Search results

Both consumer and corporate credit ratings agencies played a major role in the US subprime mortgage crisis. Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion deployed a formalized scoring system to assess individuals in mortgage origination, mortgage pools then were assessed for securitization by Moody's, S&P, and Fitch relying on expert judgment aided by formal models. What can we learn about the limits of formalization from the crisis? We discuss five problems responsible for the rating failures – reactivity, endogeneity, learning, correlated outcomes, and conflict of interest – and compare the way consumer and corporate rating agencies tackled these difficulties. We conclude with some policy lessons.

Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to explore the voluntary corporate governance role played by credit rating agencies, closing the ‘trust at a distance’ gap which might otherwise hinder fundraising in debt capital markets.

Methodology/approach – The chapter draws on Giddens’ system trust theory and Foucauldian perspectives of knowledge/power to unpack trust production as a discursive process in financial markets. Foucauldian discourse analytic techniques are used to examine texts deployed by or about Standard & Poor's, the global credit rating agency, leading up to the 2007 credit crunch.

Findings – The texts analysed illustrate the influence of rating agencies in producing trust as well as mistrust in debt instruments.

Research limitations/implications – Rating agencies produce trust by aligning with state regulatory systems, simplifying complex debt instruments with ‘AAA’ and other well-known mnemonics, as well as offering apparent transparency and guarantees.

Practical implications – While influential, rating agencies can only produce trust by proxy. Their contribution to the actual protection of investments is minimal.

Social implications – The analysis highlights the flawed nature of trust relations in debt capital markets as rating agencies’ primary customers are the arrangers and issuers of debt rather than the investors who seek protection from risk.

Originality/value – The chapter sheds light on the deliberate nature of trust production in financial markets. Five trust/mistrust production practices are introduced – protecting, guaranteeing, aligning, making visible and simplifying. Strategic trust production is established as part of corporate governance ideology in financial markets.

In July 2008 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) published three proposals relating to the use of credit ratings in its rules and forms. The proposals were designed to address concerns that the misuse of credit ratings may have contributed to the current crisis. The SEC sought market feedback regarding the effect the removal of credit rating references may produce on the markets.

This article examines the use of ratings by various market constituents, analyzes the details of the SEC proposals, and reviews the provided feedback. The main finding is that the majority of the market participants opposed the SEC proposals. Fiduciaries and regulated entities are looking to regulators to offer a common measure of risk, stable, accurate and free of conflict of interests.

We study the information content of issuer credit rating changes announced by a group of six Chinese credit rating agencies. We conduct an event study, and we use multivariate regression analyses to identify factors driving abnormal stock returns. Our results confirm prior findings for Western countries that downgrades are associated with significant negative abnormal returns. However, upgrades and positive or negative rating outlooks do not seem to have information content. While we cannot find differences in information content conditional on which rating agency issues the downgrade, we find that abnormal returns may vary with the target firm’s industry. In addition, the magnitude of stock price reactions to rating downgrades seems to be related to the business cycle to some extent. With respect to the role of the industry in explaining the information content of rating changes, our results may be biased due to small sample size. Nevertheless, they illustrate that the role the industry plays in explaining investor behavior may deserve special attention in future research. Our findings imply that new rating information seems to be processed quickly in the Chinese stock market, and that market reactions to rating signals are largely in line with what has been observed for Western stock markets. Both observations lend credibility to observable stock prices. The chapter sheds new light on the relevance of Chinese credit rating agencies from an equity investor’s perspective and confirms similarities between the Chinese and Western stock markets with respect to the way rating signals are processed by investors.

This chapter examines the central role played by credit rating agencies in the production of “knowledge” about financial instruments. That “knowledge,” in the form of credit ratings, underpinned disintermediation in mortgage markets by giving investors confidence that they knew the risk-and-return properties of otherwise opaque collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and mortgage-backed securities. Credit ratings helped to “standardize” structured financial products and create liquid markets. However, this cognitive machinery failed and liquidity collapsed during the current crisis. I use this failure to examine the role of institutionalized cognition in the production of market liquidity.

This chapter differentiates the effect of solicited credit ratings (SCRs) and unsolicited credit ratings (UCRs) on bank leverage decision before and after the credit rating change. We find that banks with UCRs issue less debt relative to equity when the credit rating changes are approaching. Such findings are also prominent when bank credit rating moves from investment grade to speculative grade. After credit rating upgrades (downgrades), banks with unsolicited (solicited) credit ratings are inclined to issue more (less) debt relative to equity than those with solicited (unsolicited) credit ratings. We conclude that SCR and UCR changes lead to significantly different effects on bank leverage decision.

With the help of financial engineering – and equipped with the modern technique of risk management – securitisation was supposed to identify and evaluate risks and parcel them out to informed parties who could bear them. In hindsight, we can see that this somewhat simplistic thesis – espoused by market participants as well as the academic promoters of modern techniques of risk management – seemed to promise a great deal more than it could ultimately deliver. At this juncture, however, the danger of regulatory over-reaction – which might be throwing the baby (financial innovation) out with the bath-water (overlooking/under-pricing of risk) – is very real and (in my view) calls for policy measures of this sort should be resisted firmly not only by market participants but also by regulators. This is not to say that regulation should be seen as immune from responsibility in the unfolding of the current credit crisis (quite the opposite would more likely be closer to the truth). As we shall see below (Section “Financial Crisis and Credit Ratings Debacle in SF”), the best risk-management practices – and related tools available before the crisis – provided enough ammunition to caution against the uncertainty surrounding risk assessment for some categories of SF products. However, the increasing complexity embedded in an increasing number of deals did provide genuine new challenges even to best risk-management practices.

Existing financial market architectures combine astonishing complexity with tight coupling, making them prone to systemic crises or “normal accidents” and placing extraordinary demands on regulation. In light of this, we consider two routes for regulatory reform. A “high modernist” possibility attempts to regulate financial markets as currently designed. This path means not only increasing the capacities of regulators and rating agencies to estimate complex risks, but also designing systems that can manage more radical forms of uncertainty through learning and bargaining. We consider a series of proposals and challenges that lie down this path. An alternative possibility takes seriously the notion that regulation constitutes markets and uses the current crisis to rethink market architectures themselves, especially their complexity and tight coupling. Preventing failures from spiraling into systemic crises may involve using regulation first, to simplify financial products and their interconnectedness, and second, to create redundancies or hedge bets through specialized financial subsectors organized around alternative principles, including recapitalized community banks, credit unions, mutuals, and public financial institutions.