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Goes back to thinking on the price theory of oligopoly in 1960. In particular, is concerned with Stackelberg’s oligopoly theory. Presents a careful description of the development of Stackelberg’s analysis. Takes into account his mathematical appendix. Confronts the theory with game theory and concludes that in a dynamic game a Nash‐Cournot equilibrium will emerge.

This paper aims to embark a mathematical model based on investigation and comparison of airport pricing policies under various types of competition, considering both per-passenger and per-flight charges at congested airports.

In this model, four-game theoretic strategies are assessed and closed-form formulas have been proved for each of the mentioned strategies. Numerical examples and graphical representations of the optimal solutions are provided to illustrate the models.

The rectitude of the presented formulas is evaluated with sensitivity analysis and numerical examples have been put forward. Finally, managerial implications are suggested by means of the proposed analysis.

The represented model is inherently limited to investigate all the available and influential factors in the field of congestion pricing. With this regard, several studies can be implemented as the future research of this study. The applications of other game theoretic approaches such as Cartel games and its combination with the four mentioned games seem to be worthwhile. Moreover, it is recommended to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed model and formulations with a large-scale database.

The authors formulate a novel strategy that put forwards a four-game theoretic strategy, which helps managers to select the best suitable ones for their specific airline and/or air traveling companies. The authors find that by means of the proposed model, the application of Stackelberg–Bertrand behavior in the field of airport congestion pricing will rebound to a more profitable strategy in contrast with the other three represented methods.

Price‐taking has long been mistakenly regarded as an inferior firm behavior in an imperfectly competitive market. This scenario is challenged when a “Naiver’s Paradox” is shown to exist in an oligopolic market where all firms produce the same product with the same technology (cost structure). It is shown that a firm behaving as a naive price‐taker with ignorance of its output impact on the market will perform no worse or even better than its rivals in terms of profits achieved, where the latter are assumed to take “Cournot”, “relative profit” or other more advanced strategies. More significantly, when the number of firms in the market is large, a price‐taker may achieve higher profit not only in a relative sense, but also in an absolute sense. Such paradoxical outcome is generic, for it results from neither ad hoc assumptions on market structure nor on information sets, but from the conventionally granted “convexity” assumption on cost functions. An analogous phenomenon is observed for oligopsony market.

The fragmentation can either lead to an all-out civil war as in Sri Lanka or a frozen conflict as in Georgia. One of the main characteristics of fragmentation is the control of group members by their respective leaders. The chapter applies standard models of non-cooperative game theory to explain the endogenous fragmentation, which seeks to model the equilibrium formation of rival groups. Citizens become members of these rival groups and some sort of clientelism develops in which political leaders control their respective fragments of citizens. Once the divisions are created, the inter-group rivalry can trigger violent conflicts that may seriously damage the social fabric of a nation and threaten the prospect of peace for the people for a very long time. In other words, our main goal in this chapter is to understand the formation of the patron–client relationship or what is called clientelisation.

Nowadays, uncertainty in market demand poses considerable risk to the retailers that supply the market. On the other hand, the risk-averse behaviors of retailers toward risk may have evolved over time. Considering a supply chain including a manufacturer and a population of retailers, the authors intend to investigate how the population of retailers tends to evolve toward risk-averse behavior. Moreover, this study aims to evaluate the effects of wholesale-retail price of manufacturer on evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the retailers.

Due to market uncertainty, a supply chain with a population of risk-averse and risk-neutral retailers was investigated. The wholesale pricing strategy is determined by a manufacturer acting as a leader, while retailers who make order quantity decisions act as followers. An integrated Cournot duopoly equilibrium and evolutionary game theory (EGT) approach has been used to model this situation.

A numerical real-world case study using Iran Khodro Company is analyzed by applying the proposed EGT approach. The study provides managerial insights to the manufacturer as well as retailers in developing their strategies. Results showed that risk behavior of retailers significantly affects optimal wholesale/retail price, profits and ESS. In the long term, the retailers tend to have a risk-neutral behavior to gain more profit. In the short term, if a retailer choses risk-averse strategy, in the long term, it will change its strategy to obtain more profit and remain in the competitive market.

The contributions in this research are fourfold. First, ESS concept to investigate the risk-averse or risk-neutral attitudes of the retailers was used. Second, the uncertain risk behavior of the competing retailers was considered. Third, the effect of varying wholesale pricing was investigated. Fourth, the equilibrium wholesale and retail prices have been obtained by considering uncertainty demand and risk.

The purpose of this paper is to describe how the performance of a system is determined.

Systems with the same structure or function often have different performances. What makes the difference? Within a system, the various actors make their decisions by their own and their actions depend on the mechanism of the system. The actors' strategy selection under different mechanisms and the mechanism design are precisely in the range of Game Theory. This paper compares two different pricing mechanisms, the Stackelberg Game and Cournot Game, in a linear supply chain. And the obtained result of the different behavior (Pm*, Pr*) and different performance (Um*, Ur*) of the supply chain obviously approves our proposition that the operational mechanism is of great importance to the performance of the system, the same as structure.

It is the structure of the system and operational mechanism which determines the performance of the system.

The paper's limitations lie in the fact that it is not yet based on experimental evidence from real‐world systems.

Game Theory is one of the most effective methods to study the systematic mechanism, especially the mechanism designs, because it reveals the inherent nature of the systematic mechanism.

This paper points out that the mechanism which restricts each behavioral subject determines the performance of these systems. It puts forward a new region for the research of general system theory.

This paper develops and proposes a game theory model that illustrates the effect of privatization on firm competitiveness using cases from the automotive industry. We first provide the mathematical derivation of the model for a competitive industry then address the special case of a duopoly. We chose the automotive industry as it is a relevant illustration of global competitive pressures pushing firms to develop strategic alliances or consolidate. The model shows that privatization has (1) a positive effect on firm performance given that managerial incentives are well defined, and (2) facilitates the firmʼs entry into strategic alliances. We then turn to discuss Renaultʼs empirically observed success factors in the European - and gradually global - markets over the last three decades despite the economic cycles.

It is well known that a player in a non-cooperative game can benefit by publicly restricting his possible moves before play begins. We show that, more generally, a player may benefit by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that is contingent on the game’s outcome. We explore what happens when external parties – who we call “game miners” – discover this fact and seek to profit from it by entering an outcome-contingent contract with the players. We analyze various structured bargaining games among such miner(s) and players that determine such an outcome-contingent contract before the start of the original game. These bargaining games include playing the players against one another as in the original game, as well as allowing the players to pay the miner(s) for exclusivity and first-mover advantage. We establish restrictions on the strategic settings in which a game miner can profit and bounds on the game miner’s profit. We also find that game miners can lead to both efficient and inefficient equilibria.

The research in competitive facility location (CFL) is quite dynamic, both from a problem formulation and an algorithmic point of view. Research direction has changed immensely over the years to address various competitive challenges. This study aims to explore CFL literature to highlight these research trends, important issues and future research opportunities.

This study utilises the Scopus database to search for related CFL models and adopts a five-step systematic approach for the review process. The five steps involve (1) Article Identification and keyword selection, (2) Selection criteria, (3) Literature review, (4) Literature analysis and (5) Research studies.

The paper presents a comprehensive review of CFL modelling efforts from 1981 to 2021 to provide a depth study of the research evolution in this area. The published articles are classified based on multiple characteristics, including the type of problem, type of competition, game-theoretical approaches, customer behaviour, decision space, type of demand, number of facilities, capacity and budget limitations. The review also highlights the popular problem areas and dedicated research in the respective domain. In addition, a second classification is also provided based on solution methods adopted to solve various CFL models and real-world case studies.

The paper covers 40 years of CFL literature from the perspective of the problem area, CFL characteristics and the solution approach. Additionally, it introduces characteristics such as capacity limit and budget constraint for the first time for classification purposes.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.