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This paper aims to assess all compulsory land acquisition court decisions in Australia over 1985‐2009 to provide a risk assessment and compensation analysis involved in proceeding to court for compulsory land acquisition cases.

Using the AustLII legal database, every publicly available compulsory land acquisition court case decision in Australia over 1985‐2009 is assessed. These 58 court cases are assessed for claim, offer and judgment value.

A total of 91.4 percent of compulsory land acquisition court cases over 1985‐2009 were found to be successful in achieving a judgment value of at least that of the offer. The median judgment value for successful cases was 60 percent higher than the offer value, while for unsuccessful cases it was 68 percent lower than the offer value. Successful smaller judgments (<$2 million) generated more upside compensation (median of 66 percent) than larger judgments (>$2 million) (median 41 percent upside compensation). Appealed cases were found to be only 28.6 percent successful, with only a maximum of 5.6 percent additional compensation achieved.

This paper provides a rigorous empirical risk assessment and compensation analysis for compulsory land acquisition court cases in Australia over the last 25 years. This provides an effective tool for dispossessed property owners, statutory acquirers and their professional legal and valuation advisors for more informed compulsory land acquisition court case decision making.

Using all compulsory land acquisition court decisions in Australia over the last 25 years, this paper is the first attempt internationally to rigorously and empirically conduct a risk assessment and compensation analysis involved with proceeding to court for compulsory land acquisition cases. Given the significance of the compulsory land acquisition process, this empirically validated research enables a more informed and critical understanding of the risk factors and compensation outcomes attached to the compulsory land acquisition court case judgment process.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

The object of this research is the reconstruction of the existing legal response by European Union states to the phenomenon of immigration. It seeks to analyse the process of conferral of protection.

One main dimension is selected and discussed: the case law of the national courts. The study focuses on the legal status of immigrants resulting from the intervention of these national courts.

The research shows that although the courts have conferred an increasing protection on immigrants, this has not challenged the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the states to decide, according to their discretionary prerogatives, which immigrants are allowed to enter and stay in their territories. Notwithstanding the differences in the general constitutional and legal structures, the research also shows that the courts of the three countries considered – France, Germany and Spain – have progressively moved towards converging solutions in protecting immigrants.

The research contributes to a better understanding of the different legal orders analysed.

Examines the applicability of EC rules on the free movement of goods to foodstuffs containing additives. Shows that the European Court of Justice has established an approach to disputes concerning additives which balances the interests of producers and consumers while giving manufacturers and traders a fair hearing.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).

June 13,1972 Industrial Relations — Unregistered trade union — Unpaid shop stewards elected by fellow members with union authority to negotiate at local level with dock employers — Shop stewards initiating campaign of blacking container lorries after blacking by unregistered union knowingly inducing breaches of contract made “unfair industrial practice” by statute — Industrial Court orders to union to stop specified blacking — Union advice to shop stewards to obey court orders rejected — Court finding union in contempt and liable to fines and to compensate complainants for unfair industrial practices — Shop stewards agents, not servants of union — Whether evidence of implied authority from union to agents to black — Union not responsible for conduct of shop stewards acting outside scope of express or implied authority — Industrial Relations Act, 1971 (c.72) ss. 96(1), 101,167(1) (9).

The purpose of this paper is to report and comment on Northern Rock shareholders' challenge to basis of compensation in nationalisation considered in the High Court and Court of Appeal.

The paper outlines the facts surrounding the case and comments on the decisions.

The High Court, in a carefully reasoned judgement which reviewed relevant UK and European Court of Human Rights case law, rejected all the claimants' arguments for judicial review and the claimants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal judgment provide a rare glimpse of the legal process examining the “lender of last resort” function of a central bank – a key technique of macro‐economic policy, the very delicacy and subtlety of which appear to defy ready legal definition.

The globalization of crime has made it possible for international money launderers, kleptocrats and fraudsters to commit crimes in one jurisdiction while remaining safe in another and hiding their assets in a third. At the same time, law enforcement officials remain constrained by the rules of national sovereignty that inhibit their ability to recover assets located beyond the territorial jurisdiction of their courts. Three recent cases, however, illustrate that governments have begun to find ways to hurdle the walls that have traditionally made the recovery of assets in other countries so difficult. This paper aims to sketch the facts of those cases, the legal issues presented and the ways in which the obstacles presented by the walls of sovereignty were overcome.

This paper is the study of three recent cases.

The cases illustrate how obstacles presented by national sovereignty have been overcome.

The cases will serve as a guide to future international cooperation.

Examines the pioneering work of the European Commission, with the support of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of First Instance (ECFI), to apply the merger control of regulation (MCR) to situations of collective as well as to single dominance. Reveals that the Commission first applied the notion of collective dominance in the Nestlé Perrier merger in 1992 but that the legality of this practice was questionable, given that the express wording of the MCR does not mention the notion. The legal challenge arose from the takeover of Mitteldeutsche Kali AG by Kali und Salz with the landmark judgment favouring the stance of the Commission – the MCR does encompass situations of collective dominance. Examines why the court reached this decision, particularly given that the Advocate General’s opinion was exactly the opposite.