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The purpose of the chapter is to specify effects of crises and to evaluate their influence on growth and development of socio-economic systems.

The authors use the method of regression analysis, with the help of which dependence on growth of the global GDP of various indicators that reflect crisis effects is determined. The information and analytical basis of the research is statistical materials of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Timeframe of the research covers 2007–2016. The research is performed at the level of global economy on the whole for provision of representativeness of data and authenticity of results.

It is determined that influence of crisis on socio-economic system is expressed in short-term, mid-term, and long-term periods, including the next phase of economic cycle (phase of rise). Growth and development of economy after crisis are predetermined by its influence – crisis creates in a socio-economic system the environment that makes economic subject and state regulators cooperate and stimulate more active state support for society and business. Comprehensive study of the wave of economic cycle allows determining crisis as an impulse for development of economy, which expands its traditional negative treatment as a source of recession. It is also shown that crisis leads not only to financial (reduction of total savings in economy) but also social (growth of unemployment rate) and other – e.g., ecological (post-crisis increase of the share of renewable energy in the structure of production of electric energy) – effects in the economic system.

It is substantiated that influence of crises on growth and development of socio-economic systems is contradictory. On the one hand, crisis leads to temporary decline of GDP and slows down the development of socio-economic systems. On the other hand, crisis opens new possibilities for further growth and development of these systems, preventing their stagnation.

This study aims to analyze the returns obtained from companies with strong growth potential (growth stocks) and the returns from companies with quite low stock prices, but with high value (value stocks).

The sample comprises monthly data, from January 2002 to December 2016, from seven countries, Germany, France, Switzerland, the UK, Portugal, the USA and Japan. The authors have used linear regression models for three different periods, the pre-crisis, subprime crisis and post-crisis period.

The results point out that the performance of value and growth stocks differs from different periods surrounding the global financial crisis. In fact, for six countries, value stocks outperformed growth stocks in the period that precedes the subprime crisis and during the crisis, this tendency remained only for France, Portugal and Japan. This trend changed in the period following the crisis. The results also show that investor sentiment has a robust significance in value and growth stock returns, mostly in the period before the crisis, highlighting that the investor sentiment is more significant in the moments that the value stocks outperformed.

As far as the authors know, this is the first work that, taking into account the future research lines of Capaul et al. (1993), investigates whether the results obtained by those authors remain current, meeting the authors’ challenge and covering the gap of recent studies on the performance of value and growth stocks. Besides, the authors have introduced a new country, heavily punished by both the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis to understand whether there are significant differences in investment styles and whether this is related to the different economies. Also, in this context, the authors were pioneers in adding investor sentiment as an exogenous variable in the influence of stock returns.

The purpose of this paper is to test whether financial crises themselves provide some degree of ex post discipline. In other words, is there learning from the mistakes associated with crises? The authors test this hypothesis on credit growth, a frequent contributor to banking crises.

The study uses statistical tests (comparison of means) on a sample of 72 banking crises, the onset of which occurred between 1980 and 2008. Tests for significance of the difference are conducted using Kolmogorov–Smirnov equality in distribution tests.

The results show that real credit growth fell substantially (relative to average) by about 8 per cent points from pre- to post-crisis periods, and that average banking regulation and supervision strengthens after a crisis.

This paper provides empirical support for the proposition that while financial markets may fail to give sufficient warning signals before a financial crisis, they may discipline governments to undertake reforms in the aftermath of a crisis.

Post-crisis policy measures in Asia have focussed on banking sector and market reform. The paper argues that in order to propel growth, banking and market reform in Asia must be undertaken with the view that they are not mutually exclusive competitive tradeoffs. Rather banks and markets must be viewed as complementary supportive pillars in a financial system. Additionally, legal and functional reform must be undertaken simultaneously. The paper proposes that a likely consequence of doing so will enable creating a four-pillared multi-dimensional growth paradigm in the region to help restore and promote growth.

The purpose of this research is to examine the growth rates of commercial banks and credit unions around the financial crisis and recovery. Credit unions are analyzed as a group and by field of membership. Specifically, this research analyzes the growth rates of assets, deposits, and loans.

This research employs univariate tests of differences to examine the median growth rates for commercial banks and credit unions. Unbalanced pool regressions analyze growth rates during the pre-crisis, crisis, and recovery periods, controlling for size, net charge-offs, and unemployment.

Univariate test results that control for size show that banks grow at faster rates than credit unions for most of the pre-crisis years. However, medium sized credit unions grow at faster rates for most of the crisis and recovery years. Results of unbalanced pool regressions suggest that, overall, credit unions grow at slower rates than do banks. However, during the crisis and recovery, credit union growth is significantly greater than that of banks, after controlling for net charge-offs, size, and unemployment. Credit union growth varies by field of membership type.

Although a large volume of research examines commercial bank performance around the financial crisis, only a few papers assess the performance of credit unions. And very few papers compare commercial banks and credit unions. This paper explores how the recent financial crisis influenced the growth of commercial banks and credit unions from 2005 to 2013.

The purpose of this paper is to explore potential drivers of high-growth intentions of early-stage entrepreneurs in Greece before and after the onset of the financial crisis of 2008.

To this end, the authors use individual-level data retrieved from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor annual surveys (2003-2015).

The results show that high-growth intentions of Greek entrepreneurs are driven by different factors in the crisis compared to the non-crisis period. Male entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs with significant work experience seem to be more likely to be engaged in growth-oriented new ventures during the crisis period. The same appears to hold for entrepreneurs who are motivated by an opportunity and also perceive future business opportunities in adverse economic conditions. On the other hand, the educational level and the social contacts of founders with other entrepreneurs are found to drive ambitious Greek entrepreneurship in the years before the crisis, while they were insignificant after the crisis outbreak.

Based on the concept of ambitious entrepreneurship, this study contributes to the literature by investigating the determinants of entrepreneurial high-growth expectations in the Greek context emphasizing the crisis period in comparison to the pre-crisis years.

This study aims to investigate the influence of systemic banking crises, currency crises and global financial crisis on the relationship between export and economic growth in China by using the annual time series data from the period of 1972 to 2014.

The Johansen and Jeuuselius’ cointegration, auto regressive distributed lag bound testing cointegration, Gregory and Hansen’s cointegration and pooled ordinary least square techniques with error correction model have been used.

Results indicate the positive and significant effect of export of goods and services on economic growth in both long and short run, whereas the negative influence of systemic banking crises and currency crises over economic growth is observed. It is also concluded that the impact of export of goods and service on economic growth becomes insignificant in the presence of systemic banking crises and currency crises. The currency crises effect the influence of export on economic growth to a higher extent compared to systemic banking crises. Surprisingly, the export in the period of global financial crises has a positive and significant influence over economic growth in China, which conclude that the global financial crises did not drastically affect the export-growth nexus.

This paper makes a unique contribution to the literature with reference to China, being a pioneering attempt to investigate the effects of systemic banking crises and currency crises on the relationship of export and economic growth by using long-time series data and applying more rigorous econometric techniques.

This paper examines the relationship between entrepreneurs' internality of causal attributions and firm growth during an economic crisis. We propose a U-shaped relationship between the two variables, arguing that the highest-growth entrepreneurs are those with either the highest or lowest levels of internal attribution (IA) during such periods.

To test our hypothesis, we analyze a database of 804 interviews with entrepreneurs in Brazil during a period of economic stress. Due to the existence of endogeneity, we estimate a model of simultaneous equations in two stages.

We find evidence of a U-shaped relationship. This means that during economic stress, the fastest-growing entrepreneurs are those who rely more on their own effort (high IA) and those who attribute their success to the economic crisis (low IA).

Tailoring interventions based on attribution patterns and recognizing the U-shaped relationship ensures effective support during economic stress. Entrepreneurial support programs should align with internality levels, emphasizing external awareness or skill development accordingly. Policymakers should take attributions into account when promoting financial resilience. Entrepreneurs would benefit from awareness programs on attributions for reflective decision-making. Ecosystems should foster collaboration by recognizing diverse attributions, enhancing a collective understanding of entrepreneurial responses in crises.

Our results have important implications for understanding the role of entrepreneurs in economic crises. Our results are relevant because they challenge the usual claim that entrepreneurs with high IA are the ones who perform better in situations where external economic conditions are adverse.

In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the performance of the Chinese construction industry seems to be more successful, especially in total factor productivity growth (TFPG) and its contribution (TFPGC). Hence, the purpose of this paper is to investigate and reveal the potential successful lessons in this regard.

This study is conducted innovatively based on a special comparative analysis of TFPG and TFPGC between pre- and post-2008 financial crisis. Solow Residual Approach is used to measure TFPG and TFPGC for the period 2002–2016. Given that the crisis hit China at the end of 2008, the pre-2008 financial crisis period is from 2002 to 2008, and the post-2008 financial crisis period is limited to 2009–2016.

The results indicate that the industry indeed has better performance in promoting TFPG and TFPGC, TFP thus achieved significant accumulative growth before and after the crisis. However, from an evolutionary perspective, both TFPG and TFPGC presented an overall downward trend from before the crisis to after the crisis. Further, the game between the centrally planned economy and the market-oriented economy was identified and revealed as the essential reason behind the evolution of TFPG and TFPGC.

Some valuable lessons for policies and practices in promoting TFPG and TFPGC were summarized and learned from the Chinese experience, such as reducing administrative intervention and making the construction market play a decisive role.

This study provides some new empirical evidence to enrich the overall body of knowledge on growth theory, especially in promoting TFPG and TFPGC.