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The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of financial market rules in protecting minorities.

The study compares two alternative disclosure rules on insider trading, namely, the market abuse directive (Directive 2004/72/EC), inspired from the United State (US) insider trading regulation enacted by the Sarbanes–Oxley act and the transparency directive enacted by the European (Directive 2004/109/EC) dealing with the crossing of the shareholding threshold. To investigate which one is more effective in signaling reserved information, and thus in reducing information asymmetry, the authors run an event study on the French context, where both regulations are adopted. The data were hand collected from the French stock exchange securities commissions during the two years following the implementation of the two regulations in 2004. The final sample consists of 363 insiders trading and 35 crossing shareholding thresholds for 10 top French firms during the period 2006-2007.

The results show that the French market reacts significantly to insider trading, but poorly to the crossing shareholding thresholds. Abnormal returns are greater after insider purchases than after crossing up thresholds. These findings support the superiority of the insider disclosure regulation, as it has better information content and provides better protection to minorities.

The study contributes to the corporate governance literature by comparing two disclosure-trading policies. The authors conclude that regulation of disclosure of insider trading along the lines of US disclosure rules is more informative to the market and thus more relevant and important than disclosure of cross-threshold trades.

The study contributes to the corporate governance literature by comparing two disclosure-trading policies. The authors conclude that regulation of disclosure of insider trading along the lines of US disclosure rules is more informative to the market and thus more relevant and important than disclosure of cross-threshold trades. This finding can be helpful for the securities lawmakers and regulators in the process of insider trading law enforcement.

Previous researchers approached the question of insider trading focusing on the identity of insiders. In the research, the authors address the question from another perspective, namely, the crossing of thresholds. Another methodological contribution of the study is the use of a market model that incorporates GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic) effect and time-varying systematic risk parameter (β), which is recommended to tackle the classical event study problem of detecting the exact timing of the event.

To examine how shareholding affects optimal profits, R&D innovation, NEV market scale and social welfare in two supply chain models with partial and cross ownership patterns.

The gradual retreat of government subsidies has directly weakened the financial support available to the stakeholders of new energy vehicles (NEVs). In this context, upstream and downstream enterprises of NEV are constantly seeking new business models of cooperation to achieve possible win-wins. NEV supply chain shareholding is an emerging new practice for such explorations. However, its performance in the NEV supply chain is seldom investigated. In this paper, we employ a Stackelberg game model to investigate how partial and cross-ownership affect the optimal decisions in a NEV supply chain.

Results showed that: (1) Compared with the unilateral shareholding model, the battery supplier will benefit from cross-ownership in the supply chain, while the NEV manufacturer will not necessarily benefit from it. At the same time, cross-ownership will bring the greatest incentive for battery R&D (2) Supply chain downstream competition will not necessarily lead to the improvement of the total consumption of NEVs or the level of battery design. Pareto improvement can be brought only when one of the manufacturers holds less than a certain equity threshold. In addition, downstream competition will also not necessarily bring more benefits to the battery supplier.

At present, NEV supply chain management has attracted widespread attention from scholars from all walks of life. Previous studies have been carried out that covers topics such as pricing strategies and optimal profits and the role of NEV in the sustainable development of the automotive industry supply chain, or disparate impacts of government subsidies and carbon emission regulation on supply chain members. However, as far as the authors know, compared with the new emerging NEV corporate practice, the shareholding phenomenon between upstream and downstream in the supply chain of NEV has not been studied in the existing studies.

The purpose of this paper is to describe and compare the different ways in which the shareholder disclosure requirements under the European Union Transparency Directive have been implemented in the UK, France, and Germany. Belgium and Luxembourg have not yet implemented the Directive.

The paper explains the categories of entities that must comply with reporting requirements, disclosure/reporting thresholds, categories of direct and indirect shareholdings to which these thresholds apply, and the reporting required methods of notification.

The paper finds that the new European rules broaden the categories of entities that must comply with the reporting requirements. In the UK, France and Germany, thresholds are calculated based on all shares or other financial instruments to which voting rights are attached and indirect holdings must be aggregated and separately identified. Additionally, Germany imposes further notification requirements with respect to options.

The paper provides a useful comparative analysis of new shareholder disclosure requirements in the UK, France, and Germany.

Marketing is a hot topic, and the purpose of this study is to investigate how shareholding strategies can be applied to achieve strategic synergy between firms in vertical supply chains to improve retailers’ marketing efforts from a long-term perspective.

This study constructs Stackelberg models to analyze the operating mechanisms of shareholding supply chains under forward, backward and cross-shareholding strategies. The authors analyze the effects of shareholding on prices, marketing efforts and profits, and explore the strategic preferences and outcomes of different supply chain members.

Forward/backward shareholding plays the same role as cross/nonshareholding in supply chains because the effect of the retailer’s shareholding is offset by the power status of the manufacturer, and the retailer can still profit when wholesale prices are higher than selling prices in certain cases. A manufacturer’s shareholding in a retailer can benefit consumers and improve marketing efforts by reducing retailers’ marketing costs, while a retailer’s shareholding in a manufacturer has no such effect. None of all shareholding strategies can coordinate the interests of all members; however, an effective rebate policy can resolve this problem.

The results reveal the operational mechanism of shareholding supply chains and provide reference values for managers who want to improve marketing efforts and economic performance using a shareholding strategy.

The paper examines the differential impact of various firm characteristics on firm value across various threshold levels of foreign ownership.

Using a panel of 408 Indian publicly listed companies for the period during 2010–2018, a fixed-effect panel threshold regression model is adapted to study the threshold effects between foreign ownership and firm value. Tobin's Q is used as a proxy for firm value.

The study identifies three threshold levels, that is, four threshold regions in which foreign ownership changes its slope considerably. Various firm characteristics impact firm value differently in these four regions.

The study employs observations of the past nine years on variables identified as firm characteristics impacting firm value. Some variables are dropped due to the problem of multicollinearity. The employed variables may not be exhaustive in nature.

The present study implies that there exists no impact of foreign ownership on the value of the firm. Foreign investors invest for financial considerations and not with the objective of governing the firms. The governance effect of foreign investments is negligible, so their activism in the firms needs to be encouraged.

The study employs a novel approach to study the impact of foreign ownership on firm value applying fixed effect panel data threshold regression, considering foreign ownership as a proxy of corporate governance.

This paper considers carbon abatement in a competitive supply chain that is composed of a manufacturer and two retailers under vertical shareholding. The authors emphasize the equilibrium decision problem of stakeholders under vertical shareholding and different power structures.

A game-theoretic approach was used to probe the influence of power structure and retailer competition on manufacturers' carbon abatement under vertical shareholding. The carbon abatement decisions, environmental imp4cacts (EIs) and social welfare (SW) of different scenarios under vertical shareholding are obtained.

The findings show that manufacturers are preferable to carbon abatement and capture optimal profits when shareholding is above a threshold under the retailer power equilibrium, but they may exert a worse negative impact on the environment. The dominant position of the held retailer is not always favorable to capturing the optimal SW and mitigating EIs. In addition, under the combined effect of competition level and shareholding, retailer power equilibrium scenarios are more favorable to improving SW and reducing EIs.

This paper inspects the combined influence of retailer competition and power structure on manufacturers' carbon abatement. Distinguishing from previous literature, the authors also consider the impact of vertical shareholding and consumer preferences. In addition, the authors analyze the SW and EIs in different scenarios.

Purpose – To investigate whether investor interest in climate issues affects the carbon behavior of the corporations in which they may invest (target corporations).

Methodology/approach – We developed the Finance and Climate Database, merging data on ownership, carbon disclosure, and investor climate interest from several sources, with 30,840 shareholder unit observations. We supplemented analysis of this with interviews.

Findings – Climate-interested investors (CIIs) account for well over a third of the ownership of the world’s very large corporations. More activist CIIs may make a difference to carbon behavior of target corporations where their shareholdings are large enough to enable them to exert power, at or above around 1.5 percent of a target company’s shares. Share price volatility also strongly affects carbon behavior, and the balance of power in investment presently favors the short term over the long term.

Research limitations/implications – More precise proxies for carbon interest and carbon behavior would benefit future research.

Social implications – There is potential for far greater influence by individual CIIs. The most important factor in shifting the balance of power from the short term to the long term would be global agreement on a carbon pricing system.

Originality/value of chapter – This is the first time such a database has been developed or used for this purpose.

Financial contagion refers to the propagation of shocks that can generate widespread failures. The authors apply a financial contagion model proposed by Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) to a cross-shareholding network of firms in Ecuador. The authors use a novel dataset to study the potential channels for contagion. Although diversification is not high, results reveal enough conditions for a contagion event to occur. However, the low level of integration attenuates the effects of shocks. The authors run simulations affecting a particular firm at the time, and find that two firms coming from the finance and trade industry cause the highest contagion. In addition, when an entire industry receives a shock, trade and manufacturing industries contagion more companies than the rest. Finally, the model can assist policymakers to monitor the market and evaluate the fragility of the network in different scenarios.

In this paper, we explore an extensive panel data set covering more than 4,000 listed firms in 16 European countries to study the effects of shareholder protection on ownership structure and firm performance. We document a negative firm-level correlation between shareholder protection and ownership concentration. Differentiating between shareholder types, we find that this pattern is mainly driven by strategic investors. In contrast, we find a positive correlation between shareholder protection and block ownership of institutional investors, in particular when we restrict the analysis to independent institutional investors. Finally, we find that independent institutional investors are positively associated with firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. The opposite applies for strategic investors. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that (i) high shareholder protection and (ii) limited ownership by strategic investors make small investors and investors interested in security returns more confident in their investments.

The paper seeks to present a novel conceptual framework that integrates the strategic dynamics of the firm with changes in its governance systems.

The agency research agenda is extended to include other corporate governance roles, such as resource and strategy functions, alongside monitoring and control functions. Theoretical arguments are supported by empirical data related to the founder‐manager/IPO, IPO/maturity, maturity/decline and reinvention thresholds.

The paper shows that corporate governance parameters may be linked to strategic thresholds in the firm's life‐cycle. Successful transition over a threshold is accompanied by a rebalancing in the structure and roles of corporate governance compared with each previous stage in the cycle.

In the absence of longitudinal data relating to firms as they pass through all life‐cycle stages the study has been restricted to reporting illustrative data from different studies regarding each strategic threshold. Further research might usefully undertake detailed long‐term case studies using a combination of archival and interview data to trace the evolution of firms across the four thresholds.

This paper develops a novel conceptual framework that integrates the strategic dynamics of the firm with changes in its governance systems. It rejects the notion of a universal governance template and argues that corporate governance parameters may be linked to transitions from one stage to another in the firm's life‐cycle. Accordingly, it argues that changes in a firm's strategic positioning may be associated with rebalancing between the wealth‐protection and wealth‐creation functions of governance.