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Case study
Publication date: 21 August 2020

Craig Lowman, Mikael Samuelsson and Geoff Bick

The learning outcomes of this paper are as follows: to critically assess and analyse public and private funding options and determine which private option is best suited to a…

Abstract

Learning outcomes

The learning outcomes of this paper are as follows: to critically assess and analyse public and private funding options and determine which private option is best suited to a company (finance – decision-making). To calculate the internal rate of return (IRR) of a project (finance – analytical). To critically assess the underlying structures of traditional and new industries (Strategy/BMI – analytical). To analyse the challenges and disruption potential of intermediated industries (Strategy/BMI – analytical).

Case overview/synopsis

The Triggerfish case looks at how films are funded in South Africa. The company is currently funding films mostly through government channels, but CEO Stuart Forrest would prefer to independently and privately fund their projects. The case looks at what returns can be expected by investors in film through the “recoupment waterfall” – the means whereby the producers and investors of a film recoup their investments and earn returns. The investment horizons of select private lenders (bank, mezzanine financiers, risk financers and venture capital firms) and public funders are explored. The case also explores the impact that video-on-demand platforms, such as Netflix and Disney+, is having on the traditional models of filmmaking.

Complexity academic level

This teaching case is aimed at postgraduate business students such as Master’s degrees in Business Administration degrees, postgraduate diplomas, executive education or specialist Master’s degrees.

Supplementary materials

Teaching notes are available for educators only.

Subject code

CSS 3: Entrepreneurship.

Details

Emerald Emerging Markets Case Studies, vol. 10 no. 3
Type: Case Study
ISSN: 2045-0621

Keywords

Case study
Publication date: 20 January 2017

Craig Garthwaite, Meghan Busse, Jennifer Brown and Greg Merkley

Founded in 1971 and acquired by CEO Howard Schultz in 1987, Starbucks was an American success story. In forty years it grew from a single-location coffee roaster in Seattle…

Abstract

Founded in 1971 and acquired by CEO Howard Schultz in 1987, Starbucks was an American success story. In forty years it grew from a single-location coffee roaster in Seattle, Washington to a multibillion-dollar global enterprise that operated more than 17,000 retail coffee shops in fifty countries and sold coffee beans, instant coffee, tea, and ready-to-drink beverages in tens of thousands of grocery and mass merchandise stores. However, as Starbucks moved into new market contexts as part of its aggressive growth strategy, the assets and activities central to its competitive advantage in its retail coffee shops were altered or weakened, which made it more vulnerable to competitive threats from both higher and lower quality entrants. The company also had to make decisions on vertical integration related to its expansion into consumer packaged goods.

Understand how strategy needs to be adapted to new contexts. Understand how to manage tradeoffs involved in growth. Be able to identify possible threats to competitive advantage as a result of growth.

Details

Kellogg School of Management Cases, vol. no.
Type: Case Study
ISSN: 2474-6568
Published by: Kellogg School of Management

Keywords

Case study
Publication date: 20 January 2017

David P. Stowell and Nicholas Kawar

During December 2012, Jorge Paulo Lemann, a co-founder and partner at 3G, proposed to Warren Buffett that 3G and Berkshire Hathaway acquire H. J. Heinz Company. Lemann and…

Abstract

During December 2012, Jorge Paulo Lemann, a co-founder and partner at 3G, proposed to Warren Buffett that 3G and Berkshire Hathaway acquire H. J. Heinz Company. Lemann and Buffett, who had known each other for years, jointly decided that the Heinz turnaround had been successful and that there was significant potential for continued global growth. 3G informed Heinz CEO William Johnson that it and Berkshire Hathaway were interested in jointly acquiring his company. Johnson then presented the investors' offer of $70.00 per share of outstanding common stock to the Heinz board.

After much discussion, the Heinz board and its advisors informed 3G that without better financial terms they would not continue to discuss the possibility of an acquisition. Two days later, 3G and Berkshire Hathaway returned with a revised proposal of $72.50 per share, for a total transaction value of $28 billion (including Heinz's outstanding debt).

Following a forty-day “go-shop” period, Heinz, 3G, and Berkshire Hathaway agreed to sign the deal. But was this, in fact, a fair deal? And what might be the future consequences for shareholders, management, employees, and citizens of Pittsburgh, the location of the company's headquarters? Last, what was the role of activist investors in bringing Heinz to this deal stage?

After reading and analyzing the case, students will be able to:

  • Understand the influence of investment bankers on M&A transactions

  • Consider synergies that drive M&A

  • Consider the role of activist investors in corporate strategic decision-making

  • Understand the impact of M&A on key corporate stakeholders

  • Apply core valuation techniques to support M&A valuation

Understand the influence of investment bankers on M&A transactions

Consider synergies that drive M&A

Consider the role of activist investors in corporate strategic decision-making

Understand the impact of M&A on key corporate stakeholders

Apply core valuation techniques to support M&A valuation

Case study
Publication date: 23 June 2014

Kristin J. Behfar and Gerry Yemen

The Global Networks Company (GNC), headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts, made its global footprint in India in 1994 by establishing a presence in Bangalore. Although mainly a…

Abstract

The Global Networks Company (GNC), headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts, made its global footprint in India in 1994 by establishing a presence in Bangalore. Although mainly a sales support office, GNC grew name recognition from its contracts with India’s government to help build nationwide networks. Not quite 20 years later, GNC decided to further invest in India and tapped a manager from the Boston office, Jim Notrika, to establish and then manage GNC’s first global software center in Mumbai. Split between Mumbai and Boston, the project team successfully completed several minor projects, but only months into its first major project, the team was struggling to meet deadlines. Blame was being passed in both directions, and when three talented engineers in Mumbai quit, Notrika makes an emergency trip to Mumbai to better understand the problem.

This case describes three common cross-cultural communication obstacles in teams: a preference for direct versus indirect confrontation of problems; a clash of collectivist versus individualistic cultural values related to reporting bad news or giving negative feedback; and different expectations of team leaders based on power-distance values.

Details

Darden Business Publishing Cases, vol. no.
Type: Case Study
ISSN: 2474-7890
Published by: University of Virginia Darden School Foundation

Case study
Publication date: 1 December 2008

Calvin M. Bacon

On April 4, 2007, Don Imus, one of the company&s most popular talk show personalities made comments on the air regarding the Rutgers women&s basketball team. According to the…

Abstract

On April 4, 2007, Don Imus, one of the company&s most popular talk show personalities made comments on the air regarding the Rutgers women&s basketball team. According to the transcription from Media Matters for America, Imus said, “ That&s some nappy-headed hos there. I&m gonna tell you that now, man, that&s some … woo. And the girls from Tennessee, they all look cute, you know, so, like … kinda like … I don&t know.” At first, the comments did not seem out of the ordinary for one of radio&s “shock jocks.” However, as the public reaction grew, the situation changed considerably. Under pressure from the public, Moonves reluctantly suspended Imus. But it was too little too late. By the end of the day on April 11, analysts estimated that $2.5 million in advertising revenue was lost. On April 12, Moonves terminated Don Imus& contract.

After Moonves fired Imus, there was still a lot to consider. He really wanted a way for the company to meet the demands of the company&s stakeholders. In addition, he wanted to avoid any more distractions from the firm&s normal day-to-day operations.

Details

The CASE Journal, vol. 5 no. 1
Type: Case Study
ISSN: 1544-9106

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