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The China threat is the first and most obvious answer when it comes to the question of threat perception in Taiwan, but the issue encompasses much more. The ruling elite for years considered the subject population a threat, for example, and even the nature and severity of the China threat varies greatly depending on an individual’s identification. How do those who identify as Taiwanese see the consequences of an attack from China? There is a very different threat perception among the Taiwanese population, who view annexation by China in much the same way as their Mainlander counterparts would see annexation by Japan, for example. Persons self-identifying as Taiwanese do not view themselves as being culturally the same as the people across the Taiwan Strait, having grown apart from them (in a cultural sense) over the past 120 years that they have been separated. Moreover, after Taiwan’s long history of being colonized by one alien power after another – from the Dutch and Spanish, to Koxinga, and then the Manchu dynasty; by the Japanese; and finally by the KMT (for being colonized is how many Taiwanese perceive the ROC period) – finally the inhabitants of the island have the opportunity to chart their own future, and enjoy a newfound sovereignty and identity separate from that of any colonizing power: thus the prospect of being colonized by China is anathema, and therefore a much greater existential threat for them than for Mainlanders.

After Ma Yingjeou's re‐election in 2012, Mainland China and Taiwan will continue cooperation in economic fields. The purpose of this paper is to undertake research on a bilateral investment agreement (BIA) between Mainland China and Taiwan.

The paper uses statistics to demonstrate the growing cross‐strait investment and incompetent contemporary investment protection mechanisms in Mainland China and Taiwan. The paper also compares laws in Mainland China and Taiwan and the investment protection agreements concluded by Mainland and Taiwan with other countries, respectively.

Based on the similarities of current laws and the investment protection agreements concluded by Mainland China and Taiwan with other countries, respectively, Mainland China and Taiwan can possibility agree upon major provisions of a BIA. Solutions are provided to both macro and micro challenges against a successful BIA.

It is hard to predict whether the BIA will promote political integration between Mainland China and Taiwan in the near future.

A BIA can boost investors' confidence.

This paper may serve as a humble reference for both the Mainland China and Taiwan government when negotiating the BIA.

Cross‐strait investment is an important and prosperous field in practice, but has not been fully explored in literature thus far. This Article aims to fill this gap.

This chapter investigates the evolution of cross-strait economic relations and Asian regional integration and its implications for future development in the region. Trade and investment in Asia is fundamentally market-driven, and cross-border FDI is the major driving force. This investment-induced trade explained the cross-strait economic relations and intensive trade in intra-industry and intra-regional trade in Asia. The rise of China in 1990s with the assistance of Taiwanese firms further accelerated the trend of integration by forming regional production networks. However, after 2000 institutional arrangement like bilateral or plural-lateral FTA emerged to normalize and institutionalize the de facto economic integration. RCEP and TPP have evolved as the two major platforms for Asian regional cooperation with two key players, China and the United States, on each side. We argue that in the long run the win-win solution that the two platforms will further merge into FTAAP, which benefits all participants including China and the United States. However, in the short run, based on its 50 years of developmental experience, Taiwan can play an important role to promote and consolidate Asian regional integration as a technology provider and resource coordinator for the region and a risk buffer for entering Chinese market. We thus propose a roadmap for Taiwan and China to jointly participate in regional integration process. In the intermediate run, Asian economies need to change the structure toward more regional-centered trade in final goods through domestic consumption market in order to reduce the dependence on Western markets and mitigate any loss may arise from external shocks.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how the USA seeks to promote its interests in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait in the context of Taiwan’s unique political status and its democratic system.

A narrative analysis examines the recent history of Taiwan’s democratic development and USA responses to it.

The USA has responded in various ways to the dilemma of respecting the outcomes of elections in friendly democracies while protecting its own interests in peace and security. This was easy during the Ma Ying-jeou administration (2008-2016) but it is likely to become more difficult following Taiwan’s presidential election in January 2016.

This study draws on personal experience and an in-depth understanding of Taiwan politics and US diplomacy.

This paper focuses on the relationship between spontaneous business groups, such as the Taiwanese Businessmen Association (TBA), and the Chinese government.

In analysing the relationship between the TBAs and the Chinese government, this paper focuses on three cities, Tianjin, Kunshan and Dongguan. Furthermore it observes Taiwanese investment in mainland China from 1987 to 2004, in three sub‐periods: 1987‐1993, 1994‐1999, 2000‐2004. Statism (e.g. rational choice) appears to be a valid theoretical framework.

It was found that the Chinese government's changing interaction with Taiwanese businesses always suited their best interests at the time, which proves that the Chinese government applied rational module in interacting with Taiwanese businesses.

Rational choice is not a comprehensive approach in political science, but it is the most suitable approach to analyse the interaction between the Chinese government and Taiwanese businesses.

The first TBA was established in Beijing in 1990; nowadays there are over 100 TBAs in mainland China. It has been argued that TBAs can be seen as the emergence of a sort of civil society in mainland China; to others, they merely reflect the strong will of the Chinese government to attract foreign investment.

This paper demonstrates that Taiwanese businesses is a security asset for the Chinese government in the cross‐Strait relationship.