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In this chapter, we provide a brief historical framework of the events and policy changes that impacted the prosecution of terrorism over the past 50 years with emphasis placed on the changes that resulted from the 9/11 attacks.

We provide a review of relevant literature and complete the chapter by providing new data (2015) on case outcomes derived from the American Terrorism Study, a database housed in the Terrorism Research Center in Fulbright College, at the University of Arkansas.

Investigative and prosecutorial authority in U.S. terrorism cases has experienced ebbs and flows that correspond with terrorism attacks as well as missteps by the FBI, and each has impacted the success of prosecution efforts. Despite dramatic changes, the number of cases prosecuted after 9/11 is unprecedented, and conviction rates continue to climb.

This chapter provides the reader with a synopsis of the policy changes that have occurred in federal terrorism investigations and trials from the late 1960s upto the present. Based on that context, we provide an explanation of how those policy changes have impacted terrorism prosecutions.

The attacks of September 11th transformed homeland security into a central policy task for governments in the U.S., culminating in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Planning and preparation for counter terrorism were no longer secondary priorities. This article seeks to examine some of the salient organizational and management issues that could potentially facilitate or impair DHS’s successful integration of its varied 22 agencies, and its subsequent execution of its critical tasks associated with countering terrorism and bioterrorism. Characterizing this change as a type of punctuated equilibrium, this article closes by suggesting that a differentiated network structure offers a potentially powerful mechanism by which the DHS could proactively and effectively address many of these leadership, management and organizational challenges.

Two fundamental reasons that account for the domestic bias of consumption are distance and borders. Distance proxies for unobservable trading costs, which include, among other things, transport and administrative costs. Distance is a powerful deterrent to international trade. This fact is illustrated by considering the situation of Bahrain and Qatar, Belgium and India, and Indonesia and Guyana, which are, respectively, the closest (55.5mi), the median (4,414.7mi), and the farthest (12,351.1mi) country pairs in a large sample of bilateral trade flows (see Chapter 2). For Bahrain and Qatar, distance is estimated to reduce the estimate of bilateral trade flows by 39%; for Belgium and India, the reduction is 58%; for Indonesia and Guyana, the reduction is 121% (it exceeds the value of bilateral transactions). The success of the gravity model in explaining bilateral trade flows is due, to no small measure, to distance. For example, the standard trade model of complete specialization, without trading costs, makes two strong predictions. The first is that a country will import goods from all other countries in the world and the second that bilateral trade flows are proportional to the income of the two countries. Both predictions are way off the mark. Countries import from a small fraction of the potential pool of exporters and incomes alone over-predict actual trade flows by a large margin.

This paper shows that terrorism reduces bilateral trade flows, in real terms, by raising trading costs and hardening borders. Countries sharing a common land border and suffering from terrorism trade much less than neighboring or distant countries that are free of terrorism. The impact of terrorism on bilateral trade declines as distance between trading partners increases. This result suggests that terrorism redirects some trade from close to more distant countries. Our findings are robust in the presence of a variety of other calamities, such as natural disasters or financial crises.

Scholars often suggest that violent extremism or terrorism – “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (LaFree, G., & Dugan, L. (2007). Introducing the Global Terrorism Database. Terrorism and Political Violence, 19, 181–204, 184) – is a battle for legitimacy. However, the ambiguous definition of legitimacy often makes its application to counterterrorism measures difficult at best. The purpose of this chapter is to define legitimacy to connect policies designed to counter violent extremism.

The main impediment in the study of the influence of legitimacy on terrorism is the debate over the meaning and measurement of legitimacy. This debate is reviewed, and a recent resolution is presented, grouping the many conceptualizations of legitimacy into three broad categories and identifying empirical indicators for each. These categories are then used to distinguish counterterrorism policies that can be used to boost legitimacy.

This chapter organizes counterterrorism policies into a recently developed framework as a tool for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers.

Purpose: The majority of academic and policy studies on counterterrorism rely on what is termed “the terror stock model.” According to this model, terrorist activity can be viewed as a product of a stock of terror: a combination of human, physical, and monetary resources needed to launch terrorist attacks. Consequently, countering terrorism is a matter of reducing the capacity of terrorist organizations to operate via direct assaults on terrorists themselves. Defining terrorism as a form of collective action, this article examines how various Israeli initiatives influence Palestinian acts of terrorism.

Method: This paper investigates how the rate of suicide terror attempts is affected by violent, non-violent, and socioeconomic forms of initiatives by the Israeli government between 2000 and 2006 using a series of event-history analyses. While directly addressing the efficacy of what the Israeli government terms as its methods of counterterrorism – violent repression of insurgents and terror suspects – it also explores the applicability of various social movement theories to exact a more accurate awareness of what activities actually incite or inhibit terrorism.

Findings: The results indicate that while certain forms of repression that the Israeli government identifies as counter-terrorist measures (such as killing of insurgents and detentions) have the intended outcome – a lower rate of suicide bombings – other forms and measures of repression have mixed effects. The results suggest that suicide bombings can be explained at least partly by a mixture of increased hostility, limited capacity to mobilize, and socioeconomic distress.

This chapter begins with a comprehensive review of the study on terrorism that has emerged in the last two decades and the consequences of terrorism in terms of economic theory. It aims to highlight the potential influence of terrorism on the distribution of military expenditure among different countries across the world. Moreover, the chapter seeks to shed light on the evolution of economic theories and models for explaining terrorism in a strategic environment to indicate the research gap in this field and presents an attempt to measure the impact of terrorism on the economic growth by considering the connection between the intensity of military expenditure made by a country and the security it faces as impinges by terrorist activities.

The threat of terrorism is not just limited to a particular nation, rather it has affected the economies of several developed and developing nations. In this study, we have tried to analyze how terrorism has been sought to be tackled and how it can be tackled. In this context, we present the extent to which the method adopted by the USA after the 9/11 attacks, which is popularly called the Global War on Terror (GWOT), has been successful in eliminating terrorism from the world. Only qualitative methodology has been used in this chapter, and most of it has been derived from secondary sources. Through this study, we seek to show that the successes of GWOT have been limited in nature, in spite of tall claims. In fact, what the US has achieved by GWOT in the name of success is the killing of the leaders of some terrorist organizations, successful disruption of their sanctuaries, passing several legislations in order to launch counterterrorism operations, and the freezing the finances of these terrorist organizations by banning some of their charity-based organizations. This chapter lists the gains obtained as a result of GWOT and also highlights what may be called the failures of this global endeavor. Such a proposition aims at showing why GWOT is not only but possibly the best solution to eradicate terrorism. The unexpected outcomes, however, have been many, not only for terrorism but also for international politics, thereby impacting international organizations and also the third-world nations.