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From a financial stability viewpoint, this paper aims to study cyclical interdependencies arising from the cross-holding of securities in the Colombian financial system.

Cross-holding of securities in financial systems occurs when two financial institutions hold securities issued by each other or when more than two financial institutions hold securities issued by each other in a circular structure. Securities cross-holding is key for financial stability because of potential contagion arising from cyclical interdependencies in the connective architecture of financial systems. The presence of cyclical interdependencies is studied based on network analysis. The data set is a multilayer network that comprises bonds, certificates of deposit and equity issued and held by Colombian financial institutions from 2016 to 2019.

Results show that the extent of securities’ cyclical interdependencies is particularly low and stable – even when cross-holding across different types of securities is considered.

The monetary value of exposures and their size with respect to financial institutions’ balance sheets are not considered. Studying the impact on the financial system’s solvency is a compulsory research path.

The network topology suggests that increased potential contagion by cyclical interdependencies and feedback effects from securities cross-holding is rather limited.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first time that cyclical interdependencies arising from the securities cross-holding are studied. From a financial stability perspective, the methodology is general and promising for monitoring and analytical purposes.

This paper primarily uses statistical methods to establish financial early‐warning models that make it possible to predict, in advance, the probability of a company experiencing financial distress.

In its empirical analysis, this is the first study that attempts to use financial ratios and non‐financial ratios as variables to analyze business groups, and the present study uses the (K‐S tests), and (M‐U tests) and logit regressions model.

Financial ratio variables remain the primary variables for predicting corporate financial distress. Upon examining the predictor variables for corporate financial distress at one, two, and three years prior to distress, it was found that financial ratio variables were the main ones at one and two years prior to distress, while at three years prior to distress there was one financial ratio variable and two ownership structure variables that showed significant differences. Financial structure, solvency, profitability, and cash flow indicators are the principal financial ratio variables. Ratios of director and supervisor ownership stakes after pledging of shares differed significantly between financially distressed and non‐distressed companies. Establishing independent directors and supervisors can lower the likelihood of financial distress.

As the time remaining before occurrence of financial distress grows shorter, test results show that the number of financial ratios with significant differences goes up. But the longer the time that remains before occurrence of financial distress, the more the financial ratios show non‐significant differences. That is why a number of scholars hold that the longer the period under study, the less explanatory power it has.

The mean contribution of this paper is that establishing independent directors and supervisors can lower the likelihood of financial distress. The paper is useful to researchers or practitioners who are focused on financial risk management and corporate governance implementation.

Financial contagion refers to the propagation of shocks that can generate widespread failures. The authors apply a financial contagion model proposed by Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) to a cross-shareholding network of firms in Ecuador. The authors use a novel dataset to study the potential channels for contagion. Although diversification is not high, results reveal enough conditions for a contagion event to occur. However, the low level of integration attenuates the effects of shocks. The authors run simulations affecting a particular firm at the time, and find that two firms coming from the finance and trade industry cause the highest contagion. In addition, when an entire industry receives a shock, trade and manufacturing industries contagion more companies than the rest. Finally, the model can assist policymakers to monitor the market and evaluate the fragility of the network in different scenarios.

To examine how shareholding affects optimal profits, R&D innovation, NEV market scale and social welfare in two supply chain models with partial and cross ownership patterns.

The gradual retreat of government subsidies has directly weakened the financial support available to the stakeholders of new energy vehicles (NEVs). In this context, upstream and downstream enterprises of NEV are constantly seeking new business models of cooperation to achieve possible win-wins. NEV supply chain shareholding is an emerging new practice for such explorations. However, its performance in the NEV supply chain is seldom investigated. In this paper, we employ a Stackelberg game model to investigate how partial and cross-ownership affect the optimal decisions in a NEV supply chain.

Results showed that: (1) Compared with the unilateral shareholding model, the battery supplier will benefit from cross-ownership in the supply chain, while the NEV manufacturer will not necessarily benefit from it. At the same time, cross-ownership will bring the greatest incentive for battery R&D (2) Supply chain downstream competition will not necessarily lead to the improvement of the total consumption of NEVs or the level of battery design. Pareto improvement can be brought only when one of the manufacturers holds less than a certain equity threshold. In addition, downstream competition will also not necessarily bring more benefits to the battery supplier.

At present, NEV supply chain management has attracted widespread attention from scholars from all walks of life. Previous studies have been carried out that covers topics such as pricing strategies and optimal profits and the role of NEV in the sustainable development of the automotive industry supply chain, or disparate impacts of government subsidies and carbon emission regulation on supply chain members. However, as far as the authors know, compared with the new emerging NEV corporate practice, the shareholding phenomenon between upstream and downstream in the supply chain of NEV has not been studied in the existing studies.

The purpose of this paper is to study the ownership‐liquidity relation in the context of the Tunisian Stock Exchange.

In particular, the paper examines two empirical relationships: the relationship between ownership concentration and stock liquidity and the relationship between the separation of ownership from control and market liquidity.

The empirical findings verify that the structure of ownership remains concentrated in the majority of the Tunisian firms. It is found that stock liquidity decreases significantly with concentrated ownership. Different devices are used to gain control and hence a significant separation of ownership from control affects liquidity in different ways. The results indicate that pyramidal structures have a significant negative impact on liquidity for all controlled firms. However, for family firms, non‐voting shares increase liquidity for minority shareholders by reducing the probability of informed trading.

Overall, this study reports that non‐voting shares may be a liquidity enhancing device for family firms.

The objective of this study is to understand the linkages among executive compensation, corporate governance and performance of the Indian family and non-family firms. Further, the study also analyzes the level of shareholding pattern of the Indian family firms on their performance and the executive compensation.

The authors have collected panel data of the companies listed on the National Stock Exchange of India Limited. The data set consists of 284 companies (both family and non-family) for the period 2005–2014. The authors have made use of a dynamic panel data model with generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation to formulate the hypotheses and used fixed-effects regression model to check the robustness of our findings.

The authors find support for the agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory in the paper. Specifically, variables related to executive compensation, corporate governance (board size, proportion of independent directors on board, chief executive officers duality and other directorships held by the executive directors outside the company), firm performance (Tobin’s Q), leverage and shareholding pattern of the family are significant in this study.

The study has practical implications for all stakeholders of the family and non-family firms, especially in the emerging market economies. It can be used as a reference guide by various other stakeholders of the family firms, viz., customers, educators, tax authorities, government and society.

The authors confirm that their research is original and provides valuable insights on the Indian family firms. The authors study cross-holding of directorships, inter alia, in the Indian family business groups. As most of the previous studies in the Indian context ignored this important aspect, this study is unique in nature.

The purpose of this paper was to determine to what extent Hong Kong’s experience proves (or disproves) theories from corporate governance in the areas of family ownership, concentration, self-dealing in Hong, executive compensation and other issues. This paper – written in the comparative corporate governance tradition – uses data from Hong Kong to discuss wider trends and issues in the corporate governance literature.

The authors use the comparative corporate governance approach – exposing a range of corporate governance theories to the light of Hong Kong data. The authors purposely avoid over-theorising – leaving the data to speak for themselves for other researchers interested in such theorising.

The authors find that Hong Kong presents corporate challenges that are unique among upper-income jurisdictions – in terms of potentially harmful (shareholder value diminishing) family relationships, shareholder concentration and self-dealing by insiders. The authors also show that excessive executive compensation, accounting and audit weaknesses do not pose the same kinds of problems they do in other countries. The authors provide numerous comments on theoretical papers throughout the presentation in this paper.

The authors chose a relatively unused research approach that eschews theory building – instead, the authors use data from a range of sectors to build an overall picture of corporate governance in Hong Kong. The authors subsequently affirm or critique the theories of others in this paper.

The original analysis conducted by the authors provided 22 recommendations for revising listing rules for Hong Kong’s stock exchange. Others – particularly Asian officials – should consider Hong Kong’s experience when revising their own corporate governance listing rules and regulations.

This paper offers new and original insights in four directions. First, the authors use the empiricist’s method – presenting data from a wide range of corporate governance areas to comment on and critique existing studies. Second, the authors provide a system-wide view of corporate governance – showing how different parts of corporate governance rules work together using concrete data. Third, the authors provide a new study in the comparative corporate governance tradition – another brick in the wall that is “normal scientific progress”. Fourth, the authors pose tentative resolutions to highly debated questions in corporate governance for the specific time and place of Hong Kong in the early 2010s.

This article attempts to answer the following questions: Who ultimately owns firms listed in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries? Does ownership structure depend on the institutional context? How does ownership affect firm performance? Do institutional factors influence the ownership–performance relationship?

We apply univariate analyses and generalised methods of moments estimations for a sample of 692 GCC listed firms during 2009–2015.

Our results reveal that corporations are mainly controlled by the state or families, the ownership structure is highly concentrated and pyramid structures are common in the region. Ownership is more concentrated in non-financial than financial firms, and ownership concentration and shareholder identity differ by institutional country setting. Finally, ownership concentration does not influence performance, but formal institutions play a moderating role in the relationship.

As our findings reveal potential type II agency problems due to ownership concentration, policymakers should raise awareness of professional corporate governance practices and tailor them to GCC countries’ institutional contexts.

Even with the introduction of new regulations by some GCC states to protect minority investors and promote corporate governance practices, ownership concentration is a rigid structure, and its use by investors to protect their economic endowment and power is culturally embedded.

Although previous studies have analysed ownership concentration and large shareholders’ identities across countries, this study fills a research gap investigating this phenomenon in-depth in emerging economies.

The purpose of this paper is to synthesize empirical results relating to antecedents influencing differences in performance between business group (BG) affiliated firms and independent firms in emerging economies.

A metanalysis was conducted in this research in which samples were collected, and a continuous data set for figuring the differentiation between group and non-group variables was selected and analyzed. These variables included performance, diversification, ownership characteristics, firm characteristics and group characteristics.

The research presents a set of hypotheses from a model that shows the influences of factors moderating the differences between the performance of BG affiliates and independent firms, including governance and the kinds of strategic choices which these firms make. Four of the five hypotheses were totally supported, showing the importance of differentiating affiliates’ and independent firms’ performance in terms of ownership concentration, dividend payout, leverage, R&D, as well as diversification and a firm’s age and size.

The study focused its research on an examination of pyramid and cross-holding groups in order to reveal the role of the core firms. It also examines ownership concentration, as well as internal relationships with capital structure, and the effect which these have on firm performance, in order to further understand the relationship among BGs, corporate governance and performance in emerging-market economies.

This study aims to explore the corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) practices of the Islamic banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries during the period 2010-2014 and examines the determinants of CSRD and its effects on firm value.

Based on the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions Governance Standard No. 7 guidelines and using content analysis, the paper develops a comprehensive CSRD index for GCC Islamic banks. The study applies ordinary least squares regression analysis for hypothesis testing and for finding determinants of respective dependent variables.

The results show a very low level of CSRD among the sample Islamic banks in GCC countries. When using corporate governance characteristics to examine the determinants of CSRD, this study provides evidence of a significant positive association between board size and CSRD practice in Islamic banks and a significant negative relationship of chief executive officer (CEO) duality with CSRD, as per expectation. For the economic consequences of CSRD, the study documents an inverse performance effect of CSRD while board size, board composition and CEO duality indicate significant positive effects on firm value.

The relatively small sample size of GCC Islamic banks may limit the application of the findings to other Islamic financial institutions such as Takaful and the Islamic unit trust company.

The findings of this study initiate the global debate on the need for corporate governance reform in Islamic banks by providing insights on the role played by corporate governance mechanisms in encouraging and enhancing CSRD practices among Islamic banks. The findings also have important implications for investors, managers, regulatory bodies, policymakers and Islamic banks in the GCC countries.

The results of the study do not support the idea that Islamic banks operating on Islamic principles can meet their social responsibilities through promoting corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and by differentiating themselves from non-Islamic banks.

This is the first study to examine the determinants of CSRD in GCC Islamic banks using comprehensive CSRD and corporate governance variables and, therefore, adds value to the existing CSR literature in banking.