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Challenges the popular explanation for Enron's failure as being simply about financial reporting or criminal behavior and offers a more subtle and complex explanation.

With a framework developed from the literature on cults and cult behavior as well as secondary research, the authors develop the perspective that Enron's senior leaders created an organization that encouraged executives to act in ways that were criminal. Five characteristics of cults: persuasion, isolation, elitism, charismatic (and dogmatic) leadership and wealth not benefiting group members were found to apply.

The major differences between a high performance organization and a cult were transparency, accountability and dialogue.

It highlights the small difference between a high performance culture and a cult and raises “red flags” or warning signs for executives to be aware of. Executives looking for long‐term outstanding performance through high levels of social cohesion and strong behavioral norms need to be aware of the cult trap.

There are important management lessons from the Enron story that transcend accounting and financial reporting techniques and lessons beyond the illegal behaviors. It provides an understanding of how an organization's culture and systems can lead to cult‐like behavior and encourage employees to act in illegal ways.

In the wake of numerous late twentieth century cult disasters, and most recently, the September 11 tragedy, this paper considers the question, why do people obey outrageous commands from charismatic authorities? According to Gary Becker, “the economic ap‐proach provides a valuable unified framework for understanding all human behavior” (Becker 1976:14). We test this generalization by attempting to explain, in terms of rational choice theory, the behavior of two members of infamous cults, the Manson Family and the Ragneesh Foundation International. Each of these subjects slavishly obeyed orders from a charismatic personality, one to the extent of committing murder. Were they mentally ill or rationally maximizing their utility? We consider these theoretical options. In August of 1969 Charles Manson ordered several of his followers to commit gruesome murders for the purpose of initiating the apocalypse. They obeyed. In late 1978, Jim Jones commanded over 900 members of the Peoples Temple to commit suicide. They obeyed. From 1981 to 1985, executing orders to build utopia perceived to come from their guru, members of the Ragneesh Foundation International terrorized the inhabitants of Antelope, Oregon. Similarly, followers of Osama Bin Laden are suspected of carrying out the disastrous suicide murders of September 11. Over past decades, the incidence of violence involving submission to a charismatic leader appears to be escalating. Increasingly the public must contend with the “awesome power” of charisma, “enshrouded in a mystique of irrationality” (Bradley 1987: 3–4). The extent to which followers committing criminal acts of obedience may be held accountable has become a pressing legal issue. How can this kind of volatile religious commitment be explained? In recent years, experts on cults have experimented with rational choice theory. According to economist, Gary Becker, “the economic approach provides a valuable unified framework for understanding all human behavior” (Becker 1976: 14). We test this extravagant claim with two cases of seemingly irrational commitment to a charismatic cult leader—one a follower of Bhagwan Rajneesh, the other a Manson Family killer. These subjects are not representative cult members but rather were chosen because they demonstrated an exceptional loyalty to their leaders that has been widely construed as the result of brainwashing or insanity. Rather than survey data, we rely on autobiographical testimonies since they offer a more detailed and comprehensive view of the thought processes that motivate behavior, the subject matter of this paper.

Studies of Tianhou-Mazu cult have been focused on three themes: studies in Taiwan emphasize hegemonic order; studies in Hong Kong reveal a relationship of “sisterhood” alliances; and studies in Singapore highlight the important role of ethnic groups. The rebuilding of the goddess’s ancestral temple in early 1980s and her acquiring a world intangible cultural heritage status in the early twenty-first century facilitate the redefinition of overseas Chinese’s religious affiliation. The purpose of this paper is to discuss this global development of the cult from the 1980s and its ritual implication in overseas Chinese communities.

This paper, by comparing the Tianhou-Mazu cult in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Southeast Asian Chinese settlements, argues that from sisters to descended replicas, or from local alliances to global hegemony, the cult of Tianhou-Mazu since the 1980s has not only replaced local culture with an emphasis on “high culture,” but also represents a religious strategy regarding local people’s interpretation of correctness and authority.

This paper argues that despite the imposition of hegemonic power from various authorities, popular religion is a matter of choice. This reflects how local religious practice is construed according to the interpretation of global cultural languages by the elite Chinese; their decision of when and how to reconnect with the goddess’s ancestral temple or the “imperial state,” or to form alliances with other local communities; and the implementation of the local government’s cultural policy.

This paper is one of the few attempts comparing development of a folk cult in various communities.

Introduces the concept of difficult people and looks at how to assess a situation. Outlines a number approaches to follow, considering the merits of each and concludes by discussing the disciplinary action available and the way in which it may be executed.

This study aims to contribute to the existing literature by empirically investigating the impact of digital competitiveness and technology on corruption under the moderating effect of some cultural and economic control variables and providing evidence on the links between corruption and various cultural dimensions at the country level.

The cross-sectional sample covers 61 countries (41 high-income and 20 lower-income countries) during the 2016–2020 period, and the analysis was carried out for both the full sample and the subsamples.

The results provide clear evidence supporting the hypothesis that digitalisation and technology significantly affect the perceived level of corruption under the moderating role of cultural framework and economic development. Furthermore, the most significant cultural dimensions of corruption are individualism versus collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation and indulgence versus restraint, even if, in some cases, its influence might be felt differently when the results are estimated on subsamples. Thus, in the case of indulgence versus restraint, high-income countries with higher indulgence scores would register higher scores for the corruption perception index and thus a better control of corruption, while for lower-income countries, the more indulgent these countries are, the weaker the corruption control will be. Furthermore, our results validate a powerful and significant correlation between the index of economic freedom and corruption in both digitalisation and technology.

This study may have relevant implications for policymakers who need to recognise the role of digitalisation and technology in the fight against corruption but considering the cultural and economic characteristics specific to each country.

To the authors' knowledge, the relationship between digital competitiveness, technology and corruption within an economic and cultural framework, while highlighting the differences between high-income and lower-income countries, has not been previously documented in the literature. Thus, this article argues that the level of digital competitiveness and the adoption of technology would significantly impact the level of perceived corruption, although this impact could be felt differently by countries in the high-income category compared to countries in the lower-level income category.

The purpose of this paper is to respond to an earlier article in the Journal of Documentation: The Cult of the “I”.

The method is a form of critical response.

Numerous problems regarding the The Cult of the “I” article are discussed.

This paper puts forward views about the iSchools Movement.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate “tribal” consumption behaviour and its relationship to branding, in the particular context of the surfing community in Portugal.

Two focus group meetings with “surfers” and “fans” respectively, in April 2006, were enriched by computerised projective techniques and program‐assisted design (PAD) technology, backed by high quality video prompts. Qualitative data analysis was enhanced by quantified data collected in the PAD phase. The design was expressly directed at future quantification and model building.

Four research propositions, derived from an extensive literature review, were mostly confirmed: surfing does exhibit characteristics of a cult. There are three distinct types of adherent, their associative behaviour characterized by affiliation, social recognition, socialization and symbolism. Surfers and fans exhibit strong brand awareness and less strong preferences for surf‐linked brands, in different ways.

Interpretation is limited by the scope of the study: two focus groups in one country. There is some compensation in the richness of the data.

Marketers involved with cult consumers and tribal brands need a body of knowledge on which to base their marketing intelligence gathering and strategic planning.

This paper provides exploratory research findings related to one classic example of the tribal brand‐consumption behaviour that accounts for significant consumer spending around the postmodern world.

Man has been seeking an ideal existence for a very long time. In this existence, justice, love, and peace are no longer words, but actual experiences. How ever, with the American preemptive invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq and the subsequent prisoner abuse, such an existence seems to be farther and farther away from reality. The purpose of this work is to stop this dangerous trend by promoting justice, love, and peace through a change of the paradigm that is inconsistent with justice, love, and peace. The strong paradigm that created the strong nation like the U.S. and the strong man like George W. Bush have been the culprit, rather than the contributor, of the above three universal ideals. Thus, rather than justice, love, and peace, the strong paradigm resulted in in justice, hatred, and violence. In order to remove these three and related evils, what the world needs in the beginning of the third millenium is the weak paradigm. Through the acceptance of the latter paradigm, the golden mean or middle paradigm can be formulated, which is a synergy of the weak and the strong paradigm. In order to understand properly the meaning of these paradigms, however, some digression appears necessary.

Man has been seeking an ideal existence for a very long time. In this existence, justice, love, and peace are no longer words, but actual experiences. How ever, with the American preemptive invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq and the subsequent prisoner abuse, such an existence seems to be farther and farther away from reality. The purpose of this work is to stop this dangerous trend by promoting justice, love, and peace through a change of the paradigm that is inconsistent with justice, love, and peace. The strong paradigm that created the strong nation like the U.S. and the strong man like George W. Bush have been the culprit, rather than the contributor, of the above three universal ideals. Thus, rather than justice, love, and peace, the strong paradigm resulted in in justice, hatred, and violence. In order to remove these three and related evils, what the world needs in the beginning of the third millenium is the weak paradigm. Through the acceptance of the latter paradigm, the golden mean or middle paradigm can be formulated, which is a synergy of the weak and the strong paradigm. In order to understand properly the meaning of these paradigms, however, some digression appears necessary.