance of IPOs in Thailand.

The results presented in this paper may be, therefore, useful for investors, security analysts, companies and regulators in many other emerging markets beyond Thailand. Given the results from the over-performance of IPOs in the post-URR period, investors may do better holding Thai IPOs for a long period with a likelihood of gaining a higher return.

This paper contributes to the literature concerning IPOs – in that we have considered two stock markets, namely, SET and mai. Furthermore, unique data such as the government ownership and proportion of IPOs subscribed by foreign and institutional investors are taken into consideration in our research model. To the best of our knowledge, for the first time in the Thai IPO market, the effect of the 30 per cent URR on IPO underpricing and the performance of IPOs in the long-run has been closely examined.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how non‐finance departmental involvement in the management of exchange rate risks impacts the extent of foreign exchange speculation in non‐financial firms.

Non‐financial firms in a small open economy (Denmark) are surveyed to investigate the extent of foreign exchange speculation and how it is related to the degree of nonfinance departmental involvement in the management of exchange rate risks. The authors employ binary and ordered probit regression analysis.

A positive link is found between the extent to which departments other than the finance department are involved in the management of exchange rate risks; and second, the extent to which the firm is likely to speculate – whether in the form of selective hedging or active speculation – on the foreign exchange market.

The findings indicate that the trend towards a more integrated risk management approach in which the finance department is not the only department responsible for risk management may have the (unforeseen) consequence that foreign exchange speculation increases.

The paper's findings are important because the link between the extent of foreign exchange speculation and a more integrated risk management approach has not been addressed previously.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which multilateral banks (MBs) use currency derivatives (CDs) to hedge and speculate in managing currency risk. It aims to provide an empirical assessment of CDs products used by MBs as a group not studied before.

Quantitative hypothesis regarding the usage of CDs to minimize adverse impact of currency risk was tested using z test about population proportion.

The results show that MBs are using CDs in the following order of importance: currency swaps, currency forwards, currency options and currency futures primarily to hedge currency risk.

The results of the study can be generalized only for MBs, given their peculiar characteristics as wholesale banks, which are owned mainly by governments and are generally not listed in the stock exchanges.

The study is of value to those interested in the multilateral banking industry. The authors acknowledge that it is the first study providing empirical evidence on CDs’ usage by MBs as a group. The results are particularly useful to managers of MBs in terms of helping them to make choices in usage of CDs. The paper has also policy implications in terms of justifying the current self-regulatory status, shareholder monitoring and governance of MBs, as they do not speculate with CDs.