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Historians have long understood that transforming people into property was the defining characteristic of Atlantic World slavery. This chapter examines litigation in British colonial Vice Admiralty Courts in order to show how English legal categories and procedures facilitated this process of dehumanization. In colonies where people were classified as chattel property, litigants transformed local Vice Admiralty Courts into slave courts by analogizing human beings to ships and cargo. Doing so made sound economic sense from their perspective; it gave colonists instant access to an early modern English legal system that was centered on procedures and categories. But for people of African descent, it had decidedly negative consequences. Indeed, when colonists treated slaves as property, they helped to create a world in which Africans were not just like things, they were things. Through the very act of categorization, they rendered factual what had been a mere supposition: that Africans were less than human.

The purpose of this paper is to theorize the social role of management systems and their political connections using ANTi-History. In so doing, it engages with academic conversations around the writing of business history. The paper focuses on subjective experience in the context of colonial privateers and the vice-admiralty court in the Napoleonic Wars era.

ANTi-History is proposed as a theoretical lens to examine the entrepreneurial work of privateers. ANTi-History destabilizes the idea of history as a dominant account of the past and is interested in controversies as to how history is produced. This paper also brings-in Bourdieu’s notion of officialization because historical knowledge is situated in official practices that conceal translations and political strategies that enable actor-networks to act as one.

The controls of the vice-admiralty court not only perpetuated the inherited British class system, but also created versions of reality that came to be accepted as recorded history. This shows that the rules and regulations of the court were not neutral accounting activities. The systems constituted the identity of actors and produced privateer history as a modernist knowledge of the past and officialized by western, white, male, elites.

The “historic turn” in management and organization studies has not been fully realized more than a decade after its introduction. This paper engages with the historic turn by providing a specific exemplar of history as applied to officialized accounts of colonial privateers. Using ANTi-History as a methodological approach also makes a contribution by promoting it beyond a prolonged descriptive phase.

In the first decades of the nineteenth century to the first decade of the twentieth century, the US Federal and Supreme Courts heard several cases on the legal status of ships. During this period, Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice Joseph Story determined that a ship was a legal person that was capable to contract and could be punished for wrongdoing. Over the nineteenth century, Marshall and Story also heard appeals on the illegal slave trade and on the status of fugitive slaves crossing state lines, cases that raised questions as to whether enslaved peoples were persons or property. Although Marshall and Story did not discuss the ship and the slave together, in this chapter, the author asks what might be gained in doing so. Specifically, what might a reading of the ship and the slave as juridical figures reveal about the history of legal personhood? The genealogy of positive and negative legal personhood that the author begins to trace here draws inspiration and guidance from scholars writing critically of slavery. In different ways, this literature emphasises the significance of maritime worlds to conceptions of racial terror, freedom, and fugitivity. Building on these insights, the author reads the ship and the slave as central characters in the history of legal personhood, a reading that highlights the interconnections between maritime law and the laws of slavery and foregrounds the changing intensities of Anglo imperial power and racial and colonial violence in shaping the legal person.

THE condition of the Scottish Bar would not matter a tinker's curse to anyone but the unfortunates who are compelled, or the misguided who are induced, to litigate, if it were not for the fact that a great deal in Scotland derives in tone and temper from the Parliament House in Edinburgh. What this tone and temper may be becomes an affair of some national significance since we are obliged to seek the explanation of various Scottish phenomena among the wigs and gowns that cluster behind St. Giles, in a degree which would be quite unjustified in the case of the Inns of Court and the Temple.

Using Bulgarian legislation on civil confiscation and analysing the nature of the substantive authority to confiscate unexplained wealth, as well as evaluating research in common and continental law, this paper aims to seek historic parallels for non-punitive civil confiscation of unexplained wealth.

The design of this paper is centred on determining whether the substantive authority of the state to confiscate unexplained wealth has a Roman law equivalent. Conducting a review of key elements of the substantive authority for the action in Bulgaria, the research examines the validity of the hypothesis that the right to confiscate has a Roman law equivalent.

The research supports the position that the substantive authority to seek civil confiscation relief in Bulgaria has its origin in the overarching principle of unjustified enrichment in Roman law. Considering needed adjustments related to the developed demarcation between public and private law in contemporary law, the action to confiscate unexplained wealth in civil proceedings in the case study jurisdiction has its equivalent in the Roman condictio furtiva.

This paper sheds light on the theoretical basis for civil asset confiscation of unexplained wealth in one continental law jurisdiction, thus contributing to the on-going debate on the compatibility of civil confiscation of unexplained wealth with the continental law tradition.