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The theoretical understanding of CSR is caught on the horns of the dilemma between the ethical and instrumental approaches. The strategic turn in CSR has brought the dilemma to a new head. The purpose of this paper is to develop a novel argumentative strategy to address the dilemma.

The paper weaves together the insights from the literatures on sociological institutionalism, organization theory, business ethics and institutional economics to elaborate the distinction between CSR communication and CSR action that is actually undertaken and visible to stakeholders. This distinction is at the core of the “hypocrisy avoidance” approach which puts the above dilemma in a new light.

According to the “hypocrisy avoidance” approach, the CSR communication constitutes a competitive arena where corporations are looking for reputational gains. Competitive pressures give rise to an inflationary dynamics of the CSR communication which consequently runs up against credibility problems. These problems are addressed by the real CSR policies which legitimate the corporate employment of the CSR communication as an instrument of competition.

The theoretical dilemma between the ethical and instrumental approaches manifests itself in the justification of skepticism toward CSR communication. This skepticism, which may be to the detriment of a corporation’s license to operate, may turn out to be a driving force of CSR action.

Despite the charges of corporate hypocrisy, CSR communication may play a role in the alleviation of business-society tensions. This role is however subject to two limitations. First, if CSR communication is used as instrument of competition, it is unlikely to translate into CSR action perfectly. Second, corporations would likely prioritize more visible CSR actions over less visible ones.

The novel implication of the “hypocrisy avoidance” approach is that CSR actions present credible commitments or “hostages” enabling the productive interaction between corporations and their stakeholders. This implication integrates some of the components of the ethical and instrumental approaches, while drawing inspiration from the institutional economics and institutional ethics literatures.

I integrate several literatures on how networks relate to firms and markets. While the logic of strong ties (based on mutual goodwill, trust, and commitment) is distinct from the style of interaction classically associated with hierarchical firms and free markets, such ties in fact depend on the legal environments constituted by firm and market. A key role is played by credible commitments to refrain from exercising rights to control others and exit relationships with them. But since such commitments to employees conflict with commitments to contractors, strong ties may be prevalent internally or externally, but not in both simultaneously.

The international linkages between money stocks (and inflation rates) has received much attention. Focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Fixed rate systems require credible commitments to the rules of the game by the central banks involved. Credible commitment can be achieved through cooperative (symmetric) or coercive (asymmetric) regimes. Did the USA (Germany) dominate other developed (European) countries during the Bretton Woods (European Monetary) system? Examines the linkages, if any, between the USA (German) money stock and money stocks in other developed (European) countries, using the cointegration and error‐correction methodology. Finds evidence that USA (German) money stock did affect other (European) countries′ money stocks during fixed exchange rates. Finds, also, reverse causality which raises serious questions about either the dominance of the USA (Germany) within the Bretton Woods (European Monetary) system, or the usefulness of causality tests is answering such questions.

This paper specifically seeks to explore the contribution of extended TCE‐reasoning to our understanding of intended change in management control in interfirm transactional relationships.

The approach is theoretical of nature. After having outlined the essentials of TCE‐reasoning and having critically reviewed the extant TCE‐contribution to research in management control, this paper extends TCE‐reasoning by incorporating the notion of trust into the analysis. Different sources of trust as well as the management control related impacts of trust are explored.

The paper develops propositions that, in the context of an interfirm transactional relationship, confront choices for alternative management control patterns with situational and institutional features.

The paper particularly covers the overt instrumental level of management control in interfirm transactional relationships. Although the paper covers relational aspects, it does not provide a strong theory of the working of “soft controls”.

An explanation of intended change could help practitioners to improve decision making at the level of their organizations.

The paper contributes to the extant knowledge by exploring the scope of TCE with regard to choices in the (re)design of management control patterns in interfirm transactional relationships.

The purpose of this paper is to contrast and to connect a transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective and an actor‐network theory (ANT) perspective on control of interfirm transactional relationships.

The paper outlines two theoretical perspectives on interfirm control: an ostensive TCE perspective and a performative ANT perspective. By contrasting these perspectives the different assumptions of each perspective are highlighted. By connecting them, potentially interacting research approaches become visible.

Ostensive research and performative research may be two sides of the same coin. Ostensive TCE‐based research produces intentional explanations for the choice of certain control structures, while performative research exposes the mobilization of control structures in specific episodes from practice. Interaction between the two potentially accelerates and enhances knowledge production on control in interfirm relationships. TCE‐based ostensive research produces conceptualizations that can be followed as actors, thus enabling a demonstration of their enactment. Conversely, ANT‐based research may challenge the stability of (con)text as it is perceived in TCE‐based research.

The paper offers a base for multi‐paradigm research into control of interfirm transactional relationships. Specifically, the paper offers a base for connecting TCE‐informed research and ANT‐informed research into interfirm control.

While supply chain management concepts are receiving increasing attention in literature and practice, the supply chain management philosophy is supported by a limited theoretical base. The industrial organisation literature related to the advantages, disadvantages and applications of vertical integration and obligational contracts is explored. The industrial organisation literature regarding vertical integration and obligational contracts is related to supply chain management. The advantages and disadvantages which supply chain management shares with vertical integration and obligational contracts are discussed. It is concluded that supply chain management is a way of combining many of the advantages of vertical integration and obligational contracts, while overcoming some of their disadvantages. Using the industrial organisation literature and findings from two case studies, prerequisites are developed for supply chain management, and three competitive situations are described. Supply chain management holds promise as a competitive form, provided that certain hazards are avoided, and that a competitive advantage results.

There exists a tremendous number of studies in strategy and management journals concerning contracting issues between private firms. Those studies are usually grounded in competing theoretical frameworks such as transaction cost economics, the resource-based view of the firm, incentive and agency theories and few others. However, very few studies, especially in those reviews (this is also true to a lesser extent in economic journals), are concerned with the issue of contracting between private firm and government. This is particularly surprising since existing theoretical frameworks qualified to tackle contracting strategies between private firms can also provide insights into issues related to contracting with government.

A somewhat underappreciated aspect of the burgeoning rush to regional trade agreements (RTAs) is a discrepancy between the dispute settlement procedure (DSP) embodied in the original World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and that found in the language of many RTAs. This chapter explores the issue in the context of a dynamic repeated game of trade agreements. As is well known, the institutional alternatives available in negotiating multilateral freer trade agreements – regional agreements, side agreements, trade dispute settlement punishments, and so on – can proscribe the limits and shape the nature of self-enforcing trade agreements. Here, we suggest the extent to which deviations from the WTO DSP embodied in RTAs – for example, “private interest access,” “third party procedures,” and “choice of forum” – can not only work against the interests of “weaker parties” but furthermore undermine multilateral agreements closer to free trade.

Aims to examine the issue of industrial strategy (IS), paying particular attention to the case of Britain. Sets out to assess the possibility and nature of an industrial strategy for Britain, in Europe, and within the global scene, taking into account the world we live in as we see it. Accordingly, the perspective is driven and shaped by a quest for a realistic, feasible and sustainable industrial strategy. In order to achieve these objectives, first examines the theoretical arguments behind much of British, and more generally, Western industrial policies. Following this, outlines and assesses British industrial policy post‐Second World War then compares and contrasts British industrial policy with that of Europe, the USA, Japan and the newly industrialized countries. Then examines recent developments in economics and management which may explain the “Far Eastern” miracle, and points to the possibility of a successful, narrowly self‐interested, IS for Europe and Britain, based on the lessons from (new) theory and international experience. To assess what is possible, develops a theoretical framework linking firms in their roles as consumers and/or electors. This hints at the possibilities and limits of feasible policies. All these ignore desirability which, in the author′s view, should be seen in terms of distributional considerations, themselves contributors to sustainability. Accordingly, discusses a desirable industrial strategy for Britain in Europe which accounts for distributional considerations, and goes on to examine its implications for the issue of North‐South convergence. Concludes by pointing to the limitations of the analysis and to directions for developments.