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The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between off-balance-sheet (OBS) operating leases and long-term debt by analyzing firms’ debt risk profiles measured by the constraints on firms in the financial ratios in their debt covenants.

This study determines debt risk profiles using three measures: the ex ante probability of covenant violation (Demerjian and Owens, 2016), firms in violation of debt covenants and firms close to covenant violations.

High-risk firms according to all three measures, on average, have a significantly lower level of operating leases, indicating that these firms use OBS leases as a substitute for long-term debt. Interestingly, for firms operating in industries in which leases are widely available, firms with a high probability of covenant violation have a significantly higher level of operating leases, indicating that these firms use OBS leases as a complement to long-term debt. Further analysis indicates that lease financing is less costly than debt financing for these firms.

Overall, evidence of this study indicates that firms facing financial constraints may attempt to lease more of their assets, but the availability of leasing is constrained by their debt covenant obligations and the strength of the leasing market in its industry.

This study identifies states in which risky firms may treat leases as either complements or substitutes for long-term debt, implying that the leasing decision relates to the availability of an active leasing market for a firm’s assets and the firm’s financial constraints. The findings of this study support recent research showing that debt and leases are complementary in the presence of counterparty risk providing insight into the paradoxical relationship identified in prior research between leases and long-term debt.

This study examines how creditor interventions after debt covenant violations affect corporate tax avoidance. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that creditor interventions increase borrowers' tax avoidance. This effect is concentrated among firms with weaker shareholder governance before creditor interventions and among those with less bargaining power during subsequent debt renegotiations. Our results indicate that creditors play an active role in shaping corporate tax policy outside of bankruptcy.

We investigate the interaction of debt covenants and tax accounting on the adoption of Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48). We examine how firms respond to the potential tightening of covenant slack upon FIN 48 adoption and whether these actions are penalized by creditors and anticipated by equity markets. We find that upon FIN 48 adoption, the majority of sample corporate borrowers increase their tax reserves and reduce equity. Firms close to debt covenant violation were even more likely to increase tax reserves upon FIN 48 adoption; however, the size of the adjustment was relatively smaller, suggesting that the FIN 48 standards limited, but did not eliminate, firms use of discretion in reporting uncertain tax positions to avoid costly covenant violations. For firms near net worth debt covenant violation, the act of decreasing equity upon FIN 48 adoption imposes real economic costs, as the average cost of debt increased by 43 basis points. Finally, we extend prior research on the market response to FIN 48 by showing how the market response to FIN 48 adoption is a function of debt covenant slack and tax aggressiveness. Specifically, the cumulative abnormal return at the FIN 48 exposure draft release date is negative only for tax aggressive firms that are close to debt covenant violation.

The study aims to investigates which form of classification shifting is preferred by firms to avoid the violation of debt covenants and whether the higher-audit quality constraints the shifting practices of firms incentivized to avoid covenant violations or not.

A sample of 1,644 Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE)-listed firms during the period 2009–2021 has been used in this study and tested through panel data regression models. Two forms of classification shifting, namely expense shifting and revenue shifting have been taken into account. The findings are validated through the propensity-score matching technique.

The findings deduced from the empirical evidence demonstrate that firms prefer revenue shifting over expense shifting to avoid covenant violations, consistent with the notion of the ease-need-advantage-based shifting framework, where firms are found to prefer a shifting tool with greater relative advantage. Further, the author finds that superior audit quality has a constraining effect on expense shifting, but not on revenue shifting, indicating the partial effectiveness of high-quality auditors in curbing the corporate misfeasance of classification shifting. These results are robust to the problem of endogeneity and self-selection bias.

The paper provides new evidence on debt market incentives behind classification shifting, where firms are found to substitute classification shifting forms to avoid covenant violations. Further, the study is among pioneering attempts to investigate the impact of audit quality on revenue shifting and document the non-constraining effect.

Loan officer decisions are of particular importance to entrepreneurial firms which rely heavily on debt financing as a primary source of capital. The authors investigate whether social purpose in these firms impact loan officer response to the violation of a debt covenant and whether there is a differential response in decision making between loan officers that work at local banks and those that work at national banks.

In total 332 loan officers from cities in the South and Midwest United States participated in a quasi-experiment comparing entrepreneurial firms that violated their debt covenants. The loan officers were asked to evaluate loan materials and decide whether they would enforce loan covenant provisions of renegotiated interest rate and by what magnitude. In the treatment group, the loan officer evaluated loan materials of an entrepreneurial firm that included information related to the firms social purpose within their community. In the control group, the evaluation materials did not include this information.

Consistent with social capital theory, the results suggest that loan officers view community involvement as beneficial to entrepreneurial firm value. Loan officers were less likely to increase interest rates among firms that demonstrated social purpose. Loan officers that decided to increase interest rates punished socially purposeful firms less severely than non-socially purposeful firms. Additionally, loan officers at community banks were less likely to increase interest rates than those at national banks.

While the prior literature examines loan covenant violations, the authors focus on the impact of loan officer decision making in entrepreneurial firms specifically around covenant enforcement. Loan officer decisions have important implications for debt financing but are typically not observable to researchers. Prior work examining the relationship between social purpose and debt financing focuses on large public firms. This study recognizes that social purpose in entrepreneurial firms is less formalized and explicit and thus should be studied separately from large firms.

To report inflated operating performance indicators, such as operating revenue and operating profit, managers vertically reposition revenue and expense items inside the income statement. This study aims to investigate the relationship between credit market incentives and these practices.

This study examined a sample of 1,592 Bombay Stock Exchange-listed companies from 2009 to 2021 and tested them using panel data regression models. The propensity score matching method and different measurements of classification shifting practices are used to validate the results.

The conclusions drawn from the empirical data show that firms prefer revenue shifting over expense shifting to prevent debt covenant violations. It shows that the firm’s classification-shifting practices are driven by credit market incentives. This finding is consistent with the notion of positive accounting theory that firms engage in classification shifting (earnings management) to avoid violation of debt covenants. Further, the firm’s preference for revenue shifting is in line with the ease-need-advantage-based shifting framework where firms choose the shifting tool based on costs and constraints associated with each tool.

The finding suggests that if managers heavily rely on revenue shifting to avoid debt covenant violations, the firm may end up breaking these covenants based on its actual operating performance. Managers may use aggressive accounting techniques to prevent covenant violations, which can be a warning indicator of financial difficulties or operational problems. It highlights the necessity for creditors and investors to carefully evaluate a company’s financial stability outside of the financial statements that are publicly disclosed. Authorities should create separate forensic accounting standards for auditors to check revenue items and stop the corporate misfeasance of revenue shifting.

The study is among the earlier attempts to provide empirical evidence on credit market incentives behind classification shifting practices. It is the first study that documents the substitution relationship between classification shifting forms for avoiding violation of debt covenants.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of bank interventions on bond performance in relation to loan covenant violations.

This paper tests the following questions: do bondholders receive benefits from bank interventions? Is bond performance related to the probability of bank interventions? Is the turnover of a chief executive officer (CEO) associated with bank interventions and bond performance? Abnormal bond returns, the difference between bond returns and matched bond index returns are used to measure bond performance. An estimated outstanding loan balance is used to measure the probability of bank interventions. CEO turnover is identified from proxy statements and categorized into forced and voluntary CEO turnovers. Event studies and regression analysis were used to answer the above research questions.

This paper finds that both short-term and long-term bond returns increase after covenant violations, bond performance is positively related to the probability of bank interventions, forced CEO turnovers are positively associated with the probability of bank interventions and firms with forced CEO turnovers tend to have superior bond performance.

This paper is the first to explore the relation between bank interventions and bond performance.

Prior research provides evidence that firms make accounting choices to avoid violation of debt covenant provisions and the resulting costs of technical default. We extend this research by asking why some firms refrain from making accounting policy changes when faced with costs of technical default. We considered two possible explanations. First, we hypothesise that these defaulting firms may lack the flexibility to make accounting changes. Second, we hypothesise that these defaulting firms may lack incentive to change accounting methods. Results confirm prior research and indicate that defaulting firms make more accounting changes than non‐defaulting firms. The decision by defaulting firms to change or not change accounting methods during the three years ending in the year of a technical default of debt covenants can be explained in part by the ability of the firm and by the incentives of the firm to make a change.

This study aims to examine the economic consequences of, and managerial behaviour in response to, the introduction of IFRS 16 Leases. It extends the debt covenant hypothesis to explain why firms reduce the use of operating leases with the introduction.

This study develops a model, based on operating leases as an alternative financing source and the determinants of debt policy, to estimate the effects of gearing on operating lease intensity. High gearing is a proxy to probably closer to the violation of, or expected to violate, the gearing restriction in debt covenants given the retrospective capitalisation of operating leases, when IFRS 16 takes effect.

This study finds that operating lease intensity fell between 2011 (immediately after the first exposure draft leading to IFRS 16) and 2018 (immediately prior to the effective date of IFRS 16). It also finds that gearing affects changes in operating lease intensity over 2011 and 2018, consistent with the debt covenant hypothesis.

The introduction of IFRS 16 is a natural experiment with unique characteristics (the active lobbying behaviour, ex ante evidence on adverse economic consequences, a prolonged standard-setting period, etc.) valuable for accounting research.

A showcase about the relevance of financial reporting for contracting interests of firms and managers and a good reference for accounting standard setters in considering and managing the economic consequences of proposed accounting standards.

This study adds to the limited research on the consequences of accounting standards and documents the ex-post impact on firm leverage ratios and the behavioural aspects of reporting entities.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the extent to which firms manage earnings prior to private debt issuance.

This is an empirical archival research paper using financial statement data and data related to private debt issuance.

The results indicate that, on average, firms engage in income-increasing earnings management in the period prior to a new private debt issuance. In addition, it was found that this income-increasing earnings management is limited to firms which have engaged in income-increasing earnings management to a greater extent in prior years.

This paper provides insight into how managers’ balance competing incentives to use income-increasing earnings management to obtain more favorable lending terms, and to use income-decreasing earnings management to reduce the risk of a future debt covenant violation. The results indicate that firms’ incentive to use income-increasing earnings management dominates. However, reputational concerns significantly constrain firms’ earnings management decisions prior to private debt issuance.

The paper fills a notable void in the literature by investigating firms’ earnings management activity prior to private lending agreements, and thereby provides new insights into both the relation between private debt and accounting quality, and the literature investigating the use of earnings management to avoid debt covenant violations.